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This dissertation investigates whether agency costs in the context of Jensen‟s free 
cash flow theory will generate demand for conservative financial reporting from 
shareholders. Jensen‟s free cash flow theory states that consumption of private benefits 
by managers, and in turn, the agency conflict between stockholders and management, is 
expected to be larger in firms that are operating in industries with limited growth 
opportunities and are generating large amounts of free cash. These are referred to as “J-
type” firms. Previous studies document that when companies are prone to overinvestment, 
the agency costs of free cash flow cause investors to discount the value of cash, thus 
lowering firm value. However, appropriate monitoring mechanisms can effectively 
mitigate the loss of firm value. Prior studies suggest strong corporate governance 
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007; Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007), and enhanced disclosures such as periodic performance reports 
(Kanodia and Lee, 1998) or geographic earnings disclosures (Hope and Thomas, 2008) as 
potential mechanisms that restrict the available resources for overinvestment or align the 
interests between shareholders and managers.    
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In this dissertation, I focus on one aspect of firms‟ reporting practices, namely 
conservative reporting, as an alternative monitoring device over opportunistic managerial 
behavior in the presence of the agency problem of free cash flow. Accounting 
conservatism is characterized as the use of stricter standards for recognizing bad news as 
losses than for recognizing good news as gains. Recent conservatism literature 
distinguishes conditional conservatism from unconditional conservatism. Conditional 
conservatism involves the more timely recognition of bad news than good news, while 
unconditional conservatism involves the predetermined understatement of the book value 
of net assets that often occurs with the immediate expensing of the costs of most 
intangibles (Ryan, 2006). The widely held view indicates only conditional conservatism 
facilitates contracting efficiency, not unconditional conservatism (e.g., Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2006). 
1
 Throughout this dissertation, I focus on conditional conservatism, 
which I simply refer to as “conservatism” in this dissertation. 
Firms with conservative reporting recognize economic losses from sluggish 
projects quickly, which serves as a timely signal for shareholders to examine the reasons 
for losses. Accordingly, the need for conservative reporting is expected to be intensified 
in firms prone to overinvestment. Although researchers primarily investigate corporate 
governance as a monitoring mechanism that controls management‟ actions and moderate 
the potential manager-shareholder conflict, governance structures are not designed ex-
ante optimally to mitigate agency problems, and are not very responsive to demands 
arising from stakeholders (Richardson, 2006). Unlike corporate governance that changes 
slowly over time, the literature provides evidence that conservatism has rapidly evolved 
                                                          
1
 More detailed explanation of the distinction between conditional and unconditional conservatism is 
summarized in the prior literature section.  
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in response to the needs of information users, and reflects managers' assessments of the 
impact of periodic economic events in preparing financial statements (Watts, 2003a; 
Holthausen and Watts, 2001; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; LaFond and Watts, 2008; 
Beatty, Weber, and Yu, 2008).  In other words, conservatism is a versatile and demand-
responding corporate reporting practice. Under more conservative financial reporting, 
shareholders might be assured that the company‟s liquidity is well under control and that 
managers are less likely to attempt to expropriate their wealth.  
The extant literature recognizes several benefits associated with conservative 
reporting. For example, conservative reporting reduces adverse moral hazard problems in 
the presence of information asymmetry and agency costs associated with low managerial 
ownership (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007), and provides 
early warning signals of weak corporate governance (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). 
Among various benefits associated with conservative reporting, the most relevant to this 
study is the role of conservative reporting in deterring managers with short-term horizons 
from investing in negative NPV projects. This is because under conservative reporting, 
the recognition of losses from such investments is less likely to be deferred into the future, 
and ex-ante knowledge that future losses in cash flows will be recognized in income in a 
timely manner provides disincentives for self-serving managers who might otherwise 
undertake negative NPV projects (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006). An emerging literature 
documents that conservative reporting is associated with more efficient acquisitions and 
divestitures, and this benefit is more pronounced among firms bearing high agency costs 
(Francis and Martin, 2010; Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma, and Penalva, 2010, Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2010). By improving ex-ante efficient investment decisions and facilitating 
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ex-post monitoring of managers‟ investment decisions, conservatism is expected to help 
safeguard the company‟s resources, and in turn help protect the value of the firm and the 
wealth of shareholders in the presence of agency costs of free cash flow. Thus, 
shareholders of J-type firms would demand higher conservatism than shareholders of non 
J-type firms as a protection from possible managerial expropriation. Because I am 
interested in contracting issues for which conditional conservatism is more relevant than 
unconditional conservatism, my goal in this dissertation is to assess the relation between 
agency costs of free cash flow and conditional conservatism, not overall conservatism. 
Consistent with this prediction, my findings suggest that firms bearing greater agency 
costs of free cash flow incorporate losses in a more timely manner relative to gains. In 
other words, J-type firms exercise more conservatism in reporting in response to 
shareholder concerns over potential agency problems. 
I further test whether the observed relations between J-type firms and earnings 
timeliness measures are affected by various other channels which could influence the 
agency costs of free cash flow. For example, when firms with substantial free cash flow 
issue debt, increase dividends or repurchase stock, free cash flow available for 
overinvestment is lower, reducing the agency problems associated with free cash flow. 
Under this circumstance, shareholders are less likely to demand conservative reporting as 
an additional control mechanism. Conversely, if firms choose to stockpile free cash flow 
for an extended period of time, the agency costs of free cash flow may increase, in turn, 
generating more demand for conservative reporting from shareholders. I find that debt 
issuance, dividend payments and corporate governance effectively serve as monitoring 
measures, thus reducing the demand for conservatism as an additional monitoring device, 
while repurchasing stock is not strongly related to conservatism. Also, results generally 
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indicate that J-type firms which persistently hold onto a large amount of excess cash 
report more conservatively than their counterparts. Furthermore, I find that J-type firms 
with greater reporting conservatism are less likely to overinvest in the future. Ex-post 
manifestation of overinvestment is determined based on the deviation from the normal 
level of investment (overall, capital and acquisition expenditures) from Biddle, Hillary, 
and Verdi (2009)‟s investment regressions.  
Findings from this research provide additional evidence on the relationship 
between shareholder-manager agency conflicts and conservative accounting policies. 
Most prior studies focus on the demand for conservative reporting from the lender‟s 
perspective. These studies note that timely loss recognition results in early violations of 
debt covenants, allowing lenders to minimize risks by restricting the actions of managers 
(Ahmed, Billings, and Morton, 2002; Zhang, 2008). However, agency costs also arise 
from circumstances other than debt contracting or compensation contracting because 
even in the absence of these formal accounting-based contracts, the firm‟s share price and, 
in turn, the wealth of managers and shareholders are affected by financial statements.  
Despite a growing volume of research on the importance of equity market demand 
for conservatism (e.g., LaFond and Watts, 2008 ; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008 ; 
Francis and Martin, 2010), the most widely held view indicates that demand for 
conservative reporting primarily arises from lenders and debt markets rather than 
shareholders and equity markets.
2
 My study aims to add additional evidence on the 
demand for conservatism from the shareholders‟ perspective by investigating whether the 
agency costs of free cash flow are associated with accounting conservatism.  
                                                          
2
 For example, Ball, Robin and Sadka (2008) compare reporting practices of different countries where the 
importance of equity markets and insider monitoring varies. They fail to find evidence that shareholders 
generate a demand for conservatism from their cross-country setting. 
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This study is different from Biddle, Ma, and Song (2011) who document that 
conservatism mitigates a firm‟s operating cash flow (OCF) from deviating below 
expected OCF (OCF downside risk) by timely informing stakeholders of bad news and 
emerging risk conditions. First, although their study also explicitly examines the 
relationship between cash flow and conservatism, they focus on the risk of holding too 
little cash (group of firms that may face liquidity constraints) while my study examines 
the risk of holding excessive cash (group of firms that have agency costs of free cash 
flow). Second, they focus on the consequences of conservatism that lead to lower OCF 
downside risk, while my study focuses on the sources of conservatism that is potentially 
related to agency costs in the presence of ex-ante high amounts of free cash flow. 
However, my study does not contradict their study because both studies view holding 
essential amounts of cash as necessary. 
This study also differs from existing literature in the way I measure the severity of 
agency costs of equity. Prior literature classifies firms having high agency costs of equity 
based on firms‟ choice variables, such as managerial ownership and board characteristics. 
Conservatism may be endogenous product of these variables since managers and boards 
implement financial reporting, thus affecting financial reporting quality. To identify 
potentially high agency costs, this study uses the amount of free cash flow, which is 
relatively exogenous with respect to firm‟s reporting choices. Therefore, this study 
examines a more direct link as to how shareholders‟ concerns for potential managerial 
opportunism affect the firms‟ reporting incentives and affect the degree of reporting 
conservatism. Additionally, unlike the majority of studies in the free cash flow literature 
that use the amounts of free cash flow or cash holdings alone as a proxy for the severity 
7 
 
of agency costs of free cash flow, my proxy precisely captures the essence of Jensen‟s 
free cash flow hypothesis by considering free cash jointly with industry growth options.
3
 
Also my proxy offers substantial variance across firms as well as within firms over time, 
allowing for a powerful statistical test. 
The results from this study may be of interest to standard setters for two reasons. 
First, despite the multiple benefits associated with conservatism, the recent FASB and 
IASB conceptual framework project states that conservatism is no longer considered a 
desirable qualitative characteristic of accounting information (See IASB 2006a, ¶BC 2.19 
to BC2.22; FASB 2010, ¶BC 3.27 to BC3.29). Instead the FASB and IASB promote 
„neutrality‟, which in their view is a necessary condition to faithfully represent reality and 
a more desirable quality of financial statements. They argue that when accounting 
standards are designed deliberately to introduce a conservative bias in financial reports, 
there would be inevitable loss of useful or relevant information content, that is, the 
marginal cost of conservatism. Critics of conservatism also claim that conservatism 
facilitates earnings management (e.g. taking big baths), impairing informational value in 
the financial statements (Levitt, 1998; Penman and Zhang, 2002).  
When determining the optimal level of conservatism, shareholders are expected to 
balance the expected marginal benefit and cost of conservatism. In terms of the 
implications of conservatism for investment behavior, the benefit of conservatism is to 
curb overinvestment by providing disincentives to managers to pursuing negative NPV 
projects, while the cost of conservatism may potentially be underinvestment.  When 
managers are required to provide more conservative reports, they may underinvest to 
                                                          
3
 A proxy that is solely based on the amount of free cash is not sufficient to segregate firms with high 




avoid privately costly effort into screening good investments and responsibility for 
oversight of undertaken projects. Roychowdhury (2010) argues that since risky projects 
are more likely to become negative projects, requiring more timely recognition of loss 
can also cause risk-averse managers to avoid risky projects even though those projects 
have positive NPV to shareholders. My study identifies an economic context, agency 
costs of free cash flow, where benefits of conservatism are likely to exceed costs of 
conservatism, and provides additional evidence on why conservatism is an important 
financial reporting attribute by highlighting the role of conservatism in monitoring 
corporate managers and mitigating agency concerns. 
Second, by providing free cash as value-relevant information for investors, my 
study suggests that regulators need to take actions to help investors understand free cash 
better.  The primary measure of this study is the amount of free cash, a non-GAAP 
disclosure item. Although the term free cash is widely used, it is not defined uniformly in 
practice. Adhikari and Duru (2006) examine free cash flow disclosures contained in 10-K 
and 10-Q filings and find that free cash flow definitions vary widely due to the lack of a 
standardized format. This study suggests that free cash is value-relevant information that 
investors use to assess their risk of managerial expropriation. This finding can encourage 
regulators to take actions to enhance investors‟ understanding of free cash by providing 
potential guidelines for firms preparing free cash flow statements to ensure comparability 
of free cash-related information across firms.  
The results of this dissertation also have implications for financial reporting 
quality. There is a widely held view indicating that financial reports that are responsive to 
the demands of information users are transparent and efficient, and that the quality of 
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financial reporting is directly related to the success of capital markets.  By showing that 
conservative reporting responds to shareholders‟ demand, I provide evidence that the 
capital markets exert sufficient pressure on firms, consistent with the view that financial 
reports exist to facilitate contracting to some extent. The remaining parts of the 
dissertation are organized as follows. Chapter II summarizes related prior studies. 
Chapter III presents my main hypotheses. Chapter IV discusses empirical proxies, and 








2.1. Agency costs of free cash flow and corporate governance 
The inherent conflict between shareholders and managers due to the separation of 
ownership and control and the agency costs that arise from shareholders‟ inability to 
monitor managerial action have been well established in the literature (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Based on this argument, Jensen (1986) develops the agency costs of 
free cash flow hypothesis, suggesting that monitoring difficulty by shareholders over 
opportunistic managerial behavior creates the potential for managers to spend internally 
generated cash flow for their own benefit, rather than for maximizing firm value. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the extant literature finds that larger free cash leads to 
more severe agency problems. For example, Harford (1999) finds that cash rich firms are 
more likely to make value destroying acquisitions. Furthermore, he finds that the market 
reaction to the announcement of a takeover bid is negatively related to the amount of 
excess cash holdings of the bidder. Opler, Pinkowitz, and Stulz (1999) find that firms 
with excess cash tend to spend more on capital expenditures and acquisitions, even when 
they have poor investment opportunities. Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that a dollar 
of cash, on average, is valued by the market below par ($0.94), and the marginal value of
11 
 
cash declines with larger cash holdings, higher leverage, and better access to capital 
markets.  
As a remedy for agency problems of free cash flow, researchers primarily 
emphasize the role of corporate governance.
4
 Prior research finds that firms with poor 
governance arrangements are more likely to invest excess cash reserves in less productive 
assets. In a cross-country study, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williams (2006) demonstrate that 
in the presence of agency costs of free cash flow, cash holdings are valued at a discount 
and this firm value discount is even more pronounced in countries where investor 
protection is weak, thus shareholders have limited power to discipline management. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that the value of excess cash of US firms is 
positively related to firm-level monitoring, measured by the G-score developed by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) which is an inverse measure of firm-level shareholder 
rights or external corporate governance. They further find that operating performance of 
firms that draw down their large excess cash reserves is significantly diminished when 
the firms are poorly governed. In a US setting, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) 
similarly examine how corporate governance influences the way firms spend their excess 
cash. They find that poorly governed firms (lower G-score or higher insider ownership) 
with excess cash invest sub-optimally.  
Recent research recognizes the benefits of conservative reporting in alleviating 
the managerial agency problem. These studies find that conservative reporting can 
mitigate the value discount associated with large cash holdings by encouraging more 
efficient use of cash (Louis, Sun, and Urcan, 2009), and benefit investors in the form of 
                                                          
4
 Corporate governance is the set of mechanisms in place to safeguard the assets of the firm and ensure the 
effective use of the assets and ultimately to prevent the inappropriate use of these assets by corporate 
insiders, especially managers, at the expense of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
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more efficient investment (Garcia Lara et al., 2010; Ahmed and Duellman, 2010). If 
shareholders understand these benefits associated with conservatism, they may demand 
more conservative reporting in the presence of agency costs of free cash flow when the 
firm value is likely to be destroyed by managerial opportunism.  
 
2.2 Reporting conservatism and the agency problem 
The most common way to minimize agency costs is through contracts that align 
the interests of all involved parties. Generally these types of contracts are based on 
accounting numbers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990), which creates incentives for 
managers to accelerate the recognition of gains by managing earnings or using aggressive 
accounting methods. Because conservatism understates reported earnings and managers‟ 
compensation is often tied to earnings numbers, conservative reporting can provide a 
mechanism to resolve the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.
5
   
Recent literature distinguishes between two different types of conservatism, 
namely, conditional and unconditional conservatism. Unconditional conservatism is an 
accounting measurement bias that is not affected by economic news. A commonly cited 
example of unconditional conservatism is the immediate expensing of all R&D 
irrespective of the probabilities of success of the underlying R&D projects and immediate 
expensing of the cost of internally generated intangible assets. By contrast, conditional 
conservatism is contingent on the sign of the shock to firm value or economic news. 
                                                          
5
 Watts (2003a) asserts that “as long as the reported financial numbers inform investors about managerial 
performance and affect investors‟ asset allocation decisions and managers‟ welfare, a priori appear neutral 
accounting will be significantly biased and noisy in practice.” When managers have the means and 
opportunity to waste their shareholders' resources (when there is greater agency costs of free cash flow), 
shareholders perceive that marginal benefits associated with conservatism, curbing overinvestment, exceed 
marginal costs, a possible underinvestment problem.  
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Conditional conservatism involves firms writing down the book value of net assets in a 
timely fashion upon receiving bad news but not writing up net assets as quickly upon 
receiving good news.  
How both types of conservatism are interrelated is still on debate. For example, 
Beaver and Ryan (2005), in their study to examine the interactions between conditional 
and unconditional conservatism, provide evidence that the two types of conservatism are 
substitutes in reducing income and equity because with unconditional conservatism, the 
probability that there is an unrealized loss in an accounting period decreases. On the other 
hand, Basu (2005) asserts that two types of conservatism have different costs and benefits 
to different parties, and that these cost-benefit tradeoffs influence the choice between the 
two types of conservatism in different circumstances, and hence, the two types of 
conservatism should not be viewed as benign substitutes. Similarly, Ball and Shivakumar 
(2006) argue that from a contracting perspective, rational investors are not likely to 
demand the downward bias caused by unconditional conservatism because if this bias is 
of known magnitude, then decision makers are likely to simply reverse the bias when 
they contract. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) also point out that unconditional conservatism 
is typically mandated and regulation-driven, whereas conditional conservatism requires 
decision makers to form judgments about future unrealized economic outcomes. In line 
with this, Ryan (2006) also suggests that unconditional conservatism is an ex-ante 
commitment to adhere to certain accounting practices, whereas conditional conservatism 
is triggered by bad news and hence responsive to demands from stakeholders. Consistent 
with this view, conditional conservatism, not unconditional conservatism, appears to be a 
component of efficient contracting that restricts management‟s opportunistic reporting 
14 
 
behavior, which can also respond to shareholders‟ demands promptly. Accordingly, I 
investigate the relationship between agency costs of free cash flow and subsequent 
conditional conservatism. 
A large body of literature examines how conservatism relates to debt contracting. 
For example, Zhang (2008) finds that conservatism improves contracting efficiency by 
providing more timely signals of default risk to lenders. Beatty et al. (2008) find that 
when lenders are likely to have a relatively high demand for conservatism, the borrower 
prepares more conservative reports. However, without formal contracting, agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers can be resolved via the use of conservative 
accounting.  
An emerging thought in the accounting literature is that the degree of conditional 
conservatism varies both cross-sectionally and over time (Khan and Watts, 2009).  In line 
with this, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) find that when agency problems as 
measured by the decline in managerial ownership increase, conditional conservatism 
increases. Similarly, LaFond and Watts (2008) find that the information asymmetry 
caused by firm-specific investment opportunities, or growth options, is associated with 
conditional conservatism because conditional conservatism can serve as a partial solution 
to the agency problems arising from information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. 
Several recent papers examine the direct relationship between conditional 
conservative reporting and investment efficiency. Francis and Martin (2010) test whether 
conservatism, defined as timely loss recognition, helps managers to make better 
acquisition decisions. They find that acquisition decisions by more conservative reporters 
15 
 
have more positive announcement returns, and this positive relationship is more 
pronounced for firms with higher ex-ante agency costs. Ahmed and Duellman (2010) 
similarly find that firms with more conservative reporting have higher future profitability, 
and argue that the benefit of conservative reporting allows managers to uncover poorly 
performing projects on a timely basis. In a similar vein, Garcia Lara et al. (2010) find that 
firms that report conservatively are less likely to make suboptimal investments. The 
improved investment efficiency under accounting conservatism is attributable to the more 
timely recognition of losses relative to gains, which in turn penalizes managers who make 
poor investment decisions during their tenure. Hence, conservative reporting limits 
investments in negative NPV projects ex-ante and triggers early abandonment of poorly 
perform projects ex-post.  
Overall, the literature indicates that conditional conservatism responds to 
demands from firms‟ stakeholders, and high agency costs generate higher demands for 
conservatism from shareholders. Also firms obtain more benefits from conservative 








BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this chapter, I develop hypotheses of the relationship between the severity of 
agency costs of free cash flow and subsequent conservatism. The main hypothesis, H1, 
tests if conservatism is an equilibrium response by shareholders to reduce agency costs 
arising from free cash flow. The main hypothesis is then substantiated by examining if 
potential factors that may affect the severity of agency costs of free cash flow, namely 
firms‟ debt (H2),  payouts to shareholders (H3), cash retention policy (H4) and corporate 
governance (H5), change the demand for conservatism among firms that are subject to 
greater agency costs associated with free cash flow. The last hypothesis (H6) tests if 
conservatism among J-type firms provides economic benefits in the form of less 
likelihood of overinvestment in subsequent periods. 
3.1. Agency costs of free cash flow and conservatism (H1) 
Prior research posits that managers, in the absence of monitoring, may invest 
resources unproductively to the detriment of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986). To curb the managerial tendency to transfer corporate resources to 
themselves, Jensen (1986, 2005) emphasizes the importance of control systems. Many 
studies argue that conservative accounting is a part of firms‟ control systems to reduce  
17 
 
this opportunistic managerial behavior and maximize firm value (e.g., Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990; Watts, 2003a; Ball and Shivakumar, 2006). While corporate 
governance is a part of corporate culture and thus exhibits little variation over time, 
conservative reporting is hypothesized to react more promptly to the information demand 
from shareholders (LaFond and Watts, 2008).  
Unlike in a debt contracting setting where conservatism is an efficiency-
enhancing mechanism that complements debt covenants to mitigate lender‟s concerns 
about uncompensated risk and loss of contracted sum (Zhang, 2008), there is no such 
formal contracts between shareholders and managers. Other than shareholder litigation 
which is ex-post in nature and very costly, there is not a particular action that 
shareholders can take when managerial expropriation is likely to occur. 
6
 Given that 
managers have a short-term incentive to overstate current earnings and expectations of 
future cash flows in order to increase their compensation, agency costs of free cash flow 
may increase demand for more efficient contracting ex-ante. 
To the extent that conservatism reduces the agency concerns associated with free 
cash flow problems, shareholders are expected to demand more conditional conservatism 
from “J-type” firms, namely those firms that are operating in industries with limited 
growth opportunities and are generating large free cash. Thus, the first hypothesis (stated 
in the alternative form) is the following: 
                                                          
6
 Once paid, excess compensation to managers is extremely hard and costly to recover, especially when 
managers leave the firm. Also, ex-post settling with managers is likely to be incomplete due to the 
difficulty associated with assessing the deadweight costs generated when managers‟ efforts to transfer 
wealth to themselves divert their attention from their primary job, increasing firm vale. Also, there is a 
usually a limit to the socially acceptable penalty amount (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
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H1: Firms that have limited growth opportunities and are generating large free cash (J-
type firms) have more conditional conservatism than firms that have high growth 
opportunities and are generating small free cash (Non J-type firms). 
 
3.2. The effect of debt on conservatism among J-type firms (H2) 
According to Jensen (1986), debt is likely to reduce agency costs associated with 
free cash flow because the required payments under debt contracts reduce the available 
cash flows that managers can exploit. Moreover, the obligation to make the interest and 
principal payments motivates managers to use a firm‟s cash more efficiently. Debt also 
signals a manager‟s willingness to pay out future cash flows and be monitored by lenders 
and the debt capital market. Several papers examine the overinvestment problem by 
investigating the relation between growth opportunities and excess cash and leverage, and 
find consistent evidence that firms with an ex-ante overinvestment problem (e.g., 
potentially high agency costs of free cash flow) use relatively more debt as a disciplining 
device (McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Lang, Ofek, and Stulz, 1996). In an international 
setting, Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) argue that debt mitigates the free cash flow 
problem in emerging markets, where overinvestment agency costs are potentially extreme. 
While demands for conservatism increase with leverage due to the increased 
demands from debtholders, this argument is not likely to be applicable to firms with high 
free cash. Debtholders of firms with less free cash may prefer earnings numbers that 
provide them with a credible signal of distress and help them take remedial actions earlier, 
generating more conservatism.
7
 However, firms with large free cash are less likely to 
                                                          
7 Firms with little free cash are often start-up companies with rapid growth. Although their capital 
requirement is high, their access to the capital market may be limited or at least costly due to uncertain 
business prospects and no credit history. Hence, shareholders would view free cash of firms that have little 
free cash, thus have limited access to external financing as a value-increasing response to costly external 
financing rather than the agency costs of free cash flow. Assuming firms with less free cash flow are 
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suffer from financial distress, thus changes in leverage within a reasonable range (to the 
extent that leverage does not severely alter the bankruptcy probabilities or credit ratings 
of the firm) would not significantly affect lenders‟ demands for conservatism. In other 
words, among J-type firms, decreased equity holders‟ demands for conservatism due to 
the added disciplining role of debt are likely to exceed the increases in debtholders‟ 
demands for conservatism due to increased leverage. In sum, high leverage reduces 
agency costs of free cash flow for J-type firms, and thereby reduces shareholders‟ 
demands for conservative reporting as an additional control mechanism.
8
 
H2: J-type firms that have a smaller amount of debt will have more conditional 
conservatism than J-type firms that have a larger amount of debt.  
 
3.3. The effect of payouts policies on conservatism among J-type firms (H3) 
Cash distributions to shareholders in the form of dividend payouts or stock 
repurchases decrease resources under management control and thereby reduce the 
incentive for wasteful investment and increase firm value. Given the modest growth 
potential for J-type firms, investors would expect cash distributions from J-type firms. 
Dividends tend to become a long-term commitment once declared by the board, 
effectively bonding managers to pay out future cash flows, and thus alleviate the free 
cash problem. The negative market reaction to announcements of dividend decreases is 
consistent with the agency costs of free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
financially constrained firms, empirical evidence also suggests that the value of cash is greater in 
financially constrained firms than in financially unconstrained firms (Faulkender and Wang 2006; 
Pinkowitz et al. 2006).   
8 However, debt itself can generate agency costs. Due to their limited liability, managers of a levered firm 
tend to overinvest and choose too risky and often negative NPV projects. This leads to asset substitution 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If this effect dominates, demand for conservatism would increase with 
leverage in firms with high free cash flow.  
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Lang and Litzenberger (1989) find that the average return in response to announcements 
of sizable dividend changes is larger for overinvesting firms than for value maximizing 
firms. In the context of stock repurchases, Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that the 
market reaction to repurchase announcements is stronger for firms that are more likely to 
overinvest. Based on this evidence, committing to paying out future free cash to investors 
in the form of dividends or stock repurchases is a possible way to decrease the likelihood 




H3: J-type firms that distribute a smaller amount of cash to shareholders (either in the 
form of dividends or stock repurchases) will have more conditional conservatism than J-
type firms that distribute a larger amount of cash to shareholders. 
 
3.4. The effect of the cash retention policy on conservatism among J-type firms (H4) 
The agency costs of free cash flow of J-type firms can be greater if the firm 
retains excess cash for an extended period of time. Although some evidence indicates that 
holding excess cash is a policy that persists over time (Opler et al. 1999), many studies 
examining the value consequence of large cash holdings only focus on a policy choice at 
a point in time. According to Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2008), retained cash 
results in sustained future declines in returns on assets due to a combination of 
diminishing marginal returns to new investment and overinvestment. Contrary to the 
findings that temporary holdings of large balances of cash impair shareholders‟ value 
                                                          
9 Although shareholders are likely to demand less conservatism for firms that increase debt and dividends, 
and initiate repurchases, alike, the relative effect of payouts in reducing agency costs of free cash flow 
would depend on the need for financial flexibility and the severity of agency costs of free cash flow. More 
mandatory form of payout would decrease agency problems more effectively. Consequently, debt may be 
better than a dividend payout and a dividend payout may be better than repurchase in reducing the free cash 
flow problem.   
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(Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shileifer, 1994; Harford 1999; Faulkender and Wang, 
2006), Mikkelson and Partch (2003) find that persistent cash holdings facilitate growth 
and investments. However, their sample firms are small and fast growing, which likely 
find it optimal to maintain high cash levels due to limited external financing options. 
Given limited growth prospects for J-type firms, cash reserves are more likely to provide 
managers with investment flexibility, expand managers‟ perks, and allow managers to 
avoid the discipline of capital markets rather than maximize the value of the firm. 
Accordingly, I predict that when J-type firms visibly hold cash in excess of their needs on 
a persistent basis (defined as three years), shareholders are likely to demand conservatism 
as an additional control mechanism to protect their wealth tied to the value of the firm.  
H4: J-type firms that persistently hold large excess cash have more conditional 
conservatism than J-type firms that do not persistently hold large excess cash.  
 
3.5. The effect of corporate governance on conservatism among J-type firms (H5) 
Although there is no well established theory that explains the relationship 
between corporate governance and conservatism, a large number of empirical findings 
suggest that these two are closely related. According to this literature, corporate 
governance and conservative reporting can be either substitutes or complements. Some 
studies posit that governance facilitates the implementation of more conservative 
reporting. For example, Beekes, Pope, and Young (2004) and Ahmed and Duellman 
(2007) find that firms with a higher proportion of outside directors recognize bad news in 
earnings on a more timely basis in a U.K. and U.S. setting, respectively. In a similar vein, 
Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma, and Penalva (2009) document that stronger governance leads 
to more conservative accounting choices, and not vice versa, indicating that governance 
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and conservatism are not substitutes. Conversely, there are studies that advocate that 
conservatism can substitute for corporate governance, predicting a negative relation 
between conservatism and corporate governance. For example, Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) find that when earnings timeliness is low, boards adopt stronger governance 
mechanisms as a substitute for high-quality accounting information. Callen, Guan, and 
Qiu (2010) find that after the passage of state anti-takeover laws, which they view as an 
exogenous shock that weakened external corporate governance, conservatism 
significantly increases.  
In sum, empirical evidence predicts both positive and negative associations 
between corporate governance and conservatism. Weak corporate governance structures 
are expected to generate a higher contracting demand for conservatism among 
shareholders. On the other hand, well-governed firms would favor the implementing of 
conservative reporting as opposed to aggressive reporting, and thus are more likely to 
exhibit greater accounting conservatism. Because convincing arguments can be made for 
either increased or reduced conservatism, I set up the following non-directional 
hypothesis with respect to the impact of corporate governance on conservatism among J-
type firms.  
H5:  The strength of corporate governance will affect the magnitude of conditional 
conservatism among J-type firms.  
 
3.6. The effect of conservatism on future investment efficiency among J-type firms (H6) 
The last hypothesis is concerned with the economic consequence of greater 
conservatism in J-type firms with respect to their subsequent investment behavior. I 
conjecture that for firms facing greater agency costs of free cash flow ex-ante, 
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shareholders demand greater conservative reporting to be protected from possible 
overinvestment associated with the free cash flow problem. Thus, the ideal economic 
consequence associated with conservative reporting would be a decrease in 
overinvestment ex-post. Francis and Martin (2010) use subsequent divestitures as a 
measure for the ex-post success of an acquisition, and find that firms with greater 
conservatism are less likely to divest ex-post. Biddle et al. (2009) find financial reporting 
quality, measured by accruals quality and financial disclosure transparency, is positively 
related to investment efficiency in a way that firms with better reporting quality are less 
likely to over- or under invest. In the same spirit, given that the importance of 
conservative reporting is even more pronounced for J-type firms due to its ability to 
address agency issues, the above predictions about financial reporting quality on the 
firm‟s investment efficiency can be similarly applied in the context of agency costs of 
free cash flow. Accordingly, I expect that J-type firms with more conservative reporting 
use their cash more efficiently, as manifested by lower likelihood of overinvestment. 
H6: J-type firms with more conditional conservatism are less likely to overinvest ex-post 










 Data are obtained from Compustat and CRSP for firms listed in the US stock 
markets (including NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX). I exclude firm years that are affected 
by recent liquidity shock. To determine EXCASH, I calculate the 10-year standard 
deviation of cash flow to proxy for industry cash flow volatility, which restricts the 
sample to the 1970 to 2006. In calculating FCF, cash flow data are directly obtained from 
cash flow statements. This limits the sample to 1987 to 2006 when FCF data are used to 
partition firm types.  Sample sizes vary across regression specifications due to the data 
availability.  I primarily use Basu (1997)‟s asymmetric timeliness coefficient from the 
reverse regression model where current fiscal earnings is regressed  on fiscal year buy-
and-hold returns to assess the association between the magnitude of agency costs of free 
cash flow and the extent of subsequent conservatism. I use pooled ordinary least square 
(OLS) regressions and Fama-MacBeth (FM) regressions to test the hypotheses. When 
pooled OLS regression models are used, standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and 
time-series dependence based on two-way industry (Fama-French industry classification 
scheme with 48  industries) and year clustering (37 years) following Petersen (2009) are 
reported. When Fama-MacBeth regressions are used, I use the mean coefficients across 
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37 annual cross-sectional regressions over the period 1970- 2006 with related t-statistics 
corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. Each hypothesis is tested 
separately as well as simultaneously to identify joint effects of each factor on 
conservatism among firms subject to high agency costs of free cash flow. 
 
4.1. Measures of agency costs of free cash flow  
To determine “J-type” firms, free cash and growth potential need to be computed. 
Free cash (FREECASH) is thought of as the cash left after necessary and pre-committed 
expenses and investments. I measure free cash as lagged FCF or EXCASH (at time t-1), 
divided by beginning of the fiscal year assets (Compustat #6). A more detailed 
description of these calculations is in Appendix 1:  
(1) Free cash flow approach: Following Richardson (2006), I calculate free cash flow as 
free cash flow from existing assets in place (CFAIP) minus expected investment (Inew) on 
new projects. To reflect cash flow beyond what is necessary to maintain assets in place, 
discretionary spending is added back, and necessary spending is deducted. Based on the 
assumption that firm value (P) can be decomposed into value of the assets in place (VAIP) 
and the value of growth opportunities (VGO), the expected investment on new projects 
(Inew ) is calculated by using the residual income framework. P (stock price) is observable 
in the market, and VAIP  is derived from the Feltham and Ohlson (1996) model, and the 
resulting V/P ratio is the proxy for growth potential. Investment expenditure is regressed 
on the V/P ratio along with other determinants of investment decisions, such as leverage, 
firm size, firm age, the level of cash, past stock returns, prior firm level investment, and 
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industry and year dummies, and the fitted value from this regression is used as a 
predicted level of investment (Inew).  
 (2) Excess cash approach 
10
 : Excess cash is measured following Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007). They develop a model based on the work of Opler et al. (1999), to capture 
excess cash by deducting a predicted level of cash from total cash holdings for each 
company using a regression model of total cash on variables that proxy for legitimate 
reasons why firms hold cash. More specifically, their model factors in various reasons for 
firms to hold cash, such as needs for day-to-day operations, precautionary financial slack 
in anticipation of new investment opportunities to reduce external financing costs, and 
firm-specific reasons.  
In order to classify firms I must identify growth opportunities, but there is no 
consensus on the most reliable measure for growth. Accordingly, this study gauges firms‟ 
growth opportunities with the most widely used proxy for growth opportunities, Tobin‟s 
Q. 
11
 I use lagged Tobin‟s Q (at time t-1) as a growth measure. Since value-maximizing 
firms are expected to invest as long as the market value of the firm is greater than the 
book value of the firm, Tobin‟s Q proxies the investment opportunities shareholders 
observe, thus is particularly suitable to the objective of this study.  
I split the sample into J-type and non J-type firms based on two free cash 
measures, free cash flow (FCF) from Richardson (2006) and excess cash (EXCASH) 
                                                          
10
 This can be understood as an extension of Jensen‟s free cash flow hypothesis. In theory, the effect of an 
extra dollar of funds on increasing shareholders‟ concerns over managerial opportunism should be the same, 
regardless of whether it enters the firm this period as cash flow or whether it was present in the firm at the 
beginning of the period as cash holdings. 
11
 Alternatively, I employ the industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q ratio equal to Tobin‟s Q minus the median 
Tobin‟s Q in the industry, where industry is defined by Fama and French‟s (1997) 48 industry 
classifications. I also employ the industry-adjusted sales growth calculated as the 2-year geometric average 
of the annual percentage sales growth minus the median industry sales growth. The results are unchanged 
in these specifications.  
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from Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), and one growth measure, Tobin‟s Q, using two 
ways of partitioning, median or quartile. I average a firm‟s FCF, EXCASH, and Tobin‟s 
Q each year for all firms in Compustat, and calculate the median and quartile values of 
FCF, EXCASH, and Tobin‟s Q across the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry classification 
to obtain the industry median for each industry. Industry is defined by the Fama and 
French 48 industry classification. I construct the dummy variable, AGENCY, to represent 
“J-type firms”. For example, when the median cutoff is used, the AGENCY dummy is set 
to 1 for firm years with more than the median FREECASH and less than the median 
GROWTH in a given industry, and set to 0 otherwise. When the quartile cutoff is used 
instead, AGENCY is assigned a value of 1(0) for firm years with FREECASH that falls 
within the upper (lower) quartile and GROWTH that falls within the lower (upper) 
quartile in a given industry.  
 
4.2. Measures of Conservatism  
To test the association between agency costs of free cash flow and conservatism, I 
use two measures of conservatism suggested by Basu (1997).
 
The first measure is used 
for the main analyses, while the second measure is used for robustness checks.  
(1) Reverse regression model:  This model focuses on how good and bad economic news, 
measured by market returns, is asymmetrically associated with accounting earnings. 
Under conservative reporting, stock returns and earnings would reflect economic losses 
in the same period, while stock returns reflect gains earlier than earnings. Basu (1997) 
regresses annual earnings on concurrent annual stock returns to investigate the extent to 
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which economic news (unrealized gain/loss) is reflected to earnings conditional on news 
being positive or negative.  
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt +εt             (1A) 
where NIt is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) divided by 
beginning of fiscal year market value of equity (Compustat #199*Compustat  #25). Rt is 
12-month compound returns ending 3 months after the end of fiscal year. Following Basu 
(1997), buy-and-hold annual returns are calculated to end 3 months after the fiscal year-
end to remove the market response to the previous year‟s earnings from the current 
economic news. Dt is an indicator variable equal to one if Rt is negative, and 0 otherwise.  
Here, the coefficient α2 measures the timeliness of gain recognition while the 
coefficient α3 measures the incremental timeliness of loss recognition. Therefore, (α2+α3) 
measures total timeliness of loss recognition. The relative timeliness of loss recognition 
to gain recognition, α3, is the main variable of interest in this study. A positive α3 implies 
greater conservatism, meaning losses are recognized more quickly than gains.  
 (2) Asymmetric reversion model: Several papers recognize the limitation of Basu‟s 
(1997) reverse regression model as it measures economic news using stock returns, which 
may also capture information not reflected in earnings. As an alternative, Basu (1997) 
suggests a second measure based on earnings changes. He argues that persistence of 
earnings is another way to view the timeliness of earnings. Under more conservative 
reporting, future periods‟ earnings are protected from current bad news while the effects 
of current good news will be spread over several periods‟ earnings in the future as gains 
are realized. In other words, negative earnings changes will be less persistent than 
positive earnings changes.  
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ΔNIt = β0 +β1DNIt +β2 ΔNIt-1+β3DNIt ΔNIt-1+εt              (1B) 
where ΔNIt is the change in net income before extraordinary items for fiscal from year t-1 
to year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1, DNIt is an indicator 
variable equal to one if ΔNIt-1 is negative, and 0 otherwise.  
A negative coefficient β3 is consistent with negative earnings being less persistent 
and thus more conservative. This model does not employ stock returns as a measure of 
news, and is thus less subject to criticism (Gigler and Hemmer, 2001; Givoly, Hayn, and 
Natarajan, 2007). The use of the asymmetric reversion model as a robustness check has 
increased in the literature (see for example, Chung and Wynn, 2008; Goh and Li, 2011).  
 
 
4.3. Empirical models   
4.3.1. Free cash and demand for conservatism (tests of H1 through H5) 
To test H1, I expand the baseline Basu (1997) models (Equation 1A and 1B) by 
including the AGENCY dummy variable, interacted with D, R, and D*R  with firm level 
control variables that are commonly used in the conservatism literature. To                                                                                                                                                                                   
parse out the demand for conservatism attributable to agency costs of free cash flow, I 
also control for other sources of conservative reporting. Khan and Watts (2009) note that 
firm-specific conservatism varies through cross-sectional variations in the firm specific 
characteristics, namely market to book (MB), leverage (LEV), and market value of equity 
(SIZE). Thus, control variables include MB, LEV and SIZE, which are also interacted with 
D, R, and D*R. These control variables have been widely used in the conservatism 
research, and shown to capture variation in the information opportunity set, which is 
closely related to demands for conservatism. These control variables are all measured at 
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the end of fiscal year t-1. All variables are ranked annually and sorted into deciles, and 
then this decile ranking is scaled by nine so that the rank variable falls within the zero-to-
one interval. The use of ranked variables is prevalent among researchers in conservatism 
studies to mitigate measurement error. Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression models and 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions are estimated over the test periods. I employ the 
following model:  
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+ α5DtAGENCYt-1 
            + α6RtAGENCYt-1+ α7DtRtAGENCYt-1+Controls +ε         (2A)
  
ΔNIt+1=β0+β1DNIt+β2 ΔNIt+β3DNIt ΔNIt+β4AGENCYt-1+β5DNItAGENCYt-1 
        + β6 ΔNItAGENCYt-1+β7DNIt ΔNItAGENCYt-1+Controls +ε                (2B)
  
where AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1 for firm-years with more than the industry 
median (or quartile) free cash and less than the industry median (or quartile) growth, and 
set to 0 otherwise. Each company is assigned to one of 48 industry groups defined in the 
Fama-French 48 industry classification. Control variables include MB, LEV, and SIZE: 
MB equals to the scaled decile rank of the market-to-book ratio (Compustat #199 * 
Compustat #25/Compustat #60) at the end of the fiscal year t-1. LEV is the scaled decile 
rank of total debt (Compustat#9 + Compustat #34) divided by total assets (Compustat #6) 
at the end of the fiscal year t-1. SIZE is the scaled decile rank of the natural log of market 
value of equity (Compustat #199 *Compustat #25) at the end of the fiscal year t-1. All 
other variables are as previously defined. 
Market to Book (MB) is included to account for the demand for conservatism 
arising from information asymmetry associated with firm‟s growth options as well as 
unconditional conservatism (LaFond and Watts, 2008). High MB firms tend to have more 
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growth options relative to their assets-in-place, thus entails more agency costs, which 
implies a positive relation between MB and conservatism. MB also indicates the litigation 
costs because they increase managers‟ incentive to recognize losses quickly relative to 
gains to minimize litigation risk. However, empirical results do not always provide a 
positive relation between MB and conservatism, possibly because greater unconditional 
conservatism reduces subsequent conditional conservatism.
 12
 The more expenditure is 
expensed immediately, the less remains that can be written down later (Beaver and Ryan, 
2005).  Consistent with this, a negative association between conditional conservatism and 
unconditional conservatism has been documented by previous studies (Givoly et al., 2007; 
Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007). Additionally, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) argue 
that the negative relation between MB and conservatism is due to the „buffer problem‟ 
that occurs due to prior unrecognized increases in nonseperable assets such as intangibles 
reducing the necessity to recognize assets value losses, creating a negative relation 
between ending and beginning MB. Thus, no prediction is made for the sign of MB.  
Leverage (LEV) controls for the debtholders‟ demand for conservatism. Lenders 
are likely to value conservatism because conservative financials provide a timely signal 
of changes in default risk, enabling lenders to mitigate their downside risk. LEV is 
expected to be positively related to conservatism. SIZE is expected to be negatively 
related to conservatism because large firms likely have a richer information environment, 
which may reduce the demand for conservative reporting.  
                                                          
12 The literature on unconditional conservatism takes a MB ratio as a manifestation of conservative 
reporting because it captures the magnitude of understatement of book assets relative to net assets (see for 
example, Feltham and Ohlson, 1996). Basu (2005) and Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that greater 
unconditional conservatism results in a lower intercept term, α0 from Equation (2A), reflecting lower 
average earnings. Thus, if any, variations in unconditional conservatism with the magnitude of agency costs 
of free cash flow will be captured and controlled in the coefficients on AGENCY and D*AGENCY from 




Beaver, Landsman, and Owens (2008) find that OLS standard errors in the 
estimation of Basu (1997)‟s reverse regression are significantly inflated by industry and 
time clustering. To address this concern, I use standard errors corrected for cross-
sectional and time-series dependence based on two-way industry (Fama-French industry 
classification scheme with 48 industries) and year clustering (37 years) following 
Petersen (2009) when using OLS regression models. 
13
 Even though cross-sectional 
correlation is reduced by using clustered standard errors at the firm level, the cross-
sectional correlation, both among firms in the pooled sample and within industries is still 
a concern. To control for cross-sectional dependence among firms and to ensure the 
robustness of my results, I estimate average coefficients using Fama-MacBeth annual 
cross-sectional regressions. With the Fama-MacBeth regression procedure, above 
regression models are estimated independently for each year and across all the firms. 
Then, the Fama-MacBeth procedure averages the cross-sectional slope coefficient and 
tests if the average is statistically significantly different from zero. 
The coefficients α7 and β7 from Equation 2A and 2B, respectively, measure the 
incremental level of conservatism for high agency costs of free cash flow relative to low 
agency costs of free cash flow. Thus, to be consistent with H1 that J-type firms report 
more conservatively than non J-type firms, I expect the coefficient estimate for α7 from 
Equation 2A and β7 from Equation 2B to be significantly positive and negative, 
respectively.  
                                                          
13
 More specifically, cluster-robust t-statistics are estimated using the two way cluster-robust variance-
covariance matrix, calculated as the sum of the industry and year one-way cluster-robust variance-
covariance matrices minus the cluster-robust variance-covariance matrix for one-way clustering based on 
the intersection of industry and year. 
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To test H2 through H5 separately as well as simultaneously, if other factors that 
reduce or increase the ex-ante agency costs affect the relative importance of conservatism 
in the presence of the free cash flow problem, I employ the above expanded Basu‟s 
regression models along with other variables of interest identified from each hypothesis 
above (X) and their interaction terms with D, R, and D*R. When DIST_D, defined as a 
dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm has a leverage ratio above the industry median 
and 0 otherwise, is tested in the model, I remove LEV from the control variables because 
these two variables capture the same attribute. A detailed variable description is 
presented in Appendix 2:   
  NIt  =α0 + α1 Dt+ α2 Rt+ α3 DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+α5 Dt*AGENCYt-1 
                    + α6 Rt* AGENCYt-1+ α7DtRt* AGENCYt-1  
             + α8,iXt-1 +α9,i DtXt-1+α10,i RtXt-1+α11,IiDtRtXt-1) 
             + α12,i AGENCYt-1 * Xi + α13,i Dt AGENCYt-1 * Xi + α14,i Rt AGENCYt-1 * Xi 
                    + α15,i Dt RtAGENCYt-1 * Xi )+ Controls +ε              (3A)  
 
ΔNIt +1 = β0 + β1 DNIt+ β2 ΔNIt+ β3 DNIt ΔNIt + β4AGENCYt-1+β5 DNIt*AGENCYt-1 
+ β6 ΔNIt * AGENCYt-1+ β7DNIt ΔNIt * AGENCYt-1 β8,iXt-1 +β9,i DNItXt-1 
+β10,i ΔNIt Xt-1+β11,i   DNIt ΔNIt Xt-1) + β12,i AGENCYt-1 * Xi  
+ β13,i DNIt AGENCYt-1 * Xi + β14,i ΔNIt AGENCYt-1 * Xi 
+ β15,i DNIt ΔNIt AGENCYt-1 * Xi )+ Controls +ε                           (3B)  
 
where X1 = DIST_Dt-1, X2= DIVt-1 X3= REPURt-1, X4= PERSt-1, and X5= GOVt-1. 
DIST_Dt-1 proxies for the control function of debt to reduce free cash flow that can be 
misused by managers. It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has above the industry 
median leverage ratio, calculated as total debt (Compustat#9 + Compustat #34) divided 
by total assets (Compustat #6) at the end of the fiscal year t-1, and 0 otherwise. DIVt-1 is a 
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dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm‟s dividend ratio relative to earnings (Compustat 
#21/Compustat #237) at the end of the fiscal year t-1 is above the industry median and 0 
otherwise. REPURt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm‟s ratio of repurchases 
relative to earnings (Compustat #237) at the end of the fiscal year t-1 exceeds the 
industry median and 0 otherwise. Repurchases are calculated as repurchase of common 
and preferred stock (Compustat #115) minus stock issuance (Compustat #108) at the end 
of the fiscal year t-1. PERSt-1 captures the firm‟s ongoing policy of managing cash 
reserves. To distinguish firms with unusual cash holdings at a point in time from those 
that persistently retain large amounts of excess cash, I define firms holding large amounts 
of excess cash for each of the prior three years as persistent cash holders. This variable is 
determined in two ways. PERS is coded 1 if (1) a firm has the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to assets in excess of 0.25 for the past three years (from fiscal years t-4 to t-2) 
following the approach of Mikkelson and Partch (2003) or (2) its EXCASH is ranked in 
the top 2 deciles within its industry for the last three years (from fiscal years t-4 to t-2). 
GOVt-1 is a governance dummy based on whether the firm has above or below the 
industry median of either the G-score by Gompers et al. (2003) or E-index by Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) at the end of the fiscal year t-1.  In all variables, Fama-French 
48 industry classifications are employed to compute the industry medians. The AGENCY 
variable and control variables are as defined previously.
14
 
                                                          
14
 Instead of using continuous value, all the independent variables are defined as dummy variables. Given 
the lack of a priori knowledge to identify the threshold value to assess the effectiveness of each proposed 
measure that can moderate the need of conservatism, using industry medians to partition the data appears 
reasonable. It can also avoid the imposition of linearity on the effectiveness of each moderating measure in 
reducing agency costs. Using a dummy variable simplifies the task of interpreting the results, and reduces 
measurement errors. Also note that using dummy variables only works against finding the results because 




 H2 predicts that the relative importance of conservatism in reducing agency costs 
of free cash decreases with leverage. Since the control function of debt in forcing 
managers to pay out fixed amount of free cash in the future is expected to reduce agency 
costs of free cash flow in firms with potentially high agency costs of free cash flow, the 
shareholders‟ demand for conservatism as an additional control function would be less 
important among J-type firms. Thus the coefficient of DtRt *AGENCYt-1* DIST_Dt-1 from 
Equation 3A is expected to be negative. On the other hand, the coefficient of DNIt ΔNIt 
*AGENCYt-1 * DIST_Dt-1 from Equation 3B is expected to be positive.  
Similarly, H3 predicts the coefficients on DtRt *AGENCYt-1 *DIV t-1 and DtRt 
*AGENCYt-1 *REPUR t-1 from Equation 3A to be negative and the coefficients on DNIt 
ΔNIt *AGENCYt-1 * DIVt-1 and DNIt ΔNIt *AGENCYt-1 * REPURt-1 from Equation 3B to be 
positive, meaning that all else equal, among firms that are subject to high agency costs of 
free cash flow, increases in payouts in the form of dividends and stock repurchases would 
reduce the demand for conservatism as an additional control mechanism.  
H4 tests if J-type firms‟ persistent holdings of large cash affect the demand for 
conservatism from shareholders. To distinguish firms with unusual cash holdings at a 
point in time from those that persistently retain large amounts of excess cash, I define 
firms holding large amounts of excess cash for each of the prior three years as persistent 
excess cash holders. The positive coefficient on DtRt *AGENCYt-1 *PERSt-1 from 
Equation 3A and the negative coefficient on DNIt ΔNIt *AGENCYt-1 * PERSt-1 from 
Equation 3B indicate that J-type firms which continue to hold a large amount of excess 
cash are expected to recognize losses more quickly relative to gains. 
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Next, I test H5, which predicts that relative importance of conservatism in 
reducing agency costs of free cash flow varies with firms‟ ex-ante corporate governance. 
Corporate governance (GOV) is measured by either the Inv G-score or the Inv E-index.
15
 
The E-index (entrenchment index) is a more condensed version of the G-score, 
formulated based on a subsample of only relevant variables shown to impact shareholder 
value from the G-score.
16
 The negative coefficient on DtRt*AGENCYt-1 *GOVt-1 from 
Equation 3A and the positive coefficient on DNIt ΔNIt *AGENCYt-1 * GOVt-1 from 
Equation 3B will indicate that corporate governance reduces the need for conservative 
reporting among J-type firms. On the other hand, the positive coefficient on 
DtRt*AGENCYt-1 *GOVt-1 and the negative coefficient on DNIt ΔNIt *AGENCYt-1 * GOVt-1 
will mean that strong corporate governance help implementing more conservative 
reporting among J-type firms. 
 
4.3.2. The effect of conservatism on future investment behavior of J-type firms (H6) 
Finally, I assess the real benefits associated with conservative reporting by 
examining the effect of conservatism on the future investment behavior of firms with 
greater agency problems. If conservatism provides proper monitoring over the use of free 
cash, then firms with greater conservatism will use their cash in a manner that maximizes 
shareholder wealth, and they should experience less likelihood of overinvestment. To 
estimate the expected investment, I estimate a firm-specific model of optimal investment 
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 Gompers et al. (2003) construct this index by using the data from the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC), 24 distinct corporate governance measures for almost 1,500 firms, with 1 point being 
granted for the governance measure that restricts shareholder rights. Thus the larger the index, the weaker 
the shareholder rights (and the more powerful the management). 
16
 Since prior literature argues that governance and conservatism are related to some extent, the inclusion of 
the governance variable in the model may provide confounding results. To address this, I use the initial G-
scores (first G-score available for each firm) as a governance measure instead of G-scores in the beginning 
of the fiscal year, following Bebchuck et al. (2009). 
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as a function of growth opportunities (as measured by past sales growth) following 
Biddle et al. (2009) and use the residual term as a firm-specific proxy for overinvestment. 
The following regression is estimated for each industry-year based on the Fama-French 
48 industry classification for all industries with at least 20 observations per year. 
Investmenti,t+1=β0+β1Sales Growthi,t+εi,t+1  
where Investment is defined as in Biddle et al. (2009) as the sum of R&D, Capital 
expenditure, acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sale of property, plant, and 
equipment multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total assets. SalesGrowtht is the 
percentage of annual sales growth rate calculated as Salest/Salest-1. The residual, εi,t+1, 
represents overinvestment. 
More specifically, firm-years are sorted annually into quartiles based on the 
magnitude of residuals, and then observations falling in the top quartile (the most positive 
residuals) are classified as overinvestment. Furthermore, I divide the overall measure of 
investment between capital expenditure and acquisition expenditure and repeat the same 
analyses since these two are more likely to be used for managerial empire building.
17
  To 
determine if conservative reporting facilitates the effective use of cash, I re-estimate 
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 R&D expenditure is often cited as good investment that can enhance firm value in the long run, so I did 




NIt  =α0 + α1 Dt+ α2 Rt+ α 3 DtRt+ α 4AGENCYt-1+ α 5 Dt*AGENCYt-1+ α 6 Rt* AGENCYt-1 
        + α7 DtRt* AGENCYt-1 + α 8,OVERINV t+1 + α 9 OVERINV t+1 + α 10 Rt OVERINV t+1 
            +α11 DtRt OVERINV t+1 + α12AGENCYt-1 * OVERINV t+1  
            + α 13 Dt AGENCYt-1 * OVERINV t+1 +α14 Rt AGENCYt-1*OVERINVt+1  
        + α15 Dt RtAGENCYt-1 * OVERINVt+1+ Controls +ε                                                (4A)  
 
∆NIt+1  =β0 + β1 DNIt+ β2 ∆NIt + β3 DNIt ∆NIt + β4AGENCYt-1+β5 DNIt*AGENCYt-1 
                + β6 ∆NIt * AGENCYt-1+ β7DNIt∆NIt * AGENCYt-1 +β8, OVERINVt+1 
                +β9 DNIt OVERINV t+1+β10 ∆NIt OVERINVt+1+β11 DNIt∆NItOVERINVt+1  
                + β12AGENCYt-1 * OVERINV t+1 
                 +β13 DNIt AGENCYt-1 * OVERINVt+1 + β14 ∆NIt AGENCYt-1 * OVERINVt+1  
           + β15 DNIt ∆NIt AGENCYt-1 * OVERINVt+1+ Controls +ε               (4B) 
 
where OVERINV is a dummy variable that gets 1 when firm-year observations are in the 
top quartile of unpredicted investment (or capital expenditure or acquisition expenditure) 
and 0 otherwise. Other variables are as previously defined. 
Note that in the above regression models, the dependent variable, OVERINV, is 
placed on the right hand side, which is different from the conventional regression 
specification. The estimation biases resulting from a misspeciﬁed model can be very 
serious especially when researchers misidentify an independent variable as a cause of a 
dependent variable. However, the essence of my analysis is to examine the association 
between accounting conservatism and the likelihood of overinvestment among J-type 
firms rather than establishing a causal link between conservatism and overinvestment (i.e., 
conservative reporting by J-type firms leads to less overinvestment in the future). In fact, 
a similar form of reverse regression model has been used by Francis and Martin (2010), 
who test whether conservatism is associated with subsequent divestiture decisions and by 
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Ahmed and Duellman (2010), who test whether conservatism is associated with higher 
future profitability and lower likelihood of future special items charges. However, given 
the potential misspecification bias, the results using the above models should be 
interpreted with caution. 
As demonstrated by Francis and Martin (2010), I expect that conservatism is 
likely to play an even more pronounced role in reducing the probability of making 
suboptimal investments in the presence of high agency problems. In turn, the coefficient 
α15  on  DtRtAGENCYt-1 * OVERINV t+1 is predicted to be negative while the coefficient 









5.1. Sample selection  
Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample selection process. The sample contains all 
observations from 1970 to 2006 with available data in Compustat, and CRSP to estimate 
two free cash proxies (FCF, EXCASH) and Basu‟s reverse regression and asymmetric 
reversion models. Post-2006 data are removed to prevent the macroeconomic liquidity 
shock from confounding the results. Consistent with the previous literature, I exclude 
firms in the financial services industries (SIC codes between 6000 to 6999), where 
liquidity is hard to assess, and in the utility sector (SIC codes between 9000 and 9999), 
where liquidity and governance as well as conservatism might be affected by regulatory 
factors. To reduce the effects of outliers, I delete firm-years where the value of free cash 
deflated by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year exceeds one in absolute value 
(Richardson, 2006), sales growth measured as the percentage of annual sales growth rate 
(Salest/Salest-1) exceeds 10 and market-to-book ratio exceeds 100. In addition to that, 
each variable is winsorized at 1% in each tail. Winsorization does not materially change 
the univariate as well as the cross-sectional results. Stock returns are obtained from CRSP 
monthly returns file and annual compounded buy-and-hold returns (R) are computed 
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  beginning 4 months after the fiscal year end to ensure that the market reaction to the 
prior year‟s earnings are excluded. I estimate conditional conservatism using the year t 
values of net income (NI) and buy-and-hold returns(R) for groups formed based on the 
year t-1 value of FREECASH and GROWTH. I partition the sample into J-type and non 
J-type firms based on two FREECASH measures, free cash flow (FCF) and excess cash 
(EXCASH) and one GROWTH measure, Tobin‟s Q (Q), using two ways of partitioning, 
median or quartile. Industry median values are annually recalculated bounds that yield 
equally sized below-median-group and above-median-group each year within each 
industry defined by the Fama-French 48 industry classification (1997). Industry quartile 
values are similarly determined annually within the each industry group, resulting 
equally sized top-quartile-group and bottom-quartile-group each year within each 
industry. For the sake of clarity, I refer to the partitioning based on FCF and Tobin‟s Q 
as FCF*Q and EXCASH and Tobin‟s Q as EXCASH*Q. For example, when the 
FCF*Q combination with median cutoffs is used, the AGENCY variable is coded 1 for 
firm-years with more than median free cash flow (FCF) and less than median growth (Q) 
in a given industry and set to 0 otherwise.  
When excess cash (EXCASH) is used to proxy for agency costs, the sample 
consists of 97,763 firm-years with all required data available. The fiscal year is identical 
to the calendar year for about 53% (52,122 firm-years) of the total sample.
18
 Because 
Statement of cash flow became available from 1987, so when free cash flow (FCF) is 
used to proxy for agency costs, the sample size is significantly reduced to 36,543 firm-
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 When I remove the observations whose fiscal year does not match the calendar year, the results are not 
materially affected, except the reduced adjusted R square.  
42 
 
years. I also obtain the G-score and E-index from the authors‟ websites.19  The data are 
only available since 1990. Since the data for the governance index are published about 
every two or three years, following Gompers et al. (2003), when the governance index for 
the particular year is missing, I assume that these governance scores are equal to the 
previously published value until the next value becomes available.  I take the negative 
value of these two measures to make them positive measures of governance and refer to 
them as the Inverse G-score (Inv G-score) and Inverse E-index (Inv E-index). Because 
the G-score and E-index are available from 1990, when the test requires corporate 
governance scores, the number of firm-year is significantly reduced to 33,923 
observation when EXCASH is used, and 19,394 when FCF is used.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the frequency distribution of the firm-year observations 
by year. The annual number of observations is generally increasing over time from 1,187 
in 1970 to 2,315 in 2006. More specifically, when EXCASH*Q is used, 38,931 firm-
years are identified as having above median free cash and below median growth rate (non 
J-type firms), and 28,979 firm-years are identified as having above median free cash and 
below median growth rate (J-type firms).  When I use the alternate quartile cutoff, 7,532 
firm-years are identified as non J-type firms, and 7,228 firm-years as J-type firms. When 
FCF*Q is used, 12,838 firm-years are classified as non J-type firms and 11,222 firm-
years as J-type firms with median cutoffs, while 1,797 and 2,603 firm-years are classified 
as non J-type firms and J-type firms, respectively with quartile cutoffs. Due to data 
requirements, the sample size varies across regression specifications. 
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 These governance indices can be found at http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/data.html. 
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5.2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel C of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for sample firms. On average, 
the sample firms hold 13.2 % of their total assets in the form of cash. The average sample 
firm has a market-to-book ratio (MB) of 2.349 and debt-to-asset ratio (LEV) of 22.2%. I 
take the natural log of market value of equity to proxy for SIZE. Both net income before 
extraordinary items (NI) and the buy and hold return (R) variables are positive, indicating 
that, my sample is composed of relatively profitable firms that have experienced positive 
market returns.  The mean (median) annual sales growth rate is 17.0 % (10.8%). The 
average sample firm spends 7.3% of its assets on capital expenditure, and 3.4% on R&D 
expenditure.  
Panel D Table 1 presents the mean and median values and the results of t-tests 
and Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the differences on a variety of firm characteristics for 
groups of firms sorted into non J-type or J-type firms by using the FCF*Q combination 
while Panel E provides the same information based on the EXCASH*Q combination. 
Most variables are significantly different between non J-type firms and J-type firms. Also 
in most cases, different partitioning methods generate similar patterns in differences 
between the types of firms.  
Across all panels, J-type firms are older, have bigger total assets, and have more 
sales than non J-type firms. Although a similar pattern of differences between firm types 
emerges, using quartile cutoffs identifies younger J-type firms and non J-type firms 
compared to using median cutoffs.  For example, when FCF*Q and median cutoffs are 
used, the mean firm age for non J-type firms is 13.7 relative to 16.3 for J-type firms, 
while with FCF*Q and quartile cutoffs, the mean firm age for non J-type firms is 10.3 
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relative to 15.9 for J-type firms. Also, compared to the median cutoff method, using the 
quartile cutoff method tends to classify smaller sized firms as J-type firms regardless of 
the choice of FREECASH as is evident from the size, total assets, and sales variables. For 
example, the median total assets for J-type firms is $135.4 million when FCF*Q with 
median cutoffs is used and $112.5 million when EXCASH*Q with median cutoffs is 
used.
20
 These compare with a median of $32.6 million and $54.7 million for FCF*Q and 
EXCASH*Q with quartile cutoffs, respectively. The median total assets of J-type firms 
with the median cutoff are similar to the sample median total assets of $100.9 million, 
while that with the quartile cutoff is much lower than the sample median irrespective of 
the method of partitioning.  
With FCF*Q, J-type firms have higher leverage than non J-type firms while the 
converse is true when EXCASH*Q is used regardless of the choice of the cutoff method. 
Especially with EXCASH*Q quartile cutoffs, the mean (median) leverage ratio of J-type 
firms is 12.7% (7.5%), which is well below the overall sample median of 22.2%. When 
FCF*Q with median cutoffs is used, J-type firms are more profitable (NI is larger for J-
type firms than non J-type firms), while the opposite is true for FCF*Q with quartile 
cutoffs. Combined together, J-type firms defined based on EXCASH*Q, especially with 
quartile cutoffs, have firm characteristics typically associated with costly external 
financing (smaller size, extremely low leverage, negative free cash flow, and lower net 
income). For example, firms with negative free cash flow are likely to be forced to find 
alternative external sources of financing for investment projects unless they have internal 
cash. Small firms are also likely to suffer from more informational asymmetry, thus 
external financing is often costly to obtain. Hence, J-type firms according to the 
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 The total assets distribution is highly skewed, thus the median is a better measure than the mean.  
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EXCASH*Q partitioning may have high costs of external finance, in turn; they may 
accumulate higher levels of internal cash to ensure they have enough resources to meet 
financial obligations (e.g., Opler et al., 1999).
21
  
Turning to the investment variables, J-type firms tend to invest less on both 
capital expenditure and R&D than non J-type firms across all panels, except the 
partitioning based on EXCASH*Q with median cutoffs where J-type firms have a similar 
level of  R&D spending than non J-type firms.  
The differences in corporate governance proxies are not statistically significant 
between the two groups except when the G score is employed to proxy for corporate 
governance under the FCF*Q with the median cutoff partitioning.  For this comparison, 
J-type firms have more antitakeover provisions (meaning weaker shareholder power) than 
non J-type firms in this case.  
J-type firms defined using FCF*Q with both median and quartile cutoffs and 
EXCASH*Q with median cutoffs pay less dividends than non J-type firms although the 
differences are not always statistically significant. This may indicate that the partitioning 
based on FREECASH/GROWTH may capture one additional dimension of agency costs 
of free cash flow, that is, unwillingness of managers to pay dividends to shareholders. On 
the other hand, J-type firms defined based on the EXCASH*Q quartile partitioning 
method pay more dividends than non J-type firms. Except in FCF*Q quartile cutoffs 
where J-type firms spend more on repurchases relative to their earnings than non J-type 
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 One may argue that shareholders may view the excess cash of financially constrained firms as necessary, 
thus do not consider excess cash as a concern for overinvestment. However, by definition, excess cash is 
defined as an additional amount of cash beyond what a company normally needs. Since all the legitimate 
reasons for firms to hold cash (including external financial constraints) is already considered in calculating 
excess cash, excess cash can still be an increasing function of agency costs of free cash flow.  
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firms, the differences in the ratio of repurchases to earnings are not statistically 
significant between the types of firms in all the other methods of partitioning. 
Taken together, the resulting differences between J-type and non J-type firms are 
largely consistent across partitioning methods except the EXCASH*Q quartile method, 
where J-type firms generate negative free cash flow on average (both the mean and 
median). More specifically, using FCF*Q median, EXCASH*Q median, and FCF*Q 
quartile cutoffs classify bigger sized firms measured by total assets and sales and more 
mature firms as J-type firms, while using EXCASH*Q quartile cutoffs provides relatively 
smaller sized firms which may face external financing constraints. Since shareholders 
may view the greater cash holdings of constrained firms as a value-increasing response to 
costly external financing, it is an empirical question to examine the expected relation 
between conservatism and agency costs of free cash flow holds with the EXCASH*Q 
quartile cutoff method. Furthermore, using quartile cutoffs filters out smaller sized firms 
from each of the firm categories.  
Panel F of Table 1 presents the pairwise Pearson (Spearman) correlations among 
contemporaneous observations of the main testing variables. Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation coefficients are reported above (below) the diagonal. AGENCY proxies, 
determined in four different ways, are significantly positively related to each other, which 
provides some evidence of construct validity of the measure of agency costs of free cash 
flow. The correlation coefficients between AGENCY and other variables are largely 
consistent with the data provided in descriptive statistics. The AGENCY variables 
determined based on FCF*Q are negatively related to PERS , a firm‟s tendency to 
persistently hold large amounts of cash, while the opposite is the case with EXCASH*Q. 
47 
 
Interestingly, 3 out of 4 AGENCY variables are negatively related to both measures of 
corporate governance, which is consistent with Richardson (2006), who finds that 
governance structures are not designed in response to free cash flow problems and with 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), who find that entrenched managers are more likely to 
build excess cash reserves. As previously indicated, the two proxies for free cash, free 
cash flow and excess cash, are negatively related to each other although the magnitude of 
the correlation is small.
22
 Similarly, each of these free cash measures is related to other 
remaining variables in an opposite direction. For example, firms with high FCF have low 
growth opportunities, low future sales growth, larger size, more leverage, and have 
stronger corporate governance. On the other hand, firms with more EXCASH have high 
growth opportunities, generate less free cash flow, are less levered, and have stronger 
corporate governance. Since the precautionary motive for cash holdings plays an 
important role in explaining the high excess cash ratio, a positive relationship between 
EXCASH and corporate governance is consistent with La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, 
A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (2000) who argue that a firm with external financing 
constraints is likely to have efficient corporate governance to build a reputation for 
moderation in expropriating shareholders. To the extent that firms with persistent large 
cash holdings accumulate internal cash as a precaution due to the external financing 
constraints, a positive correlation between PERS and governance proxies can be similarly 
explained as a firm‟s attempt to commit to a more effective bonding mechanism. The 
                                                          
22 The lack of a more developed theory makes the choice of proxies and the research hypotheses somewhat 
ad hoc. Since excessive cash reserves are essentially accumulated free cash flow, both free cash flow and 
excess cash reserves can raise a red flag about potential managerial expropriation among shareholders. Also, 
prior studies link both excess cash (e.g., Harford et al., 2008; Louis et al., 2009) and free cash flow (e.g., 
Richardson, 2006) to Jensen‟s free cash flow theory. Therefore, I explore my research questions using both 




univariate correlations generate interesting insights; however, they should be interpreted 
with caution as they do not provide any information about how the variables jointly affect 
the results.   
 
5.3. Primary results  
5.3.1. Tests of H1 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of testing H1, that is, whether J-type firms 
report more conservatively than non J-type firms. I estimate pooled OLS regressions with 
firm fixed effects and time effects to account for any firm specific or macroeconomic 
factors that may affect returns-earnings relationships across firms over time.
23
 AGENCY 
is a dummy variable that is determined as high FREECASH and low GROWTH. 
GROWTH is measured by Tobin‟s Q, while FREECASH is measured by free cash flow 
(Model 1 and 2) or excess cash measures (Model 3 and 4). Any coefficient interacted 
with DR measures the asymmetric (or incremental) timeliness with respect to bad news 
relative to good news. Thus, the coefficient on the interaction of the AGENCY and DR 
dummy variables, DR*AGENCY, is of particular importance. As expected, the 
incremental coefficient on negative returns, DR, is statistically significant and positive 
across all models, indicating that on average sample firms report losses in a more timely 
manner relative to gains. The coefficient on the DR*AGENCY as well as the sum of the 
coefficients on DR and DR*AGENCY are significantly positive at less than 1 % level for 
every model, meaning that J-type firms report more conservatively relative to non J-type 
firms. The more timely recognition of losses relative to gains is also reflected in the 
negative coefficient on R*AGENCY, meaning J-type firms are slower in recognizing good 
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 I also obtain qualitatively similar results if I do not include firm fixed effects and year dummies. 
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news as gains than non J-type firms. Notably, the coefficient on DR*AGENCY is larger in 
magnitude when the quartile cutoff is used than when the median cutoff is used. This 
indicates that using the quartile cutoff yields stronger results perhaps because the quartile 
cutoff captures the nature of J-type firms and non J-type firms better than the median 
cutoff.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results of testing H1 using annual cross-sectional 
Fama-Macbeth regressions. In general, previous results are qualitatively unchanged. In 
all specifications, the coefficient on DR*AGENCY is statistically positive at conventional 
levels of significance. Similar to the results in Panel A, the coefficient on DR*AGENCY 
is larger when the quartile cutoff is used than when the median cutoff is used. Also, the 
coefficient on DR*AGENCY is generally larger when the FCF*Q combination is used 
than when the EXCASH* Q combination is used to determine J-type firms. The same 
results hold after controlling for other potential sources of conservatism, including MB, 
LEV and SIZE. This strongly supports my main hypothesis that the severe agency 
problems associated with free cash flow engender the demand for conservative reporting 
from shareholders.  
Turning to the control variables, the coefficient on DR*MB is significantly 
negative, indicating that firms with smaller market to book ratios (MB) are more 
asymmetrically timely in recognizing bad news versus good news. The results for the 
coefficient on DR*LEV is sensitive to the estimation method used. For example, when 
Fama-MacBeth regressions are used, the coefficient on the DR*LEV is significantly 
positive at less than 1 % level in all the specifications, consistent with the previous 
findings that firms with higher leverage report more conservatively (Table 2, Panel B). 
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This indicates that debt contracting increases demands for conservative reporting. 
However, when pooled regressions are used, the coefficient on DR*LEV is often negative 
or insignificant. This might be because leverage is closely correlated to characteristics of 
J-type firms (from Panel F of Table 1, correlation coefficients of LEV between FCF, 
EXCASH and Tobin‟s Q are all significant with both positive and negative signs). The 
coefficient on DR*SIZE is negative and significant, indicating that smaller firms provide 
more conservative reports compared to their larger counterparts. With or without control 
variables, the coefficient on the DR*AGENCY interaction term is highly significant and 
positive across all the specifications. The coefficients on the control variables reported in 
Table 2 are similar to those in following tables and are not discussed further.  
 
5.3.2. Tests of H2-H4  
Tables 3 through 6 present the results from tests of H2 through H4, which 
examine how firm-type interacts with other factors that reduce or increase the free cash 
flow problem. Table 3 presents the results of testing H2, whether debt can reduce the 
demand for conservatism by restricting overinvestment by decreasing available cash. The 
variable DIST_D is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the firm‟s leverage exceeds the 
industry median leverage, else is coded 0. When agency costs are measured with median 
cutoffs, the coefficient of DR*AGENCY*DIST_D is negative and significant (coef=-0.037. 
t-stat=1.39) only when FCF*Q determines J-type firms. However, when the quartile 
cutoff is used instead, the coefficient of DR*AGENCY*DIST_D is negative and 
significant regardless of the choice of a free cash proxy, which provides statistical 
support for H2 that debt, with its obligation to pay interest, reduces agency costs of free 
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cash flow and in turn, reduces the need for conservative reporting as an additional control 
mechanism.  
Table 4 reports the results of testing H3, how firms‟ payout policies affect the 
demand for conservative reporting. Except for the specification using EXCASH*Q with 
the median cutoff, the coefficient on DR*AGENCY*DIV is negative and significant in all 
other specifications. On the other hand, the coefficient on DR*AGENCY*REPUR is not 
significant (coef= -0.033, 0.036, and 0.066, t-stat=-1.08, 0.78 and 0.82), inconsistent with 
my prediction. This means that while dividend payouts can serve as a monitoring 
mechanism to mitigate agency problems, thus reducing shareholders‟ demands for 
conservative reporting, the same argument does not apply to share repurchases. 
Repurchases do not entail as much commitment for future payouts as dividend policy or 
interest payments associated with issuing debt. If shareholders perceive share repurchases 
as an ineffective monitoring device due to its flexibility, everything else equal, the 
demand for conservative reporting would not be affected. Prior research also suggests 
that firms with weaker shareholder rights or corporate governance tend to choose to 
repurchase instead of increasing dividends in an attempt to avoid future payout 
commitments (Harford et al., 2008). Thus, the monitoring effect of repurchases can be 
minimal; this in turn, weakens the predicted negative association between repurchases 
and the extent of conservative reporting for J-type firms. Also, when a firm repurchases 
shares irregularly and infrequently, my variable REPUR may not accurately represent the 
firm‟s propensity to repurchase. To make REPUR a more meaningful indicator for a 
firm‟s general payout policy, I use the average of the amount of repurchases (deflated by 
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earnings) over the past three years as REPUR. The results are generally unchanged in this 
alternative specification (untabulated).  
In Table 5, I test how the demand for conservatism changes with the firm‟s 
propensity to retain cash. If shareholders view a sustained cash balance unfavorably, then 
they would subsequently demand more conservatism; thus, the coefficient on 
DR*AGENCY*PERS would be positive. Consistent with this conjecture, results show that 
the coefficient on DR*AGENCY*PERS is positive and significant in all the specifications. 
However, unlike quartile cutoffs where both the coefficients of DR*AGENCY and 
DR*AGENCY*PERS are positive and significant, the coefficient on DR*AGENCY is no 
longer positive when EXCASH*Q is used, or it becomes significantly negative when 
FCF*Q is used with median cutoffs. This might be because the variable AGENCY is 
subsumed in PERS. However, when the more extreme cases are compared (quartile 
cutoffs), firms‟ tendency to retain more cash leads to an incremental increase in reporting 
conservatism among J-type firms. Using an alternative proxy for PERS (when PERS gets 
1 when firms with positive EXCASH for the prior three years and 0 otherwise) does not 
change the results qualitatively.  
 
5.3.3. Joint tests of H1-H4  
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results using pooled OLS regressions when H1, H2, 
H3 and H4 are simultaneously tested in a single model to test whether each variable 
independently explains the association between conservatism and agency costs of free 
cash flow.
24
 The results from this joint model are generally consistent with results 
                                                          
24
 Corporate governance is not included in this model since (1) including corporate governance 
significantly reduces the sample size, (2) corporate governance is inherently related to firm‟s financial 
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presented previously.  This means that each of the alternative monitoring devices tested 
plays a distinct or independent role in reducing the free cash flow problem, thus adding 
an incremental effect to the overall demand in conservatism. The coefficients on the 
DR*AGENCY*DIST_D and DR*AGENCY*DIV terms are consistently significant and 
negative across different specifications. The coefficient of DR*AGENCY*REPUR is not 
statistically significant similar to the result from the previous tables. Overall, 
shareholders seem to consider leverage and dividend payments to be the more reliable 
ways of monitoring the use of free cash by managers.  
Panel B and C of Table 6 report the mean coefficients across 37 annual cross-
sectional regressions over the period 1970-2006 with related t-statistics corrected for 
autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. When the median cutoff is used (Panel 
B), the coefficients on DR and DR*AGENCY are positive and significant in most cases, 
consistent with the results using pooled OLS regressions. However, the results on the 
other tested variables are not as strong as those from pooled regressions. The coefficient 
on DR*AGENCY*DIST_D is negative in all cases but not always significant, while the 
coefficient of DR*AGENCY*DIV is significantly negative only when AGENCY is defined 
using the EXCASH*Q combination. The coefficient on DR*AGENCY*PERS is positive 
and significant at the 10% level only when EXCASH*Q is used to define J-type firms, 
while this significance goes away in the joint model (Model 5). On the other hand, when 
the quartile cutoff is used (Panel C), most coefficients show the signs as predicted and are 
statistically significant, consistent with the results from Table 6 Panel A. This confirms 
                                                                                                                                                                             
policies such as payouts or financial structure decisions. The analysis with corporate governance will be 
separately conducted in a later chapter using post-1990 data. 
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the idea that using quartile cutoffs provides a better partitioning between J-type and non 
J-type firms and a better model specification.  
 
5.3.4. Test of H5  
Next, I investigate the relation between corporate governance and conservatism in 
the presence of the free cash flow problem (H5). Focusing on the role of corporate 
governance in alleviating the agency problem, strong corporate governance implies a 
reduced need for conservatism. However, if strong corporate governance facilitates the 
implementation of more conservative reporting, then losses will be recognized more 
quickly than gains as corporate governance becomes more effective. Following extant 
corporate governance literature, I employ two proxies of corporate governance, the G-
score by Gompers et al. (2003) and the entrenchment index (E-Index) developed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) to test this conjecture. These governance measures are widely used 
to test how good corporate governance mitigates the negative effect associated with a 
large cash holdings (e.g.,Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford et al. 2008). If 
corporate governance reduces the demand for conservatism, the coefficient of 
DR*AGENCY*GOV should be negative and significant. Conversely, if conservatism is a 
manifestation of good corporate governance, a positive sign is expected. Since the G-
scores and the E-index are available from 1990, the sample for the analysis involving the 
governance variable covers the period 1990-2006.   
Results reported in Panel A of Table 7 indicate that when the median cutoff is 
used, the coefficient of DR*AGENCY*GOV is negative but not always significant. 
Specifically, the coefficient on DR*AGENCY*GOV is negative and significant only when 
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the G-score is employed as a proxy for governance. Along with the positive coefficient 
on DR*AGENCY, this means good governance reduces the incremental demand for 
conservatism among J-type firms, thus providing evidence that conservatism and good 
corporate governance act as substitutes in attenuating a firm‟s free cash flow problem. 
However, the same results do not hold when J-type firms are defined more narrowly. 
With quartile cutoffs, the coefficients on DR*AGENCY*GOV turn out to be positive in 
most cases, although they are not always significant. Another notable difference is that 
when the coefficient on DR*AGENCY*GOV is positive and significant, the coefficient on 
DR*AGENCY loses its significance. However, the sum of these two coefficients is 
positive (i.e., when FCF*Q is used, -0.007+0.106 >0), and the F-test that the sum of these 
coefficients equals zero (H0: DR*AGENCY+DR*AGENCY*GOV=0) is rejected at less 
than 0.01 level (F=9.59). This suggests that the total asymmetric timeliness coefficients 
for J-type firms with good corporate governance are positive, meaning J-type firms with 
good corporate governance report more conservatively. This indicates that among firms 
with more extreme agency costs of free cash flow, good governance facilitates the 
implementing of more conservative reporting, implying conservatism and corporate 
governance act as complements in alleviating agency costs of free cash flow especially 
when J-type firms are identified with the stricter definition.  
Using post-1990 financial data, I test whether the effect of corporate governance 
on conservatism changes in the presence of other alternative ways of monitoring 
mechanisms. Prior research indicates that corporate governance and other financial policy 
choices may be determined jointly. For example, Harford et al. (2008) find that US firms 
with weaker corporate governance measured by G-score and E-index hold lower cash 
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reserves because these firms spend their cash flow on capital expenditures or acquisitions 
quickly. Additionally, they provide evidence that in the presence of excess cash, firms 
with stronger corporate governance tend to choose dividends over repurchases, resulting 
in stronger commitment of higher payouts in the long term to shareholders. In sum, 
corporate governance and payouts and cash retention policies are clearly related. To 
mitigate this potential endogenous relationship between governance and other tested 
variables, I force the degree of corporate governance to remain constant over years by 
employing the initial corporate governance scores. The logic here is that the initial value 
of corporate governance is exogenous to the current level of conservatism, and that 
governance changes only slowly over time. This method has been used by other 
researchers in the corporate governance literature (Bebchuk et al. 2009, Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007).  
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results using pooled OLS regressions. Overall, 
results are very similar regardless of the choice of a governance proxy.  For brevity, I 
only present the results based on the G-score. Consistent with the earlier analysis, there is 
a strong positive relation between agency costs of free cash flow and the degree of 
conservatism (all the coefficients on DR*AGENCY are positive) and debt and dividends 
affect the demand for conservatism via reducing an additional need for a monitoring 
mechanism (all the coefficients on DR*AGENCY*DIST_D and DR*AGENCY*DIV in the 
EXCASH*Q method are negative and significant). However, unlike the results in Table 7 
Panel A, the coefficients on DR*AGENCY*GOV are mostly insignificant when other 
monitoring devices are taken into consideration. Only when the EXCASH* Q with 
median cutoff method determines J-type firms, the coefficient of DR*AGENCY*GOV is 
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negative and significant (coef=-0.023, t-stat=-1.79), indicating that in the presence of 
strong corporate governance, J-type firms exhibit less conservatism. However, in all the 
other specifications, governance structures do not affect conservatism in the presence of 
alternative monitoring mechanisms among J-type firms. Additionally, unlike the results 
reported in Table 6 where the PERS variable retains its positive sign, none of the 
coefficients on PERS are significant. The absence of relation between cash retention 
policy and conservatism among J-type firms may arise because even when using the 
initial corporate governance score as a governance proxy, the cash retention policy may 
still be directly correlated to corporate governance, creating a spurious relationship 
between variables.
25
 When PERS is removed from the joint model, the inferences for 
other variables are not affected. Collectively, the earlier results between conservatism and 
agency costs of free cash flow generally hold for post-1990 data and the results partially 
and weakly support the argument that corporate governance substitutes rather than 
complements the need for conservative reporting as an additional monitoring device. 
 
5.3.5. Summary of findings  
In summary, my results indicate that firms with potentially high agency costs of 
free cash flow tend to report more conservatively, and other potential monitoring 
mechanisms that are likely to influence the severity of agency costs of free cash flow 
have predicted incremental effects on a J-type firm‟s choice to report more conservatively. 
Specifically, both dividend payouts and debt issuance effectively bond managers‟ 
promises to pay out future cash flow, hence acting as substitutes for the monitoring role 
                                                          
25
 From Table 1, Panel F, the correlation coefficients between PERS and GOV are 0.17 (p<0.001) for the 
Inverse G-score and 0.15 (p<0.001) for the Inverse E-index. Although these values are not particularly 
large, they still suggest that a firm‟s cash retention policy is related to corporate governance to some extent.  
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associated with conservative reporting. However, share repurchases do not generally 
affect the incremental demand for conservatism among J-type firms, perhaps due to the 
fact that share repurchases offer companies more flexibility to hold onto cash unlike 
dividends, which are relatively more sticky because investors have been conditioned to 
expect dividend cuts only in the most dire circumstances. In my analysis of the impact of 
corporate governance on conservatism, I do not see a pattern that is fully consistent with 
corporate governance acting as a substitute or complement for conservatism. Overall, I 
generally find consistent results across alternative proxies of free cash (FCF and 
EXCASH), which adds confidence to the conclusions drawn from this study. However, 
given that different partitioning methods (FCF*Q or EXCASH*Q) identify firms with 
distinct characteristics as having greater agency costs of free cash flow, the results should 
be interpreted in its own right. 
For example, when FCF*Q is used, J-type firms also hold large excess cash, while 
J-type firms do not generate large free cash flow when EXCASH*Q is used to define J-
type firms. High excess cash may be indicative of managerial concern for uncertain 
future operating cash flows. If this is the case, the observed positive relationship between 
J-type firms according to EXCASH*Q and subsequent conditional conservatism may 
partly be explained by the cash enhancing role of accounting conservatism.
26
 Biddle et al. 
(2011) provide direct empirical evidence that increased bankruptcy risk generates a 
demand for subsequent conservatism through its cash enhancing role. Although their 
study examines this relation for firms with a condition of cash insufficiency (bankruptcy 
                                                          
26
 Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that conservatism enhances cash availability by both 
reducing cash outflows by discouraging cash disbursements and cash wastage by delaying the recording of 
net income and net assets, and increases cash inflows by making external financing easier (e.g., Watts, 
2003a,b; Biddle, Ma, and Song, 2011). 
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condition) which is an opposite condition to mine (cash rich firms), the cash enhancing 
role of conservatism is still valid in my setting. Given that J-type firms based on 
EXCASH*Q  have characteristics that are linked to greater external financing constraints 
(for example, small size and less leverage), the positive relation between high EXCASH 
firms and subsequent conservatism may partly reflect the managerial tendency to use 
conservatism in facilitating decisions regarding precautionary savings as future cash 
inflows become uncertain. However, this does not explain why the incremental 
conservatism among J-type firms decreases with debt and dividend payouts. For example, 
to the extent that firms opt for more conservative reporting in order to enhance cash, 
firms with high dividends or leverage would increase the degree of conservatism because 
both high dividend payouts and large amounts of debt represent cash outflows. However, 
the results turn out to be the opposite, suggesting that this alternative interpretation can be 
ruled out. The positive association between agency costs of free cash flow determined 
using the EXCASH*Q quartile partitioning method and subsequent conservatism is at 
least partly attributable to the disciplining role of conservatism in monitoring over 
managerial investment behaviors.     
Overall, using quartile cutoffs yields higher magnitude and statistical significance 
for the coefficients of interest, especially in the joint test. Also, the evidence inferred 
from using quartile cutoffs appears to be more compelling and robust, since it provides 
the expected signs on the coefficients of interest more often than using median cutoffs. 
Although my variables largely exhibit the expected signs, they sometimes are not 




5.3.6. Test of H6 
In this section, I examine how conservative reporting at time t affects the 
investment behavior of J-type firms at time t+1. Within the agency framework, managers 
are more likely to maximize their personal welfare by overinvesting when resources are 
under their control. Thus, the hypothesized benefit of conservatism in reducing or 
preventing overinvestment would be even more significant for J-type firms, which by 
definition are the firms that are likely to overinvest.  
In addition to overall investment, I also investigate how conservatism benefits 
firms by reducing overinvestment in specific types of activities separately, namely capital 
and acquisition expenditures to corroborate the results. Investment in R&D is excluded 
because of the unique nature of R&D expenditures compared to capital or acquisition 
expenditures. For example, investments in R&D are more likely to increase firm value by 
creating better products and adopting innovative technologies that may enhance 
productivity. Thus R&D expenditures may be viewed as long-term value creating 
investments. On the other hand, capital and acquisition expenditures may likely be 
undertaken to increase the size of the firm beyond optimal. Thus, I expect J-type firms 
with greater conservative reporting at time t would likely overinvest less in capital and 
acquisition expenditures at time t+1.  
The results reported in Table 8 provide evidence consistent with my expectation. 
In Panel A, I run Basu‟s reverse regression using median cutoffs, while Panel B presents 
the results using quartile cutoffs. Model 1 employs firm-year observations in the top 
quartile of unexplained total investment as a proxy for overinvestment, while Model 2 
and Model 3 employ firm-year observations in the top quartile of unexplained capital 
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expenditures and acquisition expenditures as a proxy for overinvestment, respectively. 
Table 8, Panel A shows that none of the coefficients are significant in Model 1, while the 
coefficient on DR*AGENCY*OVERINV is negative and significant at the 5 % level of 
significance (coef=-0.017, t-stat=-2.02) when the EXCASH*Q method is used, but not 
significant when the FCF*Q method is used in Model 2. However, all the coefficients on 
the interaction of AGENCY and DR*OVERINV are negative and statistically significant 
when OVERINV represents the overinvestment in acquisition expenditures (Model 3). I 
find more consistent results across types of investments when the quartile cutoff is used. 
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results of testing H6 using the quartile cutoff.  The 
coefficients on the interaction of AGENCY and DR*OVERINV are negative and 
statistically significant except in Model 1 with the EXCASH*Q method. I also perform 
the same analysis using the industry median investment as a benchmark for the optimal 
level of investment, and the deviation from the industry median as a proxy for 
overinvestment. The results are largely unchanged. Additionally, to measure the longer-
term effect of conservatism on overinvestment among J-type firms, I use the lagged 
AGENCY variable created at t-3, and find the coefficient DR*AGENCYt-3 OVERINVt+1 is 
still negative and significant (untabulated). In every specification, all control variables 
generally load as expected. Taken together, I document that J-type firms defined at time 
t-1 with greater accounting conservatism at time t make better investment decisions at 
time t+1, based on the magnitude of unexpected investment expenditure. As previously 
discussed, due to the concern about the model specification, all results in this section 




5.4. Additional Analyses 
5.4.1. Using Basu‟s asymmetric reversion model 
One caveat with respect to the reverse regression model, despite its popularity, is 
that information is measured using aggregate annual stock returns. Stock returns may 
capture information that will never be reflected in earnings, thus they are a noisy measure 
to determine the characteristics of news received during the period. To verify the 
robustness of the results from the reverse regression model, I use the asymmetric 
reversion model. More timely recognition of news means that more current news is 
reflected in earnings contemporaneously, leaving less current news to be recognized in 
the future. Thus if bad news is more timely, earnings will be less persistent for bad news.  
Panels A and B, in Table 9, exhibit the results of pooled regressions using median 
cutoffs with FCF* Q and EXCASH*Q, respectively. Panel C and D present the results of 
Fama-MacBeth regressions using quartile cutoffs with FCF*Q and EXCASH*Q, 
respectively. When corporate governance is included in the model, due to additional data 
requirements, the sample size is reduced. Overall, using this alternative measure of 
conservatism reduces the explanatory power measured by R square; however, inferences 
are largely unchanged compared to the results based on the reverse regression. Across all 
the specifications, the coefficient of DNIΔNI*AGENCY is negative as expected, 
indicating that the negative earnings changes of J-type firms tend to reverse slowly 
compared to those of non J-type firms. This is consistent with my primary results that 
shareholders demand greater conservative reporting in the presence of agency costs of 
free cash flow. Also, the coefficients on DNIΔNI*AGENCY*DIST_D and 
DNIΔNI*AGENCY*DIV are generally positive across all panels, implying that debt and 
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dividends reduce the need for additional monitoring mechanisms, in turn reducing the 
demand for conservative reporting. In terms of a firm‟s cash retention policy, the 
coefficient on DNIΔNI*AGENCY*PERS is positive and significant when OLS is used, 
but not significant when the Fama-MacBeth analysis is performed.  Similar to earlier 
results, I fail to find evidence that repurchases reduce the demand for conservatism. The 
explanatory power measured by R square is much larger in the Fama-MacBeth approach 
(ranging from 8.32% to 39.40%) compared to that of the OLS regression (ranging from 
4.57% to 22.06%).  
With respect to the effect of conservatism on the likelihood of overinvestment, 
Panel E presents the results with the quartile cutoff using the pooled OLS regression 
models. The coefficients of DNIΔNI *AGENCY*OVERINV are generally positive and 
significant across all types of investment activities, indicating that J-type firms reporting 
more conservatively are less likely to overinvest in a subsequent period. Overall, previous 
results using Basu‟s reverse regression generally hold with this alternative model, albeit 
with lower explanatory power.  
 
5.4.2. Alternate growth proxy 
As an alternative to using Tobin‟s Q to measure firm-level growth, I employ sales 
growth (SG). My original specifications use lagged Tobin‟s Q (at year t-1). While 
Tobin‟s Q contains forward-looking information about future investment opportunities, 
the past SG does not. To address this concern, I use the two year geometric mean of the 
annual SG of year t and year t + 1 to capture the future potential for growth. SG at time t 
is calculated as Salest/Salest-1.  
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I partition the sample into J-type and non J-type firms based on two FREECASH 
measures, free cash flow (FCF) and excess cash (EXCASH) and one alternative 
GROWTH measure, SG, using two ways of partitioning, median or quartile as originally 
done. Similar to earlier analysis, industry median and quartile values are annually 
recalculated. For the sake of clarity, I refer to the partitioning based on FCF and SG as 
FCF*SG and EXCASH and SG as EXCASH*SG. Using this alternative AGENCY 
variable, I re-estimate Equation 2A using pooled OLS. 
Using sales growth instead of Tobin‟s Q yields similar results. The results are 
presented in Table 10. The coefficients on DR*AGENCY are positive across all columns 
and statistically significant, meaning J-type firms report more conservatively than non J-
type firms. When compared to the results in Table 2 where Tobin‟s Q proxies for 
GROWTH, using quartile cutoffs provides very similar results in terms of the magnitude 
and the statistical significance of the coefficients on DR*AGENCY, while using median 
cutoffs provides relatively weaker results (for example, coef=0.039 t-stat=5.60 in FCF*Q 
vs. coef=0.016 t-stat=1.78 in FCF*SG). Overall, the results are robust to the alternative 
GROWTH proxy, sales growth. 
 
5.4.3. Lead and lag analysis 
Throughout my analysis, the AGENCY variable (a dummy for J-type firms) is 
determined based on the amount of free cash and growth prospects prior to observing the 
earnings and returns relation. However, a possible mechanical relationship between the 
AGENCY variable (the way I determine J-type firms) and contemporaneous earnings and 
returns relationship can cloud my inferences. To investigate this issue further, I conduct a 
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lead and lag analysis using the reverse regression model. To conduct this test, I 
incorporate the severity of agency costs of free cash flow at different points in time, 
including t-1 (AGENCYt-1), t (AGENCYt), and t+1 (AGENCYt+1). This specification 
allows me to track how conservatism is associated with the magnitude of agency costs of 
free cash flow over successive time periods. The results are reported in Table 11. Unlike 
the positive coefficient on the lagged DR*AGENCYt-1 (my original specification), none of 
the coefficients on DR*AGENCYt and DR*AGENCYt+1 are positive, meaning that current 
and future levels of agency costs of free cash flow do not account for the differential 
demands for reporting conservatism for J-type firms relative to non J-type firms. The 
differences in the extent of reporting conservatism between J-type firms and non J-type 
firms are only pronounced in the period immediately following the year when firms are 
identified as having greater agency costs of free cash flow. Additionally, the negative and 
significant coefficients on the DR*AGENCYt and DR*AGENCYt+1 (the coefficients from 
FCF*Q, Median cutoff) suggest that conservative reporters at time t would not likely bear 
high agency costs of free cash flow, concurrently (at t) and subsequently (at t+1), perhaps 
because the monitoring role of conservative reporting to oversee managerial actions over 
investments prevent the firms from retaining too much cash or encourage the firms to 
distribute the excess cash to shareholders. Taken together, these results lend support to 
my conjecture that greater agency costs drive the demand for conservative reporting from 
shareholders. Furthermore, these results provide evidence that the proposed AGENCY 
variable is exogenous. Although the results strongly support my main hypothesis that 
greater agency costs lead to greater conservatism in subsequent periods, I recognize that 
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my test does not imply a strong causality since the severity of agency costs of free cash 
flow is based on the firm‟s financial condition instead of exogenous shocks.  
 
5.4.4. Individual component analysis 
 One may argue that the positive association between timely loss recognition and 
agency costs of free cash flow is driven by low growth, one of the criteria to be classified 
as J-type firms, rather than the high amount of free cash. Throughout the dissertation, 
growth opportunity is measured by Tobin‟s Q, that is, the MB ratio. Although the MB 
ratio is expected to be positively related to timely loss recognition in theory, a positive 
relation is only occasionally observed empirically. If this is the case, then it would be 
difficult to argue that agency problems associated with free cash flow relate to 
conservative reporting. Since large amounts of free cash create the agency costs of free 
cash flow, and low growth opportunities exacerbate the agency problem, I investigate 
how free cash and growth opportunities interact to create the demand for conservative 
reporting. First, I partition the whole sample into four subgroups based on FREECASH 
and GROWTH. For example, a firm is placed in the High-Cash-Low-Growth group 
(HCLG) if its FREECASH is higher than the industry median and its GROWTH is lower 
than the industry median. As a result, there are four subgroups, namely LCLG, LCHG, 
HCLG, HCHG. Then, I estimate the following model and test whether my main results 
differ among these four groups sorted by FCF and GROWTH. I estimate the following 






NIt= α0+α1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+α4FREECASHt-1+α5DtFREECASHt-1 
       +α6RtFREECASHt-1+α7DtRtFREECASHt-1+α8 MBt-1+ α9 DtMBt-1+α10Rt MBt-1 
          + α11DtRt MBt-1 + α12LEVt-1+ α13 DtLEVt-1+α14 RtLEVt-1+ α15 DtRtLEVt-1 
          + α16SIZEt-1 + α17 DtSIZEt-1+α18 RtSIZEt-1+ α19 DtRtSIZEt-1  
 
where FREECASH is the scaled decile rank of either FCF or EXCASH.  All other 
variables are as previously defined. 
Table 12 shows the results of the tests where FREECASH is included separately 
in Basu‟s regression. Panel A and B present the results using FCF*Q and EXCASH*Q, 
respectively. In addition to Tobin‟s Q, I employ sales growth as an alternative growth 
proxy to ensure the robustness of the results. The coefficients on DR*FREECASH are 
significantly positive in the HCLG group across all panels (t-stat = 4.57, 3.54, 4.46, and 
1.57), suggesting that firms with large free cash report more conservatively when agency 
costs of free cash flow is the most severe. However, the same results do not hold for other 
groups. For example, when FCF is used to define J-type firms, none of the coefficients on 
DR*FREECASH are positive and significant in groups other than the HCLG group, 
regardless of the choice of the GROWTH measure. However, this pattern is not evident 
when EXCASH proxies for free cash, where there is a positive and significant coefficient 
on DR*FREECASH for the LCLG group in addition to the HCLG group when Tobin‟s Q 
proxies for growth and all groups except for the LCLG group when sales growth proxies 
for growth. In summary, there appears to be a positive relationship between high free 
cash and timely recognition of losses and this relationship is more pronounced for low 
growth firms, but the evidence for this relationship is more evident when FCF is 
employed as a proxy for free cash. In other words, MB effects are not the underlying 
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source of the positive relation between the AGENCY variable and conservatism. This 
increases my confidence that the grouping based on both growth and free cash is an 
effective way to capture the severity of agency costs of free cash flow, and results 
attributable to the differences in reporting practices between J-type firms and non J-type 
firms are reliable.  
 
5.4.5. Persistent vs. transitory J-type firms 
It is important to note that the AGENCY variable is created annually, so it is 
possible that firm type, either J-type or non J-type, may change every year. The change in 
classification does not contradict Jensen (1986)‟s agency costs of free cash flow 
hypothesis since the theory does not impose the requirement that firms bearing high 
agency costs continue to maintain that status. However, it is reasonable to argue that free 
cash flow problems would be more severe for firms with substantial and stable free cash 
than temporary free cash, holding limited growth opportunities constant. If the free cash 
flow problem persists in the form of a sustained level of free cash flow, the demand for 
monitoring managerial opportunistic behavior would be greater for these firms. Hence, 
the observed conservatism may be largely driven by the monitoring demand from 
persistent J-type firms, rather than transitory J-type firms. To investigate this issue further, 
I compare the subsequent conservatism between persistent J-type firms and 
transitory/temporary J-type firms. 
Persistent J-type firms are defined as firms having been identified as having high 
FREECASH/low GROWTH for each of the past 3 years (t-3, t-2, and t-1), while 
transitory J-type firms are those having high a FREECASH/low GROWTH condition for 
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the year t-1 only.
27
 Since these additional data requirements reduce the sample size 
significantly, I only use median cutoffs for this analysis. When FCF*Q is used, 8,206 and 
2,551 firms are identified as persistent and transitory J-type firms, respectively. Using 
EXCASH*Q identifies 20,332 persistent J-type firms and 6,624 transitory J-type firms. In 
other words, about 75 % of J-type firms maintain the J-type firm status for at least three 
years in a row regardless of the choice of a FREECASH proxy. This suggests that the 
level of agency costs of free cash flow is a relatively persistent, rather than a temporary, 
condition. 
In Panel A of Table 13, I compare the characteristics of persistent J-type firms 
and transitory J-type firms at year t-1. Irrespective of the choice of free cash proxy, 
persistent J-type firms have a lower Tobin‟s Q, bigger market capitalization, bigger total 
assets, bigger sales, more leverage, and a larger dividend payout ratio than transitory J-
type firms. Interestingly, persistent J-type firms have more anti-takeover provisions 
(weaker corporate governance) than transitory J-type firms and this difference is 
statistically significant. 
To investigate the reporting behavior of firms identified as having J-type firm 
characteristics in a persistent manner, I use the following regression model. 
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2 Rt+ α3 DtRt+ α4 AGENCYt-1+ α5 DtAGENCYt-1 
+ α6 RtAGENCYt-1+ α7 DtRtAGENCYt-1+ α8 PERSJt-1 + α9 Dt PERSJt-1  
+ α10 Rt PERSJt-1  + α11 Dt Rt PERSJt-1  +  α12 AGENCYt-1 PERSJt-1  
+ α13 Dt AGENCYt-1 PERSJt-1 + α14 Rt AGENCYt-1 PERSJt-1  
+ α15 Dt Rt AGENCYt-1 PERSJt-1 +Control + ε  
 
                                                          
27
 When I define persistent J-type firms as having the J-type firm condition for each of the past 5 years, the 
results are not qualitatively changed. 
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where a dummy variable PERSJ  is coded 1 for persistent J-type firms and 0 otherwise. If 
shareholders demand greater conservatism for persistent J-type firms, I expect the 
coefficient on DR*AGENCY*PERSJ to be positive and significant.  
Panel B of Table 13 presents the results for this model. The coefficient 
DR*AGENCY remains positive and significant, indicating that the incremental demand 
for conservatism for conservatism in J-type firms relative to non J-type firms is not 
attributable to the inclusion of persistent/temporary J-type firms in the sample. Also, 
persistent J-type firms report more conservatively than transitory J-type firms. The 
coefficient on DR*AGENCY*PERSJ is positive and significant at the 5% level regardless 
of the choice of FREECASH proxies (coef=0.023, t-stat=1.69 for FCF*Q, coef= 0.122, t-
stat=1.81 for EXCASH*Q).  Thus, the need of monitoring over managerial opportunistic 
behavior is relatively large for firms which generate a sustained level of substantial free 
cash and have limited growth opportunities persistently. It is also inferred that 
shareholders view the persistent agency problems about free cash flow as accumulated 









Recent research has shown that investors systematically discount the value of 
corporate cash reserves when they are at high risk of being misused for the private benefit 
of managers. This destruction of firm value represents the agency costs of equity, or more 
specifically agency costs of free cash flow. Prior literature also suggests that corporate 
governance can reduce the agency costs of equity by providing strong monitoring over 
managers who might act opportunistically. Although internal control (corporate 
governance) by boards of directors or institutional investors can help resolve the agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers to some extent, corporate governance is a 
part of corporate culture that changes slowly over time. Recent evidence suggests that 
accounting conservatism is an additional contracting mechanism that facilitates a 
reduction of agency costs for both shareholders and bondholders. In this dissertation, I 
examine whether financial reporting helps mitigate the potential risk of agency costs of 
equity when managers are likely to harm shareholders‟ interests by overinvesting. This 
particular environment is selected based on high free cash (or surplus cash) and limited 
growth opportunities relative to the industry.  
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I find that firms with higher agency costs of free cash flow, or J-type firms, 
measured as both high level of excess cash and low investment growth opportunities, 
incorporate losses in a more timely manner relative to gains. Also, other potential 
monitoring mechanisms that may affect the ex-ante level of agency costs associated with 
free cash flow, such as debt issuance, dividend payouts, and corporate governance reduce 
the demand for conservatism as an additional monitoring measure. J-type firms which 
persistently hold onto a large amount of excess cash report even more conservatively than 
their counterparts. Further investigation shows that J-type firms reporting conservatively 
are not likely to overinvest in the future compared to those reporting less conservatively. 
A series of robustness tests confirm the results.  
This study has several limitations. First, although the results strongly suggest that 
greater agency costs of free cash flow drive the demand for conservatism, this study does 
not identify the specific channels through which shareholders pressure managers into 
reporting more conservatively. Second, although lead and lag analysis provides some 
evidence that the severity of agency costs precede incremental conservatism among J-
type firms, it does not prove that agency costs cause conservative reporting, because J-
type firms are not determined by exogenous shocks.  
This study makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the literature that 
examines shareholder-related contracting explanations for conservatism. While prior 
research provides evidence that shareholders demand more conservatism when they face 
high agency costs of equity, these studies employ firms‟ choice variables, such as 
managerial ownership and board characteristics, to assess the levels of agency costs, thus 
making it hard to directly infer the link between agency costs of equity and conservatism. 
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Second, this study contributes to the literature that links conservatism to 
investment efficiency. By focusing on a specific agency conflict, the overinvestment of 
free cash, I find that shareholders turn to conservative reporting as an effective 
monitoring device over possible managerial opportunism, and the resulting conservatism 
among J-type firms enhances investment efficiency in the future. Moreover, my sorting 
criteria consider both the amount of free cash and investment opportunities, thus 
capturing the more subtle nature of the severity of the agency conflict. Third, the 
evidence in this dissertation is likely to be of interest to regulators who are currently 
advocating neutral accounting rather than conservatism. The fact that conservative 
reporting responds to shareholders‟ demand as hypothesized can be evidence that the 
capital markets exert sufficient pressure on firms, and act as an external corporate 
governance mechanism. 
This study could be extended in several ways. Jensen (2005) proposes agency 
costs of overvalued equity as a specific situation that may induce managers to engage in 
private wealth seeking at the expense of shareholders. When equity is overvalued, to 
justify the stock price, managers engage in value destroying activities once they run out 
of value creating activities to fool the market at least for a while. Future research can 
examine how conservatism changes with the agency costs of overvalued equity.   
Second, the downside of high surplus cash may be less pronounced during crisis 
periods because investors will likely view liquidity as more valuable during a crisis. 
Accordingly, the importance of conservatism as an additional disciplining mechanism 
may diminish. On the other hand, higher information asymmetry among investors during 
a crisis may drive up the demand for more control mechanisms for firms having high free 
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cash. Thus an interesting extension of my study might be to examine how economic 
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Appendix 1: Measuring FREECASH (Compustat codes are in parenthesis) 
I measure FREECASH as FCF or EXCASH divided by beginning of the fiscal year assets 
(Data 6). Using lagged FCF or EXCASH, and Tobin‟s Q, I define J-type firms. Firm-years 
with more than the industry median (or in upper quartile within the industry) FREECASH (either 
FCF or EXCASH) and less than the industry median (or in the lower quartile within the industry) 
GROWTH (Tobin‟s Q) at the end of the fiscal year t-1 are identified as J-type (non J-type). 
Industry affiliation is measured by the Fama-French 48 industry classification.  
(1) Free cash flow approach:  
FCF= Free cash flow from existing assets in place (CFAIP) –expected investment on new  
           projects (Inew).  
where  
CFAIP = Operating cash flows (Data 308) + Research and development expenditures (Data 46)  
  - Maintenance expenditures (Data 125)  
NEW  : The fitted value of investment regression.  
INEW=α+β1 V/Pt-1 + β2Leveraget-1+β3Casht-1+β4Aget-1+β5Sizet-1+β6Stock Returnst-1 
               +β7INEW,t-1+ΣYear Indicator+ΣIndustry Indicator 
 
where  
V/P = the ratio of VAIP* to market value, Leverage= (Data34+Data9)/(Data60);  
Cash=cash (Data 1)deflated by total assets(Data 6) at the start of the year;  
Age=the log of the number of years the firm has been listed on COMPUSTAT as of the start of 
the year; 
Size=the log of total assets(Data 6) measured at the beginning of the year;  
Stock Returns=change in market value of the firm over the prior year, calculated as (MVEt –
MVEt-1)/MVEt-1 where MVE=(Data 199* Data25); 
INEW=the difference between ITOTAL (Data46+Data 128+Data129-Data107) and IMaintenance 
(Data125).  
 
*Note : VAIP=(1-αr)BV+α(1+r)X-αrd, Where α=  r is a constant discount rate of 12% 
from Ohlson (1995), and  is the abnormal earnings persistence parameter of 0.62 from Dechow, 
Hutton, and Sloan (1999). BV is the book value of equity(Data 60), d is annual dividends(Data 21)
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and X is operating income after depreciation(Data 178). 
 
R&D is added back because while accounting standards mandate firms to expense research and 
development (R&D) expenditure, financial economists consider R&D a discretionary investment. 
Maintenance expense is deducted because it is considered necessary to maintain assets in place. 
(2) Excess cash approach:  
Excess cash :  Actual level of cash minus predicted level of cash (regression residual)  
                                   
 where , Cash=Cash and Cash equivalents (Data 1), NA=Net Assets (Data 6-Data 1), 
FCF=Operating income (Data 13) minus Interest (Data 15) minus Taxes (Data 16), 
NWC=Current Assets (Data 4) minus Current liabilities (Data 5) minus Cash (Data 1), 
Industry Sigma=industry average of prior 10 year standard deviation of FCF/NA, 
MV=Market value = Price (Data 199) times the number of shares outstanding (Data 25) 

















Appendix 2: Variable descriptions (Compustat codes are in parenthesis) 
NIt  is income before extraordinary items (Data18) at  the end of fiscal year t, scaled by market 
value of equity(Data 199* Data 25) at the end of the fiscal year t-1.  
ΔNIt is the change in net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by market value of equity at the 
end of the fiscal year t-1. 
Rt  is 12-month compound returns beginning 3 months after the fiscal year-end. Data are obtained 
from CRSP monthly stock returns.  
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
DNIt is an indicator variable set equal to one if ΔNIt is negative and 0 otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the industry median (or 
in upper quartile within the industry) FREECASH (either FCF or EXCASH) and less than the 
industry median (or in the lower quartile within the industry) GROWTH (Tobin‟s Q) at the end of 
the fiscal year t-1.  
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by lagged total assets(Data 6) at the end of 
the fiscal year t-1.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the end of the fiscal 
year t-1.  
DIST_Dt-1  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a leverage ratio above the industry 
median and 0 otherwise at the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
DIVt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a dividend payout ratio above the industry 
median and 0 otherwise. Dividends (Data 21) are scaled by earnings (Data 237) at the end of the 
fiscal year t-1.  
REPURt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a repurchase ratio above the industry 
median and 0 otherwise. Repurchases are calculated as repurchase of common and preferred 
stock (Data 115) minus stock issuances (Data 108), scaled by earnings (Data237) at the end of the 
fiscal year t-1.  
PERSt-1 is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if (1) firms have the ratio of cash and cash equivalents 
(Data1) to assets (Data6) in excess of 0.25 for the last three years(from year t-4 to t-2) following 
Mikkelson and Partch(2003) or (2) their excess cash (following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) 
are ranked in the top 2 deciles for the last three years (from year t-4 to t-2). 
GOVt-1 is either a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm has Inverse G-score (Inv G-score) or 
Inverse E-index(Inv E-index) above the industry median and 0 otherwise.  
83 
 
Inv G-score is the measure of anti-takeover protection developed by Gompers et al. , multiplied 
by minus one. Inv E-index is the measure of managerial entrenchment developed by by Bebchuck 
et al. , multiplied by minus one. Both are measured at the end of the fiscal year t-1.  
Tobin‟s Qt-1 is the sum of market value of equity (Data199*Data 25) and book value of debt 
(Data 34+ Data 9 ) scaled by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t-1. 
Industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q is calculated as Tobin‟s Q minus the median Tobin‟s Q in the 
industry, where industry is defined by the Fama and French‟ s (1997) 48 industry classification. 
Sales growth (SGt) is the percentage of annual sales growth rate calculated as Salest+1/Salest (Data 
12)  
Industry-adjusted sales growth rate is calculated as the 2-year geometric average of the 
annual percentage sales growth minus the median industry sales growth. 
Firm age is the number of years elapsed since the company‟s IPO year. I calculate firm 
age as the number of years since the firm first appeared on CRSP. 
CAPEXt is the capital expenditure (Data 128) scaled by total assets (Data 6) at the end of the 
beginning of the fiscal year t. 
R&Dt is the research and development expenditure (Data46) scaled by total assets (Data 6) at the 
beginning of the fiscal year t. 
Acquisitionst is acquisition expenditure (Data 129) scaled by total assets (Data 6) at the beginning 
of the fiscal year t. 
Investmentt is total investment expenditure, calculated as R&D (Data46) plus CAPEX(Data 128) 
plus Acquisitions(Data 129) less cash receipts from sale of property, plant and equipment, 
SalePPE (Data 107), deflated by total assets (Data6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
*Note : I average a firm‟s financial variables for all the firms  for each year in the sample, 
and calculate the median values of the variables for each industry defined by Fama-










Table 1 Sample and Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A : Sample selection table 
 
Initial sample with COMPUSTAT data with unique matches with CRSP data 294,349  
Observations after excluding financial and utilities firms 154,345  
1. Excess cash ( Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) 
Observations with valid information to calculate excess cash 120,175  
Observations after excluding outliers and winsorization 110,901  
Observations with valid information for current and lagged variables for Basu's regressions 97,763    
Observations with valid information to calculate excess cash and governance 33,923    
2. Free cash flow(Richardson) 
Observations with valid CFO data (CFO collection starts from 1987) 59,888    
Observations with valid information to calculate Free cash flow after deleting outliers 42,646    
Observations with valid information for current and lagged variables for Basu's regressions 36,543    
Observations with valid information to calculate Free cash flow and governance 19,394    
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Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Total sample 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev
AGE 97763 15.021 6.000 12.000 21.000 11.199
CASH/Total Assets 97763 0.132 0.024 0.064 0.176 0.164
FCF/Total Assets 36543 -0.021 -0.073 -0.003 0.054 0.147
EXCASH/Total Assets 97763 0.019 -0.008 0.000 0.014 0.845
Tobin's Q 97763 1.636 0.975 1.266 1.838 1.156
Ind. Adj. Q 97763 0.243 -0.258 -0.011 0.399 1.029
Sales growth 97763 0.170 0.004 0.108 0.240 0.436
Ind. Median Sales growth 97763 0.217 0.125 0.217 0.295 0.148
Ind. Adj Sales growth 97763 -0.069 -0.253 -0.112 0.044 0.453
MB 97763 2.349 0.974 1.653 2.843 2.427
SIZE(Log MVE) 97763 4.470 2.937 4.313 5.899 2.006
LEV (DIST_D) 97763 0.222 0.068 0.207 0.338 0.175
RET 97763 0.147 -0.204 0.056 0.379 0.543
NI ($ MM) 97763 0.041 0.013 0.061 0.110 0.697
Total Assets ($ MM) 97763 653.3 29.9 100.9 423.0 1667.5
Sales ($ MM) 97763 719.7 33.8 122.7 504.1 1773.7
ROA 97763 0.006 -0.041 0.012 0.070 0.139
R&D/Total Assets 97763 0.034 0.000 0.004 0.040 0.072
CAPEX/Total Assets 97763 0.073 0.029 0.053 0.092 0.072
DIV/EARN 97763 0.316 0.000 0.000 0.252 10.444
REPUR/EARN 97763 0.465 0.000 0.000 0.033 8.057
Inv G Score 5043 -9.189 -11.000 -9.000 -7.000 2.813
















Panel D : Descriptive Statistics of non J-type firms vs. J-type firms using FCF*Q 
 
FCF*Q 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
AGE 13.721 10.000 16.381 13.000 <.0001 <.0001 10.253 8.000 15.943 13.000 <.0001 <.0001
CASH/Total Assets 0.172 0.097 0.112 0.053 <.0001 <.0001 0.272 0.199 0.128 0.066 <.0001 <.0001
FCF/Total Assets -0.041 -0.021 0.001 0.015 <.0001 <.0001 -0.216 -0.169 0.057 0.067 <.0001 <.0001
EXCASH/Total Assets 0.033 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.0329 <.0001 0.093 0.018 0.016 0.000 0.0353 <.0001
Tobin's Q 2.372 1.917 1.258 1.129 <.0001 <.0001 3.424 2.808 1.080 0.960 <.0001 <.0001
Ind. Adj. Q 0.935 0.597 -0.160 -0.136 <.0001 <.0001 1.826 1.279 -0.548 -0.506 <.0001 <.0001
Sales growth 0.236 0.151 0.135 0.088 <.0001 <.0001 0.364 0.214 0.074 0.041 <.0001 <.0001
Ind. Median Sales growth 0.214 0.213 0.218 0.217 0.3654 0.3679 0.222 0.219 0.217 0.216 0.4883 0.3809
Ind. Adj Sales growth 0.001 -0.063 -0.104 -0.136 <.0001 <.0001 0.127 -0.005 -0.176 -0.202 <.0001 <.0001
MB 3.518 2.687 1.719 1.344 <.0001 <.0001 4.891 3.658 1.496 1.063 <.0001 <.0001
SIZE(Log MVE) 4.975 4.915 4.357 4.160 <.0001 <.0001 4.476 4.372 3.763 3.477 <.0001 <.0001
LEV (DIST_D) 0.187 0.155 0.247 0.237 <.0001 <.0001 0.168 0.112 0.194 0.172 <.0001 <.0001
RET 0.217 0.108 0.116 0.034 <.0001 <.0001 0.234 0.056 0.092 -0.029 <.0001 <.0001
NI ($ MM) 0.035 0.053 0.049 0.066 0.0001 <.0001 -0.043 -0.011 0.039 0.057 <.0001 <.0001
Total Assets ($ MM) 594.0 108.2 741.0 112.5 0.0817 0.8806 213.3 32.2 374.2 54.7 0.0009 <.0001
Sales ($ MM) 689.8 124.5 785.3 139.7 0.7461 0.0021 242.8 24.3 369.7 70.5 0.006 <.0001
ROA 0.020 0.038 0.003 0.005 <.0001 <.0001 -0.149 -0.059 0.017 0.004 <.0001 <.0001
R&D/Total Assets 0.044 0.007 0.031 0.003 <.0001 0.0003 0.096 0.024 0.042 0.008 <.0001 <.0001
CAPEX/Total Assets 0.080 0.057 0.068 0.049 <.0001 <.0001 0.073 0.043 0.052 0.035 <.0001 0.0004
DIV/EARN 0.323 0.000 0.312 0.000 0.0123 0.0022 0.350 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.1867 <.0001
REPUR/EARN 0.462 0.000 0.566 0.000 0.2789 0.0002 0.679 0.000 0.337 0.000 <.0001 <.0001
Inv G Score -8.925 -9.000 -9.340 -9.000 0.0543 0.8775 -8.784 -9.000 -8.894 -9.000 0.9713 0.9626
Inv E Index -2.354 -2.000 -2.519 -3.000 0.6008 0.8613 -2.224 -2.000 -2.375 -2.000 0.9521 0.8830
N 12,838   11,222   1,797     2,603     
Median Cutoff Quartile Cutoff














Panel E : Descriptive Statistics of non J-type firms vs. J-type firms using EXCASH*Q 
 
EXCASH*Q
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
AGE 14.814 11.000 16.123 13.000 <.0001 <.0001 10.076 8.000 13.625 11.000 <.0001 <.0001
CASH/Total Assets 0.120 0.054 0.147 0.086 <.0001 <.0001 0.066 0.032 0.247 0.193 <.0001 <.0001
FCF/Total Assets -0.015 0.007 -0.027 -0.011 <.0001 <.0001 -0.040 -0.007 -0.052 -0.035 0.08 <.0001
EXCASH/Total Assets 0.007 0.000 0.021 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 -0.101 -0.036 0.107 0.032 <.0001 <.0001
Tobin's Q 2.005 1.563 1.260 1.107 <.0001 <.0001 2.615 2.190 1.007 0.866 <.0001 <.0001
Ind. Adj. Q 0.615 0.253 -0.125 -0.135 <.0001 <.0001 1.266 0.875 -0.362 -0.377 <.0001 <.0001
Sales growth 0.202 0.131 0.140 0.088 <.0001 <.0001 0.273 0.187 0.096 0.048 <.0001 <.0001
Ind. Median Sales growth 0.218 0.217 0.216 0.216 0.4076 0.2111 0.213 0.212 0.207 0.205 0.1834 0.1596
Ind. Adj Sales growth -0.037 -0.087 -0.099 -0.134 <.0001 <.0001 0.038 -0.019 -0.137 -0.175 <.0001 <.0001
MB 2.982 2.183 1.698 1.309 <.0001 <.0001 4.063 2.992 1.220 0.880 <.0001 <.0001
SIZE(Log MVE) 4.880 4.778 4.361 4.222 <.0001 <.0001 3.511 3.287 3.061 2.920 <.0001 <.0001
LEV (DIST_D) 0.226 0.213 0.218 0.203 <.0001 <.0001 0.263 0.247 0.127 0.075 <.0001 <.0001
RET 0.195 0.098 0.106 0.028 <.0001 <.0001 0.266 0.114 0.066 -0.011 <.0001 <.0001
NI ($ MM) 0.044 0.060 0.042 0.065 0.8400 <.0001 0.031 0.049 0.015 0.050 0.1262 0.0437
Total Assets ($ MM) 684.8 135.4 781.9 105.9 <.0001 <.0001 109.4 20.9 146.2 32.6 0.0067 <.0001
Sales ($ MM) 766.5 167.5 844.7 123.2 <.0001 <.0001 126.0 27.8 153.2 33.8 0.0335 <.0001
ROA 0.023 0.030 -0.009 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 0.012 0.043 -0.052 -0.036 <.0001 <.0001
R&D/Total Assets 0.035 0.005 0.034 0.004 0.0241 0.0006 0.037 0.001 0.037 0.000 0.9696 0.1653
CAPEX/Total Assets 0.081 0.058 0.067 0.049 <.0001 <.0001 0.102 0.066 0.056 0.037 <.0001 <.0001
DIV/EARN 0.354 0.000 0.301 0.000 0.519 0.0744 0.094 0.000 0.215 0.000 <.0001 <.0001
REPUR/EARN 0.446 0.000 0.484 0.000 0.5664 0.0063 0.436 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.8485 0.0225
Inv G Score -9.137 -9.000 -9.370 -9.000 0.0251 0.1954 -8.804 -8.500 -8.244 -8.000 0.3156 0.2152
Inv E Index -2.435 -3.000 -2.497 -3.000 0.1506 0.1618 -2.237 -2.000 -2.286 -2.000 0.8431 0.7352
N 38,931   28,979   7,532     7,228     
Median Cutoff Quartile Cutoff











Panel F : Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) Correlations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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1. Panel A shows the sample selection procedures ; Panel B shows the number of observations for each fiscal year; Panel C shows the descriptive statistics of the entire 
sample firms; Panel D shows the descriptive statistics of non J-type firms and J-type firms, partitioned based on free cash flow (Richardson, 2006) and Tobin‟s Q; Panel 
E shows the descriptive statistics of non J-type firms and J-type firms, partitioned based on excess cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) and Tobin‟s Q; Panel F shows 
the correlations among the key variables used in the empirical analyses. Pearson and Spearman correlations are reported, respectively, above and below the diagonal.  
2. Coefficient a,b,c  is significantly different than 0 at the 1%, 5, and 10%, respectively using a two-tailed t-test. 
3. Variable descriptions:  
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) FREECASH (either FCF or EXCASH) and less than the median 
(or lower quartile) GROWTH (Tobin‟s Q) relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
FCF is free cash flow from Richardson (2006). FCF is scaled by lagged total assets (Data6).  
EXCASH is excess cash from Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). EXCASH is scaled by lagged total assets (Data6). 
Tobin‟s Q is the sum of market value of equity (Data199*Data 25) and book value of debt (Data 34+ Data 9 ) scaled by total assets (Data 6). 
AGE is the number of years since the firm first appeared on CRSP. 
CASH is cash and cash equivalent (Data 1) deflated by total assets (Data 6). 
Sales Growth is the percentage of annual sales growth rate calculated as Salest+1/Salest  
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets (Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
DIST_Dt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a leverage ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
RETt  is buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
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Net Incomet  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
DIV/EARN t-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a dividend payout ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. Dividends (Data 21) are scaled by 
earnings (Data 237) at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
REPUR/EARN t-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a repurchase ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. Repurchases are calculated as repurchase 
of common and preferred stock (Data 115) minus stock issuances (Data 108), scaled by earnings (Data237) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
PERSt-1 is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if (1) firms have the ratio of cash and cash equivalents (Data1) to assets (Data6) in excess of 0.25 for the last three years or (2) 
their excess cash (following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) are ranked in the top 2 deciles for the last three years (from year t-4 to t-2). 
GOVt-1 is either a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm has Inverse G-score (Inv G-score) or Inverse E-index (Inv E-index) above the industry median or 0 otherwise. 
Inv G-score is the measure of anti-takeover protection developed by Gompers et al., multiplied by minus one. Inv E-index is the measure of managerial entrenchment 































Table 2   Conservatism and Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow Using Basu’s Reverse Regression (H1) 
  
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+ α5DtAGENCYt-1+ α6RtAGENCYt-1+ α7DtRtAGENCYt-1+Controls +ε  (2A) 
  
Panel A: Pooled OLS Regressions of Earnings on Contemporaneous Returns 
 
Variable sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.067 27.02 *** 0.050 9.81 *** 0.022 1.67 -0.005 -0.38
D -0.022 -5.21 *** -0.057 -7.78 *** -0.022 -1.15 -0.053 -2.79 ***
R + 0.009 2.53 ** -0.016 -2.09 ** -0.037 -2.42 ** -0.022 -1.58
DR + 0.295 27.03 *** 0.339 18.50 *** 0.319 7.94 *** 0.342 8.48 ***
AGENCY 0.002 0.69 0.011 2.77 *** 0.035 3.80 *** 0.043 4.64 ***
DAGENCY 0.005 0.87 -0.003 -0.44 -0.004 -0.32 0.020 1.46
RAGENCY - -0.003 -0.48 -0.019 3.52 *** 0.014 1.28 -0.002 -0.23
DRAGENCY + 0.039 5.60 *** 0.048 3.43 *** 0.076 2.60 *** 0.086 2.89 ***
MB -0.029 -9.89 *** -0.048 -11.24 *** -0.047 -3.93 *** -0.027 -2.3 *
DMB 0.001 0.14 0.011 1.75 * 0.008 0.45 0.032 1.83 *
RMB - -0.027 -6.49 *** -0.007 -1.24 0.009 0.65 -0.005 -0.38
DRMB +/- -0.106 -8.79 *** -0.223 -15.31 *** -0.124 -3.30 *** -0.148 -3.93 ***
LEV -0.016 -5.69 *** -0.013 -3.37 *** 0.007 0.64 -0.001 -0.05
DLEV 0.011 2.30 ** 0.006 0.94 -0.009 -0.53 -0.006 -0.32
RLEV - -0.010 -0.83 -0.011 -0.82 -0.085 -2.45 ** -0.069 -1.82 *
DRLEV + 0.034 8.31 *** 0.041 7.71 *** 0.045 3.38 *** 0.050 3.7 ***
SIZE 0.043 15.06 *** 0.064 15.03 *** 0.076 6.07 *** 0.117 8.82 ***
DSIZE 0.013 2.78 *** 0.028 4.32 *** 0.018 0.88 0.015 0.7
RSIZE + 0.014 3.03 *** 0.018 2.90 *** 0.000 -0.01 0.014 0.81
DRSIZE - -0.212 -16.68 *** -0.188 -11.48 *** -0.170 -3.65 *** -0.304 -5.67 ***
Adj. R square 15.00% 14.37% 13.93% 14.58%
N 22,122   63,818   4,459     14,362   
FCF*Q EXCASH*Q
Model 1 Model 2Predicted 
EXCASH*QFCF*Q
Model 1 Model 2





1. This table reports the pooled OLS regression results of H1, firms that have limited growth opportunities and are generating large free cash (J-type firms) have more 
conditional conservatism than firms that have high growth opportunities and are generating small free cash (Non J-type firms),using the reverse regression in Basu 
(1997). 
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, one tailed if predictions are made, and two tailed otherwise.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items (Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and less than the median (or lower quartile) growth 
relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
Q is Tobin‟s Q, calculated as the sum of market value of equity (Data199*Data 25) and book value of debt (Data 34+ Data 9 ) scaled by total assets (Data 6).  
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets (Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
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Panel B: Annual Cross-sectional Fama-Macbeth regressions of Earnings Regressed 
on Contemporaneous Returns 
Variables Predicted sign
Intercept 0.0665 *** 0.0586 *** 0.0646 *** 0.054 *** 0.0587 *** 0.0669 * 0.0646 *** 0.0435 ***
5.44 3.14 5.59 2.91 3.16 1.76 5.59 5.13
D 0.0276 *** 0.0416 *** 0.0275 *** 0.0399 *** -0.0123 -0.0848 -0.0042 -0.0055
4.44 5.01 4.61 5.08 (-2.77) (-1.30) (-1.42) (-0.96)
R + -0.006 ** -0.0119 ** -0.0041 * -0.0142 *** 0.0413 *** -0.0439 0.0274 *** 0.0337 **
(-2.04) (-2.65) (-1.42) (-2.87) 5 (-0.45) 4.57 2.38
DR + 0.1976 *** 0.2865 *** 0.1984 *** 0.2782 *** 0.2861 *** 0.1194 * 0.1985 *** 0.1274 ***
11.12 8.39 11.18 7.96 8.43 1.43 11.18 4.14
AGENCY 0.0061 *** -0.0016 0.0136 *** 0.0134 *** -0.0017 0.0266 0.0135 *** 0.0279 **
3.38 (-0.83) 3.21 4.6 (-0.85) 1.02 3.13 2.34
DAGENCY 0.0107 *** 0.0107 *** -0.0017 0.0022 0.0107 *** 0.0343** -0.0016 0.0012
3.37 3.03 (-0.34) 0.42 3.02 2.63 (-0.32) 0.18
RAGENCY - 0.0051 0.0049 0.0021 -0.0002 0.0049 -0.0436 0.0025 -0.0107
0.86 0.69 0.48 (-0.04) 0.69 (-1.19) 0.58 (-0.92)
DRAGENCY + 0.06 ** 0.0818 *** 0.0284 ** 0.0243 ** 0.081 *** 0.2263 *** 0.0279 ** 0.1047 ***
2.36 2.99 1.87 1.84 2.97 5.14 1.85 3.28
MB -0.0293 *** -0.0289 *** -0.0437 -0.0362 **
(-3.50) (-3.45) (-1.62) (-2.64)
DMB 0.0034 0.0052 0.0194 0.0026
0.71 1.32 0.66 0.24
RMB - -0.0263 *** -0.0252 *** 0.0227 -0.0611 **
(-2.72) (-2.76) 0.34 (-2.03)
DRMB +/- -0.1613 *** -0.1591 *** -0.1032 ** -0.1284 *
(-5.21) (-5.50) (-2.12) (-1.67)
LEV -0.0048 0.0016 -0.0061 -0.0049
(-0.99) (-0.35) (-0.72) (-0.28)
DLEV 0.0039 0.0091 0.1649 0.0093
0.6 1.51 1.1 0.5
RLEV - -0.0088 -0.0086 -0.0400 ** -0.0222
(-1.04) (-1.03) (-2.18) (-0.51)
DRLEV + 0.0536 *** 0.0823 *** 0.4526 0.1039
2.72 4.48 1.06 0.85
SIZE 0.0457 *** 0.0456 *** 0.0333 0.0597 ***
7.28 6.68 1.23 4.21
DSIZE 0.0014 0.0009 0.0182 -0.0183
0.26 0.16 1.31 (-1.21)
RSIZE + -0.0012 0.0006 0.0608 0.0116
(-0.16) 0.10 0.78 0.48
DRSIZE - -0.1825 *** -0.1942 *** -0.0681 -0.143
(-7.28) (-6.45) (-1.38) (-1.52)
Adj. R Square 13.82% 19.81% 13.86% 19.76% 11.91% 18.56% 14.01% 16.08%
Median cutoff Quartile cutoff
FCF*Q EXCASH*Q FCF*Q EXCASH*Q
*Notes 
1. This table reports the Fama-MacBeth regression results of H1, firms that have limited growth opportunities and are 
generating large free cash (J-type firms) have more conditional conservatism than firms that have high growth 
opportunities and are generating small free cash (Non J-type) firms, using the reverse regression in Basu (1997). 
2. This table reports the mean coefficients across 37 annual cross-sectional regressions over the period 1970-2006 with 
Fama-MacBeth t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. The t-statistics are reported 
below the coefficients.   
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, one tailed if 
predictions are made, and two tailed otherwise.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of 
year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and 
less than the median (or lower quartile) growth relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
94 
 
Table 3 The Effect of Debt on Conservatism among J-type firms (H2) 
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+ α5DtAGENCYt-1+ α6RtAGENCYt-1 
       +α7DtRtAGENCYt-1+α8DIST_Dt-1+α9DtDIST_Dt-1+α10RtDIST_Dt-1+α11DtRtDIST_Dt-1  
            +α12AGENCYt-1DIST_Dt-1+α13DtAGENCYt-1DIST_Dt-1+ 
           +α14RtAGENCYt-1DIST_Dt-1+α15DtRtAGENCYt-1DIST_Dt-11 +Controls +ε  (3A) 
  
sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.070 15.01 *** 0.049 7.73 *** -0.007 -0.41 0.023 1.44
D -0.057 -8.45 *** -0.063 -7.25 *** -0.023 -0.97 -0.032 -1.38
R + -0.011 -1.64 -0.004 -0.40 -0.012 -0.71 -0.020 -1.12
DR + 0.323 19.46 *** 0.310 14.16 *** 0.227 4.87 *** 0.270 5.64 ***
AGENCY -0.019 -4.22 *** 0.006 0.92 0.072 4.90 *** 0.034 2.27 **
RAGENCY 0.006 0.99 -0.002 -0.20 -0.016 -0.95 -0.003 -0.16
DAGENCY - 0.030 4.45 *** 0.033 3.92 *** -0.002 -0.10 0.007 0.31
DRAGENCY + 0.053 3.26 *** 0.062 2.90 *** 0.204 4.55 *** 0.157 3.38 ***
DIST_D -0.026 -3.92 *** -0.020 -2.00 ** 0.056 3.30 *** 0.021 1.22
DDIST_D 0.023 2.39 ** 0.029 2.26 ** -0.008 -0.33 0.014 0.55
RDIST_D - 0.051 5.24 0.031 2.02 0.014 0.75 0.050 2.50
DRDIST_D + 0.030 1.29 * 0.034 1.01 0.061 1.29 * -0.001 -0.01
AGENCYDIST_D 0.019 2.50 ** 0.010 0.96 -0.076 -3.41 *** -0.042 -1.87 *
DAGENCYDIST_D -0.020 -1.81 * -0.028 -1.98 ** -0.005 -0.14 -0.020 -0.60
RAGENCYDIST_D + -0.021 -1.97 0.003 0.18 0.056 2.09 ** 0.010 0.36
DRAGENCYDIST_D - -0.037 -1.39 * -0.041 -1.16 -0.268 -3.73 *** -0.149 -2.02 **
MB -0.038 -11.12 *** -0.040 -11.46 *** -0.049 -4.11 *** -0.045 -4.00 ***
DMB 0.004 0.79 0.005 0.87 0.008 0.47 0.001 0.09
RMB - -0.017 -3.69 *** -0.018 -3.90 *** 0.004 0.32 -0.005 -0.39
DRMB +/- -0.205 -16.63 *** -0.205 -16.66 *** -0.121 -3.25 *** -0.134 -3.68 ***
SIZE 0.058 17.05 *** 0.061 17.67 *** 0.075 6.00 *** 0.096 7.49 ***
DSIZE 0.022 4.19 *** 0.026 4.82 *** 0.019 0.97 0.016 0.81
RSIZE + 0.016 3.24 *** 0.016 3.10 *** -0.001 -0.07 0.004 0.23
DRSIZE - -0.204 -15.38 *** -0.191 -14.11 *** -0.167 -3.57 *** -0.226 -4.50 ***
Adj. R square 14.68% 14.56% 13.42% 13.26%








1.This table reports the pooled OLS regression results of H2, J-type firms that have a smaller amount of debt will have 
more conditional conservatism than J-type firms that have a larger amount of debt, using the reverse regression in 
Basu(1997). 
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, one tailed if 
predictions are made, and two tailed otherwise.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of 
year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and 
less than the median (or lower quartile) growth relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
DIST_Dt-1  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a leverage ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 The Effect of Dividend Payouts Policy and Stock Repurchases on Conservatism 
among J-type firms (H3) 
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+ α5DtAGENCYt-1+ α6RtAGENCYt-1 
       +α7DtRtAGENCYt-1+α8DIVt-1+α9DtDIVt-1+α10RtDIVt-1+α11DtRtDIVt-1  
            +α12AGENCYt-1DIVt-1+α13DtAGENCYt-1DIVt-1+α14RtAGENCYt-1DIVt-1 
            +α15DtRtAGENCYt-1DIVt-11 +Controls +ε  (3A)  
 
sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept        0.048 11.46 *** 0.018 2.08 ** 0.092 5.20 *** 0.017 3.55 **
D -0.027 -4.19 *** -0.023 -1.75 * -0.043 -1.63 -0.048 -1.84 *
R + 0.032 5.40 *** 0.024 1.73 ** 0.022 1.03 0.044 2.25 **
DR + 0.270 17.06 *** 0.294 8.80 *** 0.166 3.02 *** 0.266 4.78 ***
AGENCY 0.000 -0.08 0.032 3.52 *** -0.066 -3.56 *** -0.049 -2.69 ***
RAGENCY -0.009 -1.15 0.006 0.47 -0.003 -0.15 -0.029 -1.36
DAGENCY - 0.017 1.80 * 0.002 0.13 0.033 1.17 0.026 0.92
DRAGENCY + 0.056 2.35 ** -0.012 -0.37 0.121 1.88 ** 0.048 1.73 **
DIV 0.043 9.56 *** 0.058 6.29 *** 0.009 0.42 0.000 -0.01
DDIV 0.012 1.70 * 0.013 0.95 0.044 1.29 0.069 2.02 **
RDIV 0.019 2.67 *** 0.040 2.53 ** -0.031 -0.97 -0.023 -0.86
DRDIV 0.120 6.25 *** 0.086 2.20 ** 0.312 3.93 *** 0.263 3.28 ***
AGENCYDIV -0.012 -1.81 * -0.022 -2.22 ** 0.040 1.50 0.052 2.01 **
DAGENCYDIV -0.001 -0.05 0.001 0.06 -0.053 -1.28 -0.074 -1.78 *
RAGENCYDIV + 0.015 1.34 -0.018 -1.09 0.060 1.52 0.031 0.86
DRAGENCYDIV - -0.084 -2.56 *** 0.008 0.18 -0.209 -1.92 ** -0.158 -1.85 **
REPUR -0.023 -5.14 *** -0.010 -0.95 -0.131 -6.85 *** -0.118 -6.20 ***
DREPUR -0.019 -2.72 *** -0.016 -1.02 -0.002 -0.09 -0.049 -1.74 *
RREPUR -0.080 -12.28 *** -0.065 -3.64 *** -0.092 -4.10 *** -0.106 -5.14 ***
DRREPUR 0.136 8.25 *** 0.095 2.20 ** 0.065 1.21 -0.032 -0.56
AGENCYREPUR 0.018 2.43 ** -0.008 -0.69 0.146 6.16 *** 0.132 5.59 ***
DAGENCYREPUR -0.007 -0.55 -0.006 -0.34 -0.014 -0.39 0.047 1.30
RAGENCYREPUR + 0.009 0.81 -0.012 -0.66 0.006 0.22 0.046 1.63
DRAGENCYREPUR - -0.033 -1.08 0.036 0.78 0.066 0.82 0.172 2.09
MB -0.029 -8.22 *** -0.031 -8.76 *** -0.037 -3.14 *** -0.016 -1.37
DMB -0.001 -0.12 -0.003 -0.55 0.009 0.50 0.030 1.73 *
RMB - -0.020 -4.26 *** -0.020 -4.30 *** 0.013 0.91 -0.012 -0.90
DRMB +/- -0.216 -16.74 *** -0.213 -16.75 *** -0.123 -3.28 *** -0.141 -3.73 ***
LEV -0.011 -3.27 *** -0.011 -3.40 *** 0.003 0.25 0.001 0.11
DLEV 0.002 0.34 0.001 0.24 -0.011 -0.65 -0.011 -0.61
RLEV - 0.033 7.25 0.032 7.23 0.039 2.92 0.043 3.20
DRLEV + -0.014 -1.18 -0.012 -0.97 -0.083 -2.41 -0.063 -1.69
SIZE 0.032 7.59 *** 0.035 8.27 *** 0.059 4.24 *** 0.104 7.08 ***
DSIZE 0.026 3.97 *** 0.027 4.00 *** 0.025 1.13 0.009 0.39
RSIZE + 0.013 2.30 ** 0.012 2.08 ** -0.006 -0.32 0.012 0.72
DRSIZE - -0.240 -15.57 *** -0.237 -15.23 *** -0.192 -3.99 *** -0.347 -6.31 ***
Adj. R square 16.45% 16.42% 16.24% 17.00%
N 22,122 63,818 4,459  14,362 
FCF*Q EXCASH*Q FCF*Q EXCASH*Q







1.This table reports the pooled OLS regression results of H3, J-type firms that distribute a smaller amount of cash to 
shareholders (either in the form of dividends or stock repurchases) will have more conditional conservatism than J-type 
firms that distribute a larger amount of cash to shareholders, using the reverse regression in Basu(1997). 
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, one tailed if 
predictions are made, and two tailed otherwise.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of 
year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and 
less than the median (or lower quartile) growth relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
DIVt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a dividend payout ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
Dividends (Data 21) are scaled by earnings (Data 237) at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
REPURt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a repurchase ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
Repurchases are calculated as repurchase of common and preferred stock (Data 115) minus stock issuances (Data 108), 





















Table 5 The Effect of the Cash Retention Policy on Conservatism among J-type firms (H4) 
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+ α5DtAGENCYt-1+ α6RtAGENCYt-1 
       +α7DtRtAGENCYt-1+α8PERSt-1+α9DtPERSt-1+α10RtPERSt-1+α11DtRtPERSt-1  
            +α12AGENCYt-1PERSt-1+α13DtAGENCYt-1PERSt-1+α14RtAGENCYt-1PERSt-1 
            +α15DtRtAGENCYt-1PERSt-11 +Controls +ε  (3A)  
 
sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept        0.051 16.17 *** 0.048 17.80 *** 0.035 3.17 *** 0.032 1.31
D -0.019 -3.54 *** -0.032 -4.49 *** -0.029 -1.74 * -0.024 -1.20
R + 0.001 0.34 0.003 0.41 -0.031 -2.26 -0.025 -1.61
DR + 0.401 32.08 *** 0.357 19.81 *** 0.320 8.91 *** 0.315 7.66 ***
AGENCY 0.014 6.15 *** 0.010 2.82 *** 0.025 3.01 *** 0.032 3.31 ***
RAGENCY 0.012 3.53 *** -0.001 -0.22 0.027 2.67 *** 0.023 1.95 *
DAGENCY - -0.001 -0.34 0.004 0.79 0.001 0.11 -0.002 -0.15
DRAGENCY + -0.070 -7.11 0.017 1.20 0.054 1.95 ** 0.054 1.74 **
PERS -0.022 -5.32 *** -0.045 -3.80 *** -0.039 -2.34 ** -0.042 -2.34 **
DPERS -0.009 -1.30 0.009 0.52 -0.022 -0.86 -0.005 -0.20
RPERS -0.038 -7.39 *** 0.010 0.61 -0.024 -1.35 -0.040 -2.24 **
DRPERS -0.010 -0.64 -0.050 -1.21 -0.029 -0.60 -0.004 -0.08
AGENCYPERS -0.013 -2.06 ** 0.019 1.58 0.020 1.07 0.019 0.94
DAGENCYPERS 0.008 0.74 -0.014 -0.76 0.018 0.63 0.004 0.12
RAGENCYPERS - -0.003 -0.30 -0.044 -2.51 *** -0.032 -1.53 * -0.017 -0.80
DRAGENCYPERS + 0.053 2.16 ** 0.075 1.76 ** 0.098 1.72 ** 0.078 3.32 ***
MB -0.011 -2.99 *** -0.035 -10.06 *** -0.040 -3.70 *** -0.045 -3.79 ***
DMB 0.006 1.07 -0.002 -0.36 0.012 0.73 0.011 0.61
RMB - -0.014 -3.06 *** -0.018 -3.93 *** 0.014 1.06 0.021 1.45
DRMB +/- -0.188 -13.97 *** -0.215 -17.12 *** -0.129 -3.73 *** -0.134 -3.58 ***
LEV -0.022 -6.50 *** -0.017 -4.87 *** -0.016 -1.51 -0.003 -0.24
DLEV 0.006 1.05 0.002 0.34 -0.001 -0.09 -0.010 -0.59
RLEV - 0.020 4.23 0.026 5.70 0.042 3.18 0.025 1.83
DRLEV + 0.034 2.57 *** -0.005 -0.42 -0.081 -2.37 -0.070 -1.93
SIZE 0.044 12.27 *** 0.060 17.35 *** 0.070 6.07 *** 0.072 5.74 ***
DSIZE 0.010 1.74 * 0.030 5.65 *** 0.022 1.19 0.022 1.12
RSIZE + 0.018 3.43 *** 0.020 3.84 *** 0.007 0.47 0.003 0.20
DRSIZE - -0.219 -15.08 *** -0.189 -13.79 *** -0.221 -5.15 *** -0.177 -3.79 ***
Adj. R square 15.53% 15.47% 15.17% 14.12%
N 22,122 63,818 4,459  14,362 
FCF*Q EXCASH*Q FCF*Q EXCASH*Q
Predicted Median cutoff Quartile cutoff
 
*Notes  
1. This table reports the pooled OLS regression results of H3, J-type firms that persistently hold large excess cash have 
more conditional conservatism than J-type firms that do not persistently hold large excess cash, using the reverse 
regression in Basu (1997). 
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, one tailed if 
predictions are made, and two tailed otherwise.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of 
year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and 
less than the median (or lower quartile) growth relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
PERSt-1 is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if (1) firms have the ratio of cash and cash equivalents (Data1) to assets 
(Data6) in excess of 0.25 for the last three years or (2) their excess cash (following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) are 
ranked in the top 2 deciles for the last three years (from year t-4 to t-2). 
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Table 6 Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and Conservatism Controlling for other factors 
affecting ex-ante Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow (Joint Tests of H1 to H4) 
NIt  =α0 + α1 Dt+ α2 Rt+ α3 DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+α5 Dt*AGENCYt-1+ α6 Rt*AGENCYt-1  
        + α7DtRt* AGENCYt-1 + α8,iXt-1 +α9,i DtXt-1+α10,i RtXt-1+α11,IiDtRtXt-1) 
        + α12,i AGENCYt-1 * Xi + α13,i Dt AGENCYt-1 * Xi + α14,i Rt AGENCYt-1 * Xi  
        + α15,i Dt RtAGENCYt-1 * Xi )+ Controls +ε  (3A)  
 
Panel A : Pooled OLS Regressions of Earnings on Contemporaneous Returns 
 
Predicted
Variable sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept         0.032 5.85 *** 0.032 1.46 0.046 9.89 *** 0.025 1.17
D -0.021 -2.48 ** -0.001 -0.03 -0.031 -4.22 *** 0.020 0.65
R + 0.034 4.34 *** 0.092 3.15 *** 0.046 6.97 *** 0.096 3.41 ***
DR + 0.224 11.17 *** 0.023 0.34 0.230 12.76 *** 0.017 0.25
AGENCY -0.003 -0.39 -0.024 -0.96 -0.015 -2.22 ** -0.041 -1.70 *
RAGENCY -0.008 -0.81 -0.048 -1.42 -0.029 -2.99 *** -0.042 -1.29
DAGENCY - 0.007 0.67 0.012 0.30 0.021 1.94 * 0.017 0.46
DRAGENCY + 0.118 4.36 *** 0.332 3.69 *** 0.165 6.00 *** 0.341 3.80 ***
DIST_D 0.005 1.66 * -0.021 -1.60 0.009 3.03 *** 0.003 0.27
DDIST_D -0.007 -1.39 0.010 0.53 0.001 0.11 -0.005 -0.28
RDIST_D - -0.016 -3.29 *** -0.004 -0.21 -0.013 -2.99 *** -0.014 -0.78
DRDIST_D + -0.008 -0.67 -0.016 -0.41 0.007 0.58 0.010 0.26
AGENCYDIST_D 0.005 0.99 0.028 1.65 * -0.001 -0.23 0.008 0.48
DAGENCYDIST_D 0.008 1.10 -0.024 -0.91 -0.007 -0.97 -0.023 -0.88
RAGENCYDIST_D + 0.009 1.40 -0.017 -0.72 0.006 0.90 0.002 0.11
DRAGENCYDIST_D - -0.009 -1.47 * -0.050 -0.86 -0.055 -2.95 *** -0.008 -1.14
DIV 0.037 6.06 *** 0.038 1.36 0.025 4.43 *** 0.025 0.95
DDIV 0.019 1.90 * 0.020 0.44 0.029 3.11 *** 0.026 0.63
RDIV 0.016 1.41 -0.036 -0.77 0.011 1.09 -0.025 -0.59
DRDIV 0.054 1.92 * 0.232 1.97 ** 0.059 2.18 ** 0.172 1.54
AGENCYDIV 0.002 0.20 0.048 1.40 0.022 2.71 *** 0.068 2.14 **
DAGENCYDIV -0.011 -0.82 -0.064 -1.15 -0.015 -1.12 -0.039 -0.75
RAGENCYDIV + 0.014 0.98 0.050 0.88 0.044 3.16 *** 0.038 0.71
DRAGENCYDIV - -0.140 -3.52 *** -0.365 -2.30 ** -0.122 -3.03 *** -0.187 -1.51 *
REPUR -0.032 -5.17 *** -0.090 -3.82 *** -0.017 -2.99 *** -0.056 -2.27 **
DREPUR -0.022 -2.29 ** -0.010 -0.28 -0.022 -2.43 ** -0.037 -1.04
RREPUR -0.044 -4.91 *** -0.031 -0.99 -0.034 -4.15 *** -0.055 -1.64
DRREPUR 0.091 4.26 *** -0.021 -0.33 0.095 4.62 *** 0.008 0.11
AGENCYREPUR 0.033 3.86 *** 0.061 2.00 ** 0.014 1.58 0.071 2.29 **
DAGENCYREPUR 0.010 0.73 0.047 1.02 0.009 0.62 0.018 0.39
RAGENCYREPUR + 0.023 1.85 ** 0.072 1.77 ** 0.007 0.58 0.041 0.97
DRAGENCYREPUR - 0.040 1.19 0.097 0.95 0.029 0.84 0.079 0.75
FCF*Q EXCASH*Q












Table 6 (continued) 
 
PERS -0.018 -4.00 *** -0.035 -1.96 ** -0.022 -4.42 *** -0.047 -1.67 *
DPERS -0.003 -0.44 0.001 0.04 0.003 0.39 0.012 0.28
RPERS -0.023 -3.86 *** 0.019 0.89 -0.008 -1.17 0.035 1.18
DRPERS 0.025 1.61 -0.024 -0.47 0.011 0.60 -0.073 -0.88
AGENCYPERS -0.003 -0.49 0.034 1.51 0.002 0.32 0.021 0.68
DAGENCYPERS -0.014 -1.27 -0.057 -1.68 * -0.028 -2.44 ** -0.043 -0.93
RAGENCYPERS - -0.005 -0.60 -0.097 -3.65 *** -0.031 -3.38 *** -0.085 -2.55 **
DRAGENCYPERS + 0.048 1.79 ** 0.026 1.36 * 0.037 1.40 * 0.015 1.15
MB -0.013 -3.15 *** 0.011 0.73 -0.029 -7.09 *** 0.007 0.46
DMB -0.008 -1.23 -0.038 -1.79 * -0.005 -0.74 -0.039 -1.82 *
RMB + -0.018 -3.21 -0.094 -5.35 -0.028 -5.12 -0.079 -4.47
DRMB +/- -0.140 -9.19 *** 0.098 2.22 ** -0.149 -10.19 *** 0.106 2.32 **
SIZE 0.036 8.89 *** 0.063 3.99 *** 0.037 8.98 *** 0.078 4.57 ***
DSIZE 0.033 5.02 *** 0.036 1.37 0.028 4.29 *** 0.022 0.81
RSIZE + 0.022 3.71 *** 0.017 0.80 0.018 3.09 *** 0.017 0.74
DRSIZE - -0.201 -12.64 *** -0.195 -3.29 *** -0.234 -14.48 *** -0.218 -3.32 ***
Adj. R Square 16.77% 18.07% 16.67% 17.00%














Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Regressions using the Median cutoff 
Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variable Sign H1 H2 H3 H4 H1-H4 H1 H2 H3 H4 H1-H4
Intercept 0.0501 ** 0.0511 ** 0.048 ** 0.0513 ** 0.0518 ** 0.0447 * 0.0457 * 0.045 * 0.0475 ** 0.0486 **
-2.18 -2.04 -2.16 -2.22 -2.09 1.93 1.91 1.97 2.08 2.07
D -0.0347 ** -0.0386 *** -0.0215 -0.0346 *** -0.0518 *** -0.0372 *** -0.0428 *** -0.0487 ** -0.0393 *** -0.0621 ***
(-6.25) (-5.69) (-0.99) (-5.85) (-3.54) (-5.01) (-6.28) (-2.56) (-5.30) (-3.32)
R + 0.0307 *** 0.0368 ** 0.0476 *** 0.0364 *** 0.044 *** 0.0197 * 0.0331 ** 0.01 0.0225 ** 0.0223
2.76 1.81 3 3.51 3.05 1.68 1.84 0.47 2 1
DR + 0.3153 *** 0.2573 *** 0.2662 ** 0.3108 *** 0.0922 0.3445 *** 0.3474 *** 0.1616 ** 0.3373 *** 0.1405 ***
10.85 3.62 2.13 10.78 1.51 10.12 7.5 2.41 10.71 2.72
AGENCY -0.0008 -0.0033 -0.006 0.0001 -0.0075 0.0052 0.004 -0.0019 0.0042 -0.0025
(-0.32) (-0.55) (-0.61) -0.03 (-0.60) 1.43 0.6 (-0.14) 1.11 (-0.17)
DAGENCY 0.0098 * 0.0052 0.0233 0.0096 0.0308 0.0188 0.0172 *** 0.0256 -0.0205 0.0496
1.66 0.26 1.32 1.61 1.62 (-0.88) 2.97 0.48 (-0.92) 1.3
RAGENCY - -0.0075 -0.0697 0.0782 -0.0013 -0.0996 0.0192 *** 0.0047 0.0614 *** 0.022 *** 0.0496 **
0.44 0.89 (-0.74) 0.07 1.49 2.62 0.27 3.17 2.71 2.64
DRAGENCY + 0.0129 *** 0.0188 *** 0.0064 0.0126 *** 0.0393 ** 0.0139 *** 0.0206 *** 0.0315 ** 0.0159 *** 0.0452 ***
3.07 2.77 0.29 2.79 2.27 2.99 2.97 2.05 2.9 2.89
DIST_D -0.0071 -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0075
(-0.69) (-1.10) (-0.54) (-0.61)
DDIST_D 0.0061 0.0192 * 0.0218 ** 0.0242 *
0.48 1.95 1.91 1.8
RDIST_D - 0.0123 0.0208 -0.0023 0.0005
0.41 1.53 (-0.07) 0.01
DRDIST_D + 0.181 * 0.2183 ** 0.1039 ** 0.1241 **
1.43 1.77 1.7 1.98
AGENCYDIST_D 0.008 0.0064 0.007 0.0058
0.85 0.91 0.53 0.48
DAGENCYDIST_D -0.0121 -0.0265 ** -0.0273 ** -0.0289 **
(-0.83) (-2.11) (-2.19) (-2.06)
RAGENCYDIST_D + -0.002 -0.0176 0.0157 0.0047
(-0.07) (-1.22) 0.45 0.15
DRAGENCYDIST_D - -0.1249 -0.1461 -0.0295 *** -0.0253 ***
(-0.92) (-1.11) (-2.48) (-2.43)






Table 6 (continued) 
DIV 0.0544 *** 0.0541 *** 0.0618 ***
3.95 3.78 3.92 3.53
DDIV 0.0341 0.0458** 0.0313 0.035
1.51 2.16 1.29 1.29
RDIV 0.0687 *** 0.0684*** 0.0611 *** 0.0645 ***
3.3 2.89 3.24 3.22
DRDIV 0.1028 0.1287* 0.1633 0.1891
1.6 1.94 1.36 1.49
AGENCYDIV 0.0127 0.0122 0.0034 0.0087
1.08 0.96 0.23 0.58
DAGENCYDIV -0.0142 -0.0271 -0.0044 -0.0105
(-0.56) (-0.99) (-0.20) (-0.43)
RAGENCYDIV + -0.0319 -0.0343 -0.0233 -0.0303 *
(-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.12) (-1.36)
DRAGENCYDIV - -0.0601 -0.0846 -0.1033 ** -0.1296
(-0.76) (-0.94) (-1.86) (-1.01)
REPUR -0.0203 -0.0218 -0.0321 ** -0.0263
(-1.40) (-1.54) (-1.86) (-1.56)
DREPUR -0.0413 -0.0028 0.0197 0.0165
(-0.98) (-0.14) 0.72 0.57
RREPUR -0.0752 ** -0.0729** -0.0028 -0.0205
(-2.11) (-2.14) (-0.06) (-0.48)
DRREPUR 0.0446 0.2992*** 0.257 ** 0.2691 **
0.17 2.76 2.12 2.09
AGENCYREPUR 0.0046 0.0041 0.0147 0.0059
0.3 0.25 0.6 0.24
DAGENCYREPUR 0.0106 -0.027 -0.0515 ** -0.0456
0.25 (-1.12) (-1.95) (-1.57)
RAGENCYREPUR + -0.0168 -0.0137 -0.0909 *** -0.0643 **
(-0.68) (-0.55) (-2.47) (-1.91)
DRAGENCYREPUR - 0.2193 -0.0501 0.0097 -0.0134








Table 6 (continued) 
PERS -0.3163 -0.3042 0.8528 0.8501
(-1.14) (-1.16) 1.01 1
DPERS 0.2994 0.2898 -1.8962 -1.8449
1.07 1.1 (-1.07) (-1.05)
RPERS 2.2684 2.191 -3.1748 -3.1542
1.06 1.08 (-1.01) (-1.01)
DRPERS -2.3418 -2.2467 -1.0622 -0.4433
(-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.32) (-0.68)
AGENCYPERS 0.295 0.2844 -0.8684 -0.8648
1.1 1.11 (-1.02) (-1.02)
DAGENCYPERS -0.2824 -0.2742 1.9074 1.856
(-1.06) (-1.09) 1.07 1.06
RAGENCYPERS - -2.1911 -2.1111 3.2347 3.2189
(-1.05) (-1.07) 1.03 1.03
DRAGENCYPERS + 2.3217 2.2119 1.0373 * 0.409
1.11 1.1 1.31 0.64
MB -0.0362 *** -0.0367 *** -0.0233 ** -0.0354 *** -0.0234 ** -0.0371 *** -0.0371 *** -0.0241 ** -0.036 *** -0.0241 **
(-3.23) (-3.26) (-2.15) (-3.16) (-2.16) (-3.35) (-3.38) (-2.19) (-3.21) (-2.21)
DMB -0.001 0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0014 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0019
(-0.13) 0.15 (-0.20) (-0.18) 0.06 (-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.19) (-0.21) (-0.23)
RMB - -0.0319 *** -0.0307 *** -0.0333 *** -0.0318 *** -0.0324 *** -0.0323 *** -0.0321 *** -0.035 *** -0.033 *** -0.0339 ***
(-4.35) (-4.21) (-4.73) (-4.01) (-4.54) (-4.51) (-4.51) (-5.11) (-4.28) (-4.98)
DRMB +/- -0.2523 *** -0.2387 *** -0.2343 *** -0.2622 *** -0.2263 *** -0.2519 *** -0.2516 *** -0.2416 *** -0.262 *** -0.2536
(-6.26) (-6.11) (-5.50) (-6.20) (-5.56) (-6.21) (-6.05) (-5.59) (-6.26) (-5.57)
LEV -0.0024 -0.0003 -0.005 -0.0021 0.0003 -0.0045
(-0.44) (-0.06) (-1.06) (-0.37) 0.06 (-0.96)
DLEV -0.0008 -0.0019 0.0003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.16) (-0.43) 0.08 (-0.41) (-0.66) (-0.21)
RLEV - 0.0123 0.0073 0.0069 0.011 0.0049 0.0056
2.16 1.37 1.05 2 0.98 0.91
DRLEV + 0.091 *** 0.0845 *** 0.1037 *** 0.0861 *** 0.1002 *** 0.1014 ***
3.19 4.18 3.16 3.54 3.76 3.14
SIZE 0.0586 *** 0.0591 *** 0.0211 * 0.0582 *** 0.0218 * 0.0599 *** 0.0594 *** 0.0234 * 0.0591 *** 0.0232*
7.38 7.58 1.81 7.39 1.89 7.16 6.94 2.02 7.15 1.97
DSIZE 0.0238 0.0226 *** 0.0192 ** 0.024 *** 0.0177 ** 0.0256 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0195 *** 0.0264 *** 0.0211 ***
3.19 2.94 2.49 3.22 2.51 3.59 3.75 2.73 3.68 3.23
RSIZE + 0.0071 0.0049 0.0031 0.0071 0.0002 0.0103 0.0095 0.0054 0.0112 * 0.0041
1.12 0.76 0.28 1.11 0.03 1.56 1.34 0.57 1.72 0.63
DRSIZE - -0.1673 *** -0.1657 *** -0.1965 *** -0.1663 *** -0.202 *** -0.1723 *** -0.1692 *** -0.2078 *** -0.1718 *** -0.2005 ***
(-5.72) (-6.01) (-8.81) (-6.61) (-5.83) (-6.07) (-9.65) (-6.25) (-9.29)




Panel C: Fama-MacBeth Regressions Using the Quartile cutoff 
Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variable Sign H1 H2 H3 H4 H1-H4 H1 H2 H3 H4 H1-H4
Intercept 0.0035 -0.0118 0.138 ** 0.0385 0.0453 0.0138 -0.0191 0.1355 ** 0.0184 2.7252
0.1 (-0.28) 2.11 0.95 1.15 0.42 (-0.47) 2.08 0.59 1.04
D 0.11 -0.0038 -0.1139 * -0.1094 -0.0402 0.0097 0.0281 -0.0953 0.0183 -3.9886
0.93 (-0.08) (-1.88) (-1.00) (-0.64) 0.29 0.66 (-1.51) 0.63 (-1.02)
R + 0.2151 * 0.1413 * -0.0354 -0.2225 0.141 ** 0.1544 * 0.2021 ** -0.0041 0.1532 ** -4.4094
1.35 1.53 (-0.32) (-0.73) 1.7 1.65 1.86 (-0.03) 1.77 (-1.01)
DR + -0.1212 0.1069 -0.0402 0.4949 * -0.2744 0.2355 ** 0.2085 ** 0.099 0.35 *** 11.9052
(-0.36) 1.06 (-0.20) 1.57 (-0.81) 2.12 1.77 0.67 3.11 1.01
AGENCY 0.0541 0.0337 * -0.0383 ** -0.0428 -0.0261 -0.0012 0.0328 -0.0619 *** 0.001 0.7137
1.39 1.87 (-2.47) (-0.70) (-0.95) (-0.10) 1.67 (-4.43) 0.09 0.91
DAGENCY -0.1133 0.0255 0.0125 0.1276 0.0202 0.0051 0.001 0.024 0.0013 0.0403
(-0.94) 0.92 0.33 1.01 0.32 0.64 0.06 0.76 0.19 1.15
RAGENCY - -0.1536 0.0093 0.0108 0.3729 0.0121 -0.0098 -0.0559 -0.0297 -0.0161 -14.929
(-0.79) 0.23 0.24 1.13 0.13 (-0.24) (-1.26) (-0.66) (-0.30) (-0.99)
DRAGENCY + 0.0045 ** 0.1645 *** 0.2113 -0.0308 0.3593 *** 0.1703 *** 0.1344 *** 0.2302 ** -0.0359 0.1738
2.09 2.68 0.96 (-0.65) 2.89 3.21 2.82 1.86 (-0.75) 0.68
DIST_D 0.0799 * 0.0575 0.0441 0.0835 ** -7.3697
1.9 1.37 1.4 1.95 (-0.99)
DDIST_D -0.0424 -0.0108 -0.0457 -0.0621 8.6662
(-0.89) (-0.18) (-1.39) (-1.44) 1
RDIST_D - -0.1517 * -0.0698 -0.0909 -0.145 * 30.192
(-1.53) (-0.66) (-1.20) (-1.52) 1
DRDIST_D + 0.1839 ** 0.2714 -0.0664 0.0849 0.0166
2.08 1.23 (-0.82) 0.88 0.15
AGENCYDIST_D -0.0382 * 0.0034 -0.0496 ** -0.0184
(-1.72) 0.12 (-2.29) (-0.88)
DAGENCYDIST_D -0.0282 -0.0385 -0.0004 -0.0052
(-0.79) (-0.71) (-0.02) (-0.23)
RAGENCYDIST_D + 0.07 * -0.1237 0.0539 * -0.0758
1.53 (-0.81) 1.36 (-0.81)
DRAGENCYDIST_D - -0.3318 *** -0.08 ** -0.1505 -0.0138 **
(-2.70) (-2.19) (-1.15) (-1.87)







Table 6 (continued) 
DIV 0.0856 ** 0.1366 ** 0.0907 ** -4.2871
2.69 2.71 2.41 (-0.97)
DDIV 0.0708 0.0243 0.0407 0.0215
1.57 0.34 0.55 0.24
RDIV 0.0048 -0.132 -0.0158 33.8976
0.04 (-0.69) (-0.11) 1
DRDIV 0.2219 0.4264 * 0.3136 0.4212
1.32 1.94 1.52 1.63
AGENCYDIV 0.0557 ** 0.0513 ** 0.0446 0.0543 **
-2.21 -2.05 1.63 1.84
DAGENCYDIV -0.1174 -0.0868 -0.0474 -0.0626
(-1.68) (-1.62) (-0.59) (-0.81)
RAGENCYDIV + -0.069 -0.0429 0.0086 -0.0097
(-0.80) (-0.47) 0.13 (-0.16)
DRAGENCYDIV - -0.3216 ** -0.2078 ** -0.1616 *** -0.1449 ***
(-1.74) (-1.75) (-2.53) (-2.48)
REPUR -0.1908 *** -0.0896 -0.1701 ** -0.2016 **
(-3.03) (-1.14) (-2.26) (-2.42)
DREPUR 0.0118 -0.0491 0.0239 0.0699
0.18 (-0.60) 0.32 0.88
RREPUR -0.0544 -0.3954 * 0.0311 0.1566
(-0.35) (-1.87) 0.15 0.52
DRREPUR 0.3999 0.8774 ** 0.5154 ** 0.2358
1.47 2.18 1.69 0.64
AGENCYREPUR 0.1068 *** 0.0347 0.0999 *** 0.1323 **
3.75 0.44 2.89 2.68
DAGENCYREPUR 0.0474 0.1089 0.0291 -0.0133
0.93 1.08 0.58 (-0.21)
RAGENCYREPUR + 0.0699 0.395 * 0.036 -0.0857
0.8 1.6 0.34 (-0.40)
DRAGENCYREPUR - -0.1534 -0.7081 * -0.2716 -0.2299








Table 6 (continued) 
PERS -0.0386 * 0.0125 -0.0332 0.0346
(-1.80) 0.34 (-0.91) -0.82
DPERS 0.0246 -0.0375 0.1198 0.0623
-0.67 (-0.72) 1.3 0.66
RPERS -0.0362 -0.0286 0.0404 0.0069
(-0.55) (-0.40) 0.37 0.06
DRPERS 0.11 0.0523 0.1891 0.2462
1.32 0.46 0.9 1.16
AGENCYPERS 0.0075 0.0076 0.0234 -0.0198
-0.34 -0.29 0.68 (-0.67)
DAGENCYPERS -0.0006 0.0077 -0.1241 -0.0904
(-0.02) 0.27 (-1.40) (-1.16)
RAGENCYPERS - -0.0265 -0.0312 -0.1248 * -0.0609
(-0.83) (-0.53) (-1.45) (-0.56)
DRAGENCYPERS + 0.1447 ** 0.1682 ** 0.1257 ** 0.0857
1.82 1.91 1.87 0.33
MB -0.1133 -0.0068 -0.1435 0.0764 -0.0877* -0.0106 -0.009 -0.141 -0.0114 -0.0851
(-0.92) (-0.12) (-1.44) -0.79 (-1.73) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-1.40) (-0.20) (-1.64)
DMB -0.039 -0.0391 0.1136 -0.0418 0.0511 -0.0467 -0.05 0.0989 -0.0453 0.0411
(-0.62) (-0.63) -1.16 (-0.70) -0.97 (-0.74) (-0.80) 0.97 (-0.74) 0.74
RMB - 0.0487 -0.1366 0.2686 -0.1359 0.162 -0.1193 -0.1196 0.2733 -0.1148 0.1706
0.21 (-0.99) 0.97 (-1.00) 0.9 (-0.87) (-0.87) 0.96 (-0.85) 0.91
DRMB +/- 0.0036 -0.0153 -0.371 -0.0102 -0.3363 ** 0.2472 -0.064 -0.4019 -0.0562 -0.3103
0.02 (-0.10) (-1.26) (-0.07) (-1.83) 0.74 (-0.44) (-1.42) (-0.38) (-1.69)
LEV 0.0474 0.007 0.0423 -0.0025 0.031
1.51 0.44 1.41 (-0.17) 1.07
DLEV -0.0427 -0.0018 -0.0383 -0.0065 -0.0461
(-1.25) (-0.09) (-1.18) (-0.37) (-1.52)
RLEV - -0.0363 -0.1258 -0.0454 -0.1096 -0.0432
(-0.62) (-0.92) (-0.78) (-0.84) (-0.77)
DRLEV + 0.0137 0.1884 0.0382 0.04 -0.078
0.17 1.21 0.47 0.27 (-0.90)
SIZE 0.0784 *** 0.0801 *** 0.0171 0.0749 *** 0.023 0.0921 *** 0.0947 *** 0.0231 0.0902 *** 0.0352 **
5.72 5.98 0.68 5.35 1.45 7.74 7.73 1.09 7.3 2.56
DSIZE 0.0192 0.0154 0.0618 ** 0.0335 0.0513 * 0.0157 0.0165 0.04 0.0172 0.0292
0.69 0.59 2.11 1.14 1.88 0.67 0.74 1.54 0.77 1.25
RSIZE + -0.0254 -0.0242 -0.0305 -0.0208 -0.0214 -0.0434 -0.0448 -0.032 -0.0472 ** -0.037
(-1.04) (-0.96) (-1.09) (-0.95) (-0.74) (-1.64) (-1.61) (-0.96) (-2.06) (-1.11)
DRSIZE - -0.158 *** -0.1693 *** -0.0689 -0.1267 ** -0.111 -0.1336 ** -0.1242 * -0.2438 ** -0.1293 * -0.2416 **
(-2.62) (-3.00) (-0.69) (-1.72) (-1.15) (-1.74) (-1.66) (-2.20) (-1.46) (-2.48)





1.Panel A reports the pooled OLS regression results of  the joint test of H1 through H4, while Panel B and C report the Fama-MacBeth regression results of the joint test 
of H1 through H4 using the reverse regression in Basu  (1997). 
2. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. Panel B and C report the mean coefficients across 37 annual cross-sectional regressions over the period 1970-2006 with Fama-MacBeth t-statistics corrected for 
autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. The t-statistics are reported below the coefficients.   
4. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when the sign of the coefficient is 
predicted, two-tailed otherwise.   
5. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and less than the median (or lower quartile) growth 
relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
DIST_Dt-1  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a leverage ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
DIVt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a dividend payout ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. Dividends (Data 21) are scaled by earnings 
(Data 237) at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
REPURt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a repurchase ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. Repurchases are calculated as repurchase of 
common and preferred stock (Data 115) minus stock issuances (Data 108), scaled by earnings (Data237) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
PERSt-1 is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if (1) firms have the ratio of cash and cash equivalents (Data1) to assets (Data6) in excess of 0.25 for the last three years or (2) 













Table 7 The Effect of Corporate Governance on Conservative Reporting among J-type firms (H5) 
Panel A: Pooled OLS regressions using the Median cutoff  
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+ α5DtAGENCYt-1+ α6RtAGENCYt-1+α7DtRtAGENCYt-1+α8GOVt-1 
           +α9DtGOVt-1+α10RtGOVt-1+α11DtRtGOVt-1 +α12AGENCYt-1GOVt-1+α13DtAGENCYt-1GOVt-1+α14RtAGENCYt-1GOVt-1 
            +α15DtRtAGENCYt-1GOVt-11 +Controls +ε  (3A)  
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept -0.003 -0.37 0.000 1.00 0.045 8.43 *** -0.006 0.4493 0.000 0.98 0.019 0.88 0.034 1.45 0.052 2.24 **
D 0.014 1.17 -0.039 -4.28 *** -0.017 -1.93 * -0.034 -3.24 *** -0.027 -0.83 -0.043 -1.31 -0.018 -0.52 -0.037 -1.11
R + 0.034 3.16 *** -0.001 -0.10 0.014 1.76 * 0.000 0.04 0.001 0.03 -0.048 -1.97 -0.031 -1.18 -0.071 -2.68
DR + 0.279 10.13 *** 0.259 12.00 *** 0.350 15.21 *** 0.282 10.8 *** 0.278 4.27 *** 0.326 5.04 *** 0.407 5.8 *** 0.430 6.33 ***
AGENCY 0.004 0.33 0.003 0.54 0.007 1.33 0.009 1.25 0.021 1.08 -0.009 -0.46 -0.010 -0.48 -0.037 -1.82 *
DAGENCY 0.000 -0.03 0.030 3.65 *** 0.007 0.77 0.020 2.14 ** -0.014 -0.49 0.029 1.00 -0.013 -0.43 0.012 0.38
RAGENCY - -0.007 -0.37 -0.001 -0.18 -0.007 -0.77 -0.003 -0.28 -0.023 -1.00 0.044 2.03 ** -0.010 -0.45 0.035 1.51
DRAGENCY + 0.075 1.81 ** 0.064 3.22 *** 0.076 2.83 *** 0.029 1.20 -0.007 -0.12 0.002 0.03 -0.042 -0.65 -0.085 -1.34
GOV 0.003 0.35 0.012 1.58 0.003 0.63 0.004 0.38 0.017 0.82 -0.016 -0.82 0.035 1.5 0.001 0.06
DGOV 0.003 0.23 0.001 0.10 -0.003 -0.36 0.004 0.29 -0.025 -0.83 -0.002 -0.06 -0.060 -1.84 * -0.027 -0.86
RGOV -0.032 -2.48 ** -0.011 -1.02 0.004 0.52 -0.017 -1.06 0.070 2.97 *** 0.012 0.56 -0.056 -2.05 ** 0.015 0.59
DRGOV 0.076 2.44 ** 0.013 0.46 -0.017 -0.80 0.011 0.31 -0.032 0.56 -0.055 -1.99 ** -0.028 -0.44 -0.076 -1.83 *
AGENCYGOV -0.016 -1.01 -0.008 -0.93 -0.003 -0.42 0.002 0.22 -0.023 -0.90 0.028 1.15 -0.057 -2.03 ** -0.003 -0.12
DAGENCYGOV 0.002 0.06 -0.018 -1.38 -0.006 -0.38 -0.018 -1.19 0.047 1.20 -0.029 -0.78 0.057 1.38 0.013 0.33
RAGENCYGOV +/- 0.015 0.58 0.004 0.30 -0.001 -0.04 0.009 0.54 0.062 2.04 ** -0.050 -1.76 ** 0.058 1.72 ** -0.026 -0.86
DRAGENCYGOV +/- -0.095 -1.87 ** -0.031 -0.99 -0.081 -1.99 ** -0.021 -0.56 0.106 2.27 ** 0.080 1.01 0.041 1.46 * 0.129 1.92 **
MB -0.016 -2.57 ** -0.028 -5.87 *** -0.004 -0.75 -0.030 -6.12 *** -0.080 -4.71 *** -0.081 -4.75 *** -0.095 -5.33 *** -0.095 -5.34 ***
DMB -0.027 -2.49 ** -0.002 -0.26 -0.008 -0.95 -0.001 -0.14 0.016 0.63 0.018 0.69 0.023 0.89 0.025 0.94
RMB + -0.046 -5.61 *** -0.024 -3.90 *** -0.021 -2.87 *** -0.023 -3.85 *** -0.013 -0.69 -0.011 -0.60 0.003 0.14 0.001 0.06
DRMB +/- -0.081 -3.37 *** -0.134 -8.27 *** -0.145 -6.86 *** -0.132 -8.15 *** -0.136 -2.60 *** -0.133 -2.54 *** -0.171 -3.16 *** -0.167 -3.07 ***
LEV 0.013 2.14 ** 0.013 2.93 *** -0.016 -3.22 *** 0.013 2.91 *** 0.043 2.78 *** 0.042 2.78 *** 0.016 0.96 0.016 0.91
DLEV 0.004 0.35 0.000 -0.01 0.019 2.30 ** -0.001 -0.15 -0.007 -0.29 -0.007 -0.29 0.014 0.53 0.015 0.58
RLEV - 0.021 2.59 0.023 3.91 0.023 3.24 0.023 3.92 0.037 2.08 0.038 2.11 0.057 2.91 0.060 3.05
DRLEV + 0.043 1.83 ** 0.006 0.39 0.036 1.73 ** 0.004 0.28 -0.014 -0.29 -0.017 -0.36 -0.076 -1.39 -0.078 -1.43
SIZE 0.068 10.43 *** 0.068 14.36 *** 0.040 8.57 *** 0.070 14.60 *** 0.072 4.30 *** 0.072 4.31 *** 0.085 4.52 *** 0.083 4.4 ***
DSIZE -0.009 -0.86 0.019 2.58 *** 0.016 2.02 ** 0.020 2.66 *** 0.046 1.70 * 0.047 1.74 * 0.024 0.81 0.026 0.87
RSIZE + 0.004 0.39 0.013 1.98 ** 0.021 2.84 *** 0.013 1.96 ** 0.022 1.04 0.021 0.96 0.022 0.92 0.027 1.09
DRSIZE - -0.314 -11.71 *** -0.205 -11.79 *** -0.256 -12.12 *** -0.203 -11.44 *** -0.152 -2.49 *** -0.147 -2.40 *** -0.231 -3.12 *** -0.235 -3.17 ***
Adj. R square 13.75% 13.76% 13.65% 13.78% 13.22% 14.02% 11.87% 12.01%
N 19,394 19,394 33,923 33,923 4,507  4,507  3,848  3,848  
FCF*Q EXCASH*Q FCF*Q EXCASH*Q
Median Cutoff Quartile Cutoff
Inv G score Inv E Index Inv G score Inv E Index
Predicted sign




Panel B: Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and Conservatism Controlling for other factors 
affecting ex-ante Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow (Joint Test) post 90s 
NIt  =α0 + α1 Dt+ α2 Rt+ α3 DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+α5 Dt*AGENCYt-1+ α6 Rt*AGENCYt-1  
        + α7DtRt* AGENCYt-1 + α8,iXt-1 +α9,i DtXt-1+α10,i RtXt-1+α11,IiDtRtXt-1) 
        + α12,i AGENCYt-1 * Xi + α13,i Dt AGENCYt-1 * Xi + α14,i Rt AGENCYt-1 * Xi  
         + α15,i Dt RtAGENCYt-1 * Xi )+ Controls +ε  (3A)  
  
Predicted
variable sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.003 0.37 0.078 2.17 ** 0.021 2.89 *** 0.051 1.24
D -0.008 -0.63 -0.053 -0.99 -0.003 -0.23 0.024 0.41
R + 0.016 1.35 * 0.021 0.36 0.039 3.71 *** 0.085 1.32 *
DR + 0.268 9.10 *** 0.195 1.69 * 0.264 9.67 *** 0.104 0.79
AGENCY 0.010 1.00 -0.047 -1.14 -0.014 -1.27 -0.099 -2.08 **
DAGENCY -0.001 -0.08 0.031 0.49 -0.025 -1.44 0.093 1.32
RAGENCY + -0.003 -0.21 0.013 0.20 -0.055 -3.60 *** -0.028 -0.39
DRAGENCY + 0.048 1.78 ** 0.160 1.91 ** 0.095 2.19 ** 0.383 2.25 **
GOV 0.004 0.67 -0.039 -1.67 * 0.010 1.88 * -0.015 -0.52
DGOV -0.010 -1.11 0.058 1.75 * -0.015 -1.75 * 0.020 0.50
RGOV -0.005 -0.59 0.030 0.94 -0.010 -1.36 0.010 0.26
DRGOV -0.009 -0.43 0.004 0.06 -0.004 -0.19 0.014 0.18
AGENCYGOV 0.005 0.65 0.033 1.14 -0.012 -1.50 0.009 0.25
DAGENCYGOV -0.001 -0.04 -0.056 -1.25 0.022 1.63 * -0.061 -1.18
RAGENCYGOV +/- -0.010 -0.90 -0.049 -1.29 0.013 1.12 -0.033 -0.71
DRAGENCYGOV +/- 0.027 0.88 0.040 0.42 -0.023 -1.79 ** 0.076 0.66
DIST_D -0.001 -0.33 -0.030 -1.70 * 0.003 0.80 -0.007 -0.35
DDIST_D -0.007 -0.98 0.011 0.41 -0.006 -0.89 -0.011 -0.38
RDIST_D -0.011 -1.70 * -0.002 -0.10 -0.016 -2.68 *** -0.018 -0.63
DRDIST_D -0.014 -0.87 -0.035 -0.67 -0.003 -0.21 -0.003 -0.04
AGENCYDIST_D 0.000 0.00 0.002 0.10 -0.011 -1.62 * -0.001 -0.04
DAGENCYDIST_D 0.013 1.21 -0.010 -0.29 0.019 1.75 * -0.051 -1.21
RAGENCYDIST_D + 0.012 1.39 -0.005 -0.15 0.028 3.16 *** 0.016 0.46
DRAGENCYDIST_D - -0.034 -1.14 -0.042 -2.55 *** -0.036 -1.39 * -0.082 -1.68 **
DIV 0.042 4.74 *** 0.047 1.09 0.022 2.63 *** 0.039 0.85
DDIV 0.012 0.82 0.006 0.08 0.018 1.25 -0.002 -0.02
RDIV 0.047 2.67 *** 0.043 0.45 0.041 2.59 *** 0.006 0.07
DRDIV -0.082 -1.96 ** -0.014 -0.07 -0.075 -1.83 0.013 0.06
AGENCYDIV -0.015 -1.28 0.046 0.89 0.029 2.36 ** 0.094 1.65 *
DAGENCYDIV 0.003 0.15 -0.012 -0.14 0.003 0.16 0.006 0.07
RAGENCYDIV + 0.011 0.52 -0.015 -1.14 0.042 1.88 * 0.014 1.13
DRAGENCYDIV - -0.055 -0.91 -0.103 -1.40 * -0.062 -1.99 ** -0.118 -1.41 *
REPUR -0.028 -3.55 *** -0.089 -2.93 *** -0.021 -2.76 *** -0.050 -1.30
DREPUR -0.025 -2.05 ** -0.003 -0.08 -0.041 -3.43 *** -0.040 -0.72
RREPUR -0.046 -4.22 -0.008 -0.19 -0.043 -4.12 *** -0.076 -1.38
DRREPUR 0.091 3.42 *** -0.015 -0.17 0.063 2.38 *** 0.091 0.83
AGENCYREPUR 0.008 0.69 -0.006 -0.15 -0.010 -0.84 -0.003 -0.05
DAGENCYREPUR 0.011 0.61 0.082 1.33 0.039 2.04 ** 0.016 0.22
RAGENCYREPUR + 0.023 1.46 0.072 1.36 0.019 1.17 0.074 1.13
DRAGENCYREPUR - 0.004 0.10 0.034 0.26 0.026 0.59 -0.078 -0.50
FCF*Q EXCASH*Q




Table 7 (continued) 
PERS -0.009 -1.63 -0.016 -0.76 -0.017 -2.61 *** -0.075 -1.62
DPERS 0.000 -0.04 0.006 0.19 0.010 1.02 0.033 0.50
RPERS -0.016 -2.22 ** 0.029 1.09 0.006 0.70 0.079 1.48
DRPERS 0.018 0.95 -0.018 -0.30 0.001 0.04 -0.129 -1.08
AGENCYPERS -0.003 -0.38 0.042 1.47 0.017 1.82 * 0.101 2.02 **
DAGENCYPERS -0.023 -1.63 -0.100 -2.35 ** -0.054 -3.69 *** -0.115 -1.62
RAGENCYPERS - -0.005 -0.44 -0.111 -3.38 *** -0.038 -3.36 *** -0.142 -2.50 **
DRAGENCYPERS + -0.058 -1.78 -0.051 -0.59 -0.061 -1.89 0.043 0.31
MB -0.014 -2.43 ** -0.039 -1.92 * -0.029 -5.05 *** -0.041 -1.72
DMB -0.020 -2.30 ** -0.032 -1.04 -0.015 -1.66 * -0.033 -0.97
RMB + -0.028 -3.88 -0.105 -4.59 *** -0.040 -5.47 *** -0.091 -3.60 ***
DRMB +/- -0.140 -7.12 *** -0.007 -0.11 -0.120 -6.08 *** 0.029 0.41
SIZE 0.046 8.27 *** 0.049 2.36 ** 0.048 8.47 *** 0.061 2.31 **
DSIZE 0.041 4.65 *** 0.063 1.86 * 0.037 4.09 *** 0.017 0.38
RSIZE + 0.024 3.20 *** 0.029 1.11 0.024 3.09 *** 0.029 0.86
DRSIZE - -0.168 -8.05 *** -0.192 -2.53 ** -0.194 -9.02 *** -0.261 -2.44 **
Adj. R square 16.30% 19.40% 16.60% 17.05%
N 19,394 4,507  33,923 3,848   
 
*Notes  
1. Panel A  reports the pooled OLS regression results of H5, the strength of corporate governance will affect the 
magnitude of conditional conservatism among J-type firms, while Panel B reports the pooled OLS regression results of  
joint tests of H1 through H5 using the reverse regression in Basu (1997). 
2. Panels A and B report the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included.  
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively. P-values are 
one-tailed when the sign of the coefficient is predicted, two-tailed otherwise.   
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of 
year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and 
less than the median (or lower quartile) growth relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
DIST_Dt-1  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a leverage ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
DIVt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a dividend payout ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
Dividends (Data 21) are scaled by earnings (Data 237) at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
REPURt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a repurchase ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
Repurchases are calculated as repurchase of common and preferred stock (Data 115) minus stock issuances (Data 108), 
scaled by earnings (Data237) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
PERSt-1 is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if (1) firms have the ratio of cash and cash equivalents (Data1) to assets 
(Data6) in excess of 0.25 for the last three years or (2) their excess cash (following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) are 
ranked in the top 2 deciles for the last three years (from year t-4 to t-2). 
GOVt-1 is either a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm has Inverse G-score (Inv G-score) or Inverse E-index (Inv 
E-index) above the industry median and 0 otherwise. Inv G-score is the measure of anti-takeover protection developed 
by Gompers et al. (2003), multiplied by minus one. Inv E-index is the measure of managerial entrenchment developed 
by Bebchuck et al (2009), multiplied by minus one.  
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Table 8 The Effect of Conservatism on Ex-Post Overinvestment among J-type firms (H6) 
NIt  =α0 + α1 Dt+ α2 Rt+ α 3 DtRt+ α 4AGENCYt-1+ α 5 Dt*AGENCYt-1+ α 6 Rt* AGENCYt-1+ α7 DtRt* AGENCYt-1  
       + α 8OVERINV t+1 + α 9 OVERINV t+1 + α 10 Rt OVERINV t+1+α11 DtRt OVERINV t+1 + α12AGENCYt-1 * OVERINV t+1  
          + α 13 Dt AGENCYt-1 * OVERINV t+1 +α14 Rt AGENCYt-1*OVERINVt+1 + α15 Dt RtAGENCYt-1 * OVERINVt+1+ Controls +ε      (4A)  
 
Panel A: Pooled OLS Regressions of Earnings on Contemporaneous Returns using the Median cutoff 
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.023 4.82 *** 0.023 4.93 *** 0.021 4.40 *** 0.054 14.19 *** 0.060 14.07 *** 0.054 14.13 ***
D -0.046 -6.30 *** -0.045 -6.11 *** -0.044 -6.08 *** -0.036 -5.94 *** -0.039 -5.77 *** -0.035 -5.83 ***
R + -0.016 -2.63 -0.019 -3.09 -0.019 -3.15 0.004 0.81 0.008 1.32 * 0.004 0.76
DR + 0.329 19.55 *** 0.341 20.39 *** 0.333 20.04 *** 0.341 23.62 *** 0.308 19.27 *** 0.345 23.93 ***
AGENCY 0.025 8.38 *** 0.025 8.48 *** 0.029 9.49 *** 0.005 1.85 * 0.006 1.36 0.004 1.55
DAGENCY 0.021 4.40 *** 0.022 4.57 *** 0.019 3.93 *** 0.008 1.88 * 0.015 2.35 ** 0.007 1.60
RAGENCY + 0.017 4.12 *** 0.019 4.60 *** 0.015 3.70 *** -0.010 -2.90 -0.002 -0.42 -0.015 -4.01
DRAGENCY + 0.019 1.65 ** 0.015 1.31 * 0.031 2.69 *** 0.041 4.09 *** 0.068 4.43 *** 0.053 5.10 ***
OVERINV -0.002 -0.45 -0.005 -0.88 0.025 5.25 *** 0.002 0.36 0.006 3.93 *** 0.014 3.51 ***
DOVERINV 0.014 1.84 * -0.002 -0.28 0.007 0.83 0.014 1.28 0.001 0.47 0.007 0.97
ROVERINV -0.015 -2.37 ** -0.019 -2.69 *** 0.005 0.72 0.003 0.33 -0.006 -3.25 *** 0.006 1.15
DROVERINV 0.046 2.64 *** -0.025 -1.40 -0.001 -0.03 0.042 1.74 * 0.006 1.05 -0.029 -1.57
AGENCYOVERINV 0.003 0.46 0.005 0.77 -0.016 -2.56 ** -0.012 -1.31 -0.001 -0.70 0.003 0.54
DAGENCYOVERINV -0.015 -1.41 -0.020 -1.82 * -0.009 -0.83 -0.035 -2.21 ** -0.007 -2.18 ** -0.014 -1.39
RAGENCYOVERINV + 0.001 0.08 -0.009 -0.88 0.007 0.74 -0.029 -2.56 -0.006 -2.22 0.003 0.39
DRAGENCYOVERINV - -0.006 -0.22 0.022 0.83 -0.091 -2.95 *** 0.011 0.30 -0.017 -2.02 ** -0.066 -2.29 **
MB -0.023 -5.01 *** -0.023 -5.09 *** -0.024 -5.21 *** -0.039 -9.57 *** -0.043 -10.44 *** -0.039 -9.79 ***
DMB 0.009 1.30 0.011 1.47 0.011 1.49 0.001 0.08 0.004 0.57 0.000 -0.03
RMB - -0.008 -1.33 * -0.008 -1.40 * -0.009 -1.49 * -0.023 -4.30 *** -0.019 -3.48 *** -0.023 -4.37 ***
DRMB +/- -0.194 -11.75 *** -0.190 -11.54 *** -0.189 -11.52 *** -0.213 -14.72 *** -0.194 -12.71 *** -0.213 -14.73 ***
LEV 0.005 1.13 0.005 1.20 0.004 0.94 -0.008 -2.10 ** -0.011 -2.96 *** -0.009 -2.35 **
DLEV 0.008 1.19 0.007 1.07 0.006 0.98 0.006 0.94 0.008 1.30 0.005 0.82
RLEV - 0.034 6.26 0.037 6.94 0.035 6.55 0.026 5.13 0.030 5.82 0.026 5.14
DRLEV + 0.017 1.13 0.009 0.63 0.011 0.72 0.023 1.64 * 0.006 0.44 0.017 1.24
SIZE 0.057 13.87 *** 0.057 13.86 *** 0.054 12.94 *** 0.056 14.92 *** 0.045 11.40 *** 0.053 13.97 ***
DSIZE 0.027 4.09 *** 0.028 4.34 *** 0.027 4.02 *** 0.033 5.56 *** 0.032 5.11 *** 0.034 5.58 ***
RSIZE + 0.015 2.44 *** 0.015 2.56 ** 0.013 2.12 ** 0.019 3.48 *** 0.022 3.85 *** 0.018 3.32 ***
DRSIZE - -0.189 -11.54 *** -0.183 -11.19 *** -0.182 -11.01 *** -0.179 -11.82 *** -0.143 -8.81 *** -0.172 -11.24 ***
Adj. R square 15.61% 15.68% 15.76% 15.02% 13.56% 15.16%




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




Panel B: Pooled OLS Regressions of Earnings on Contemporaneous Returns using the Quartile cutoff 
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.024 1.85 * 0.024 1.85 * 0.024 1.80 * 0.042 3.33 *** 0.060 4.26 *** 0.041 3.28 ***
D -0.059 -2.99 *** -0.053 -2.67 *** -0.050 -2.52 ** -0.055 -2.92 *** -0.050 -2.42 ** -0.048 -2.55 **
R + -0.021 -1.31 -0.022 -1.36 -0.020 -1.29 -0.018 -1.21 -0.010 -0.61 -0.017 -1.15
DR + 0.216 5.11 *** 0.228 5.39 *** 0.229 5.47 *** 0.254 6.15 *** 0.233 5.16 *** 0.264 6.41 ***
AGENCY 0.030 3.12 *** 0.032 3.34 *** 0.034 3.56 *** 0.015 1.57 0.010 0.81 0.014 1.52
DAGENCY 0.026 1.75 * 0.020 1.34 0.010 0.71 0.016 1.18 0.023 1.26 0.010 0.71
RAGENCY - 0.020 1.69 0.014 1.21 0.005 0.45 0.003 0.29 0.002 0.10 -0.004 -0.38
DRAGENCY + 0.115 3.57 *** 0.126 3.91 *** 0.121 3.89 *** 0.119 3.87 *** 0.161 3.96 *** 0.133 4.32 ***
OVERINV 0.001 0.07 0.009 0.54 0.039 2.32 ** 0.009 0.41 0.003 0.69 0.041 2.55 **
DOVERINV 0.044 1.92 * -0.006 -0.26 -0.018 -0.68 0.039 1.19 0.003 0.40 -0.022 -0.86
ROVERINV -0.005 -0.31 -0.034 -1.82 * -0.032 -1.47 -0.017 -0.74 -0.011 -2.05 ** -0.029 -1.32
DROVERINV 0.082 1.77 * 0.006 0.12 -0.004 -0.06 0.116 1.65 * 0.024 1.53 0.026 0.40
AGENCYOVERINV 0.006 0.3 -0.002 -0.12 -0.027 -1.29 -0.053 -1.94 * -0.004 -0.74 -0.027 -1.31
DAGENCYOVERINV -0.074 -2.53 ** -0.036 -1.19 0.016 0.47 -0.062 -1.42 -0.012 -1.28 0.010 0.30
RAGENCYOVERINV + -0.037 -1.62 * -0.009 -0.36 0.058 2.10 ** -0.001 -0.02 0.001 0.13 0.053 1.92 *
DRAGENCYOVERINV - -0.066 -1.81 ** -0.101 -2.15 ** -0.163 -1.83 ** -0.072 -0.75 -0.045 -2.15 ** -0.184 -2.08 **
MB -0.046 -3.84 *** -0.047 -3.98 *** -0.047 -3.91 *** -0.038 -3.35 *** -0.044 -3.79 *** -0.041 -3.60 ***
DMB 0.019 1.05 0.022 1.25 0.020 1.14 0.018 1.08 0.013 0.77 0.017 1.00
RMB - 0.008 0.58 0.012 0.82 0.007 0.52 -0.008 -0.57 -0.008 -0.56 -0.008 -0.59
DRMB +/- -0.085 -2.22 ** -0.081 -2.11 ** -0.084 -2.19 ** -0.090 -2.40 ** -0.085 -2.18 ** -0.092 -2.46 **
LEV 0.012 1.06 0.011 1.01 0.008 0.75 -0.005 -0.50 -0.016 -1.46 -0.008 -0.72
DLEV 0.008 0.46 0.007 0.41 0.006 0.38 0.017 1.01 0.025 1.47 0.016 0.96
RLEV - 0.036 2.56 0.040 2.87 0.040 2.87 0.047 3.47 0.057 4.13 0.049 3.62 ***
DRLEV + -0.017 -0.48 -0.024 -0.67 -0.025 -0.69 -0.034 -0.93 -0.053 -1.38 -0.046 -1.24
SIZE 0.080 6.33 *** 0.080 6.34 *** 0.076 5.94 *** 0.093 7.28 *** 0.083 6.20 *** 0.090 6.97 ***
DSIZE 0.024 1.20 0.025 1.27 0.025 1.23 0.025 1.22 0.010 0.48 0.025 1.25
RSIZE + -0.026 -1.47 -0.025 -1.45 -0.025 -1.42 0.006 0.35 0.006 0.33 0.006 0.33
DRSIZE - -0.131 -2.71 *** -0.121 -2.51 ** -0.124 -2.56 ** -0.208 -4.07 *** -0.186 -3.41 *** -0.202 -3.93 ***
Adj. R square 13.00% 13.25% 13.08% 13.72% 13.53% 13.79%
N 11,012     12,780         
FCF*Q
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3






1. This table reports the pooled OLS regression results of H6, J-type firms with more conditional conservatism are less likely to overinvest ex-post than J-type firms with 
less conditional conservatism, using reverse regression in Basu (1997). 
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when the sign of the coefficient is 
predicted, two-tailed otherwise.   
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
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Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and less than the median (or lower quartile) growth 
relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t 
OVERINV is a dummy variable that gets 1 when firm-year observations are in the top quartile of * unpredicted total investment (or capital expenditure or acquisition 
expenditure)from Biddle et al. (2009)‟s investment regression and 0 otherwise.  
CAPEX is the capital expenditure (Data 128) scaled by total assets (Data 6). 
 R&D is the research and development expenditure (Data46) scaled by total assets (Data 6). 
Acquisitions is acquisition expenditure (Data 129) scaled by total assets (Data 6). 
Investment is total investment expenditure, calculated as R&D(Data46) plus CAPEX(Data 128) plus Acquisitions(Data 129) less cash receipts from sale of property, 
plant and equipment, SalePPE (Data 107), deflated by total assets (Data6). 
Biddle et al. (2009) use residual term from the following regression as a firm-specific proxy for overinvestment. The following regression is estimated for each 
industry-year based on the Fama and French 48 industry classification for all industries with at least 20 observations per year. 
 








Table 9 Robustness tests – Using Basu’s Asymmetric reversion model  
Pooled OLS Regression of Change in Earnings at year t+1 on Change in Earnings at year t  
ΔNIt +1 = β0 + β1 DNIt+ β2 ΔNIt+ β3 DNIt ΔNIt + β4AGENCYt-1+β5 DNIt*AGENCYt-1+ β6 ΔNIt * AGENCYt-1 
+ β7DNIt ΔNIt * AGENCYt-1 β8,iXt-1 +β9,i DNItXt-1+β10,i ΔNIt Xt-1+β11,i   DNIt ΔNIt Xt-1)  
+ β12,i AGENCYt-1 * Xi + β13,i DNIt AGENCYt-1 * Xi + β14,i ΔNIt AGENCYt-1 * Xi 
+ β15,i DNIt ΔNIt AGENCYt-1 * Xi )+ Controls +ε              (3B)  
  
Panel A :  FCF*Q  
FCF*Q Predicted
Variable sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept -0.003 -0.49 -0.018 -2.20 ** -0.019 -1.19 0.040 2.06 ** -0.004 -0.14 0.032 0.62
DNI 0.038 3.89 *** -0.007 -0.48 -0.028 -1.10 0.027 0.92 0.009 0.20 -0.080 -0.98
ΔNI - -0.034 -1.72 ** 0.015 0.36 -0.032 -0.12 -0.160 -3.06 *** -0.016 -0.11 -0.344 -0.23
DNIΔNI - -0.041 -3.80 *** -0.055 -4.62 *** -0.452 -1.46 -0.126 -3.66 ** -0.072 -2.08 ** -0.793 -1.08
AGENCY -0.008 -1.89 * -0.007 -0.67 -0.013 -0.68 -0.019 -1.38 -0.022 -0.63 -0.014 -0.24
DNI*AGENCY -0.011 -1.72 * 0.056 3.20 *** -0.012 -0.38 0.208 4.53 *** 0.109 1.97 ** -0.007 -0.08
ΔNI*AGENCY + 0.018 1.38 0.013 0.25 0.230 0.63 0.040 -0.85 0.156 0.81 0.391 0.26
DNIΔNI*AGENCY - -0.106 -3.72 *** -0.279 -1.55 * -0.597 -1.44 * -0.529 -2.52 *** -0.429 -1.69 ** -1.169 -2.10 **
DNI*DIST_D -0.001 -0.09 -0.005 -0.60 -0.023 -1.43 -0.022 -1.04
DNI*DIST_D -0.045 -3.58 *** 0.035 2.28 ** 0.003 0.12 0.058 1.67 *
ΔNI*DIST_D + -0.070 -1.16 0.116 2.64 *** 0.550 6.89 *** 0.494 2.96 ***
DNIΔNI*DIST_D - -0.436 -5.84 ** 0.288 2.79 *** -0.917 -5.29 *** 0.680 2.12 **
AGENCYDIST_D 0.005 1.02 0.008 0.60 0.047 2.09 ** 0.043 1.41
DNI*AGENCYDIST_D 0.014 1.67 * -0.038 -1.61 0.113 3.2 *** -0.044 -0.86
ΔNI*AGENCYDIST_D - 0.038 1.55 -0.165 -2.75 *** -0.570 -3.35 *** -0.610 -3.24 ***
DNIΔNI*AGENCYDIST_D + 0.245 3.95 *** 0.250 1.80 * 0.309 1.74 ** 0.213 0.59
DIV -0.005 -0.50 0.002 0.18 0.007 0.16 0.000 0.01
DNI*DIV -0.038 -2.40 ** -0.019 -1.05 -0.078 -1.17 0.009 0.14
ΔNI*DIV -0.053 -1.05 -0.091 -0.36 0.110 0.21 0.014 0.01
DNIΔNI*DIV -1.458 -4.10 *** -0.382 -1.29 * -2.288 -3.73 *** 0.087 0.05
AGENCYDIV 0.000 -0.02 0.002 1.10 -0.026 -0.49 0.013 0.26
DNI*AGENCYDIV -0.006 -0.24 0.000 1.00 0.038 0.45 -0.047 -0.61
ΔNI*AGENCYDIV - 0.157 2.67 *** -0.006 -1.02 0.189 0.30 -0.065 -0.04
DNIΔNI*AGENCYDIV + 0.703 3.00 *** 0.392 1.97 ** 0.670 2.26 ** -0.364 -1.22
REPUR 0.000 0.02 0.001 0.06 0.013 0.42 -0.026 -1.28
DNI*REPUR 0.047 2.81 *** -0.015 -0.99 0.036 0.73 -0.008 -0.26
ΔNI*REPUR 0.254 2.11 ** -0.012 -0.27 -0.290 -1.43 0.274 1.90 *
DNIΔNI*REPUR 0.054 0.38 -0.110 -1.18 -0.021 -0.05 -0.412 -1.47
AGENCYREPUR 0.014 1.07 0.009 0.64 0.030 0.67 -0.016 -0.51
DNI*AGENCYREPUR -0.069 -3.11 *** -0.001 -0.05 -0.075 -1.07 0.045 0.89
ΔNI*AGENCYREPUR - -0.326 -2.11 ** -0.063 -1.05 -0.008 -0.04 -0.229 -1.37
DNIΔNI*AGENCYREPUR + -0.128 -0.69 0.040 0.31 -0.171 -1.36 1.078 3.25 ***
PERS -0.001 -0.11 -0.011 -1.06 0.035 1.48 0.005 0.25
DNI*PERS 0.054 4.55 *** -0.004 -0.21 0.014 0.36 0.006 0.17
ΔNI*PERS 0.026 0.59 0.280 5.35 *** -0.148 -0.83 -0.197 -1.35
DNIΔNI*PERS 0.721 7.80 *** -0.173 -1.42 * 0.820 2.15 ** 0.625 2.13 **
AGENCYPERS -0.014 -1.21 0.010 0.54 -0.062 -1.94 * -0.018 -0.42
DNI*AGENCYPERS -0.052 -2.74 *** 0.014 0.48 0.075 1.45 0.023 0.34
ΔNI*AGENCYPERS + 0.117 2.08 ** -0.306 -3.14 *** 0.327 1.75 * 0.432 1.83 *
DNIΔNI*AGENCYPERS - -0.988 -8.01 *** 0.115 0.58 -0.482 -1.40 * -1.596 -3.21 ***
GOV -0.001 -0.12 0.022 0.86
DNI*GOV -0.005 -0.29 0.020 0.47
ΔNI*GOV 0.088 1.49 -0.073 -0.35
DNI*ΔNI*GOV -0.162 -1.35 1.016 2.83 ***
AGENCY*GOV -0.002 -0.11 -0.061 -1.68 *
DNI*AGENCY*GOV 0.057 2.01 ** 0.046 0.74
ΔNI*AGENCY*GOV +/- -0.130 -1.74 * 0.080 0.37
DNI*ΔNI*AGENCY*GOV +/- 0.851 5.33 *** -0.780 -1.95 **
MB -0.010 -1.57 0.000 0.02 0.001 0.11 -0.030 -1.530 -0.018 -0.90 -0.049 -1.81 *
DNI*MB -0.071 -6.69 *** -0.052 -4.66 *** 0.040 2.09 ** -0.019 -0.630 0.002 0.06 0.020 0.47
ΔNI*MB - 0.064 3.19 *** -0.007 -0.33 0.059 1.38 0.043 0.710 -0.016 -0.25 0.058 0.50
DNIΔNI*MB +/- -1.345 -3.99 *** -1.005 -4.05 *** 0.060 0.60 -0.386 -3.020 *** -0.071 -0.57 -0.281 -1.24
LEV -0.014 -2.53 ** -0.045 -2.620 ***
DNI*LEV 0.003 0.38 0.086 2.310 **
ΔNI*LEV + 0.076 2.68 *** 0.162 2.150 **
DNIΔNI*LEV - -0.161 -2.95 *** 0.285 2.780
SIZE 0.018 3.15 *** 0.016 2.39 ** 0.025 2.10 ** 0.006 0.280 0.009 0.40 0.026 0.94
DNI*SIZE -0.038 -4.02 *** -0.019 -1.74 * -0.009 -0.47 -0.138 -3.940 -0.094 -2.43 ** 0.038 0.86
ΔNI*SIZE - -0.059 -2.16 ** -0.069 -2.46 ** -0.192 -3.11 *** -0.351 -3.010 *** -0.307 -2.52 ** -0.198 -1.06
DNIΔNI*SIZE + -0.064 -1.21 0.127 2.20 ** 0.018 0.15 0.449 2.200 ** -0.080 -0.36 0.877 3.09 ***
Adj. R sqaure 6.31% 7.26% 6.33% 4.57% 6.62% 22.06%






Panel B: EXCASH*Q  
EXCASH*Q Predicted
Variable sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept -0.005 -0.96 -0.016 -2.35 ** -0.026 -2.08 -0.002 -0.10 -0.016 -0.61 -0.004 -0.07
DNI -0.002 -0.22 0.020 1.75 * -0.031 -1.54 -0.074 -2.44 ** -0.019 -0.46 -0.014 -0.17
ΔNI - -0.045 -2.65 ** 0.073 2.84 *** -0.098 -0.49 -0.127 -2.07 ** 0.052 0.35 0.471 0.51
DNIΔNI - -0.469 -8.08 *** 0.230 4.33 -0.962 -3.99 *** -1.356 -9.12 *** -0.238 -0.83 -2.055 -1.68 *
AGENCY -0.007 -1.76 * -0.015 -1.41 -0.016 -1.06 -0.007 -0.53 -0.026 -0.77 0.051 0.98
DNI*AGENCY -0.023 -3.87 -0.056 -3.19 -0.083 -3.44 *** 0.216 4.18 *** 0.121 2.29 * -0.030 -0.38
ΔNI*AGENCY + 0.039 3.21 *** -0.029 -0.62 0.143 2.27 ** 0.034 1.55 0.209 1.17 1.115 1.13
DNIΔNI*AGENCY - -0.467 -5.08 *** -0.994 -5.68 *** -1.096 -7.05 *** -0.291 -2.53 ** -0.124 -3.39 *** -2.146 -1.70 **
DIST_D 0.004 0.80 0.008 1.19 0.003 0.22 -0.013 -0.40
DNI*DIST_D -0.027 -3.46 *** -0.017 -1.48 -0.028 -1.06 0.036 0.71
ΔNI*DIST_D + -0.019 -0.85 -0.063 -1.88 * 0.050 0.51 -0.168 -0.83
DNIΔNI*DIST_D - -0.252 -5.16 *** 0.055 0.71 -0.527 -2.33 ** 1.148 2.83 ***
AGENCYDIST_D 0.007 1.05 -0.001 -0.12 0.007 0.32 -0.001 -0.05
DNI*AGENCYDIST_D 0.037 3.04 *** 0.035 1.87 * -0.079 -2.12 ** -0.031 -0.65
ΔNI*AGENCYDIST_D - -0.012 -0.41 0.041 0.92 -0.062 -0.58 0.091 0.58
DNIΔNI*AGENCYDIST_D + 0.429 6.52 *** 0.025 1.34 * -0.275 -1.14 1.440 3.81 ***
DIV 0.013 1.51 -0.005 -0.61 0.045 1.28 -0.007 -0.24
DNI*DIV 0.004 0.30 -0.005 -0.35 -0.019 -0.32 -0.034 -0.68
ΔNI*DIV -0.229 -3.10 *** 0.164 0.83 -1.189 -2.52 ** -0.239 -0.26
DNIΔNI*DIV 0.070 0.56 -0.336 -1.50 0.537 0.75 -0.091 -0.08
AGENCYDIV -0.003 -0.27 -0.005 -0.36 -0.024 -0.53 -0.030 -0.74
DNI*AGENCYDIV -0.003 -0.12 0.010 0.47 -0.028 -0.37 0.052 0.82
ΔNI*AGENCYDIV - -0.173 -0.96 0.012 0.04 -0.794 -1.01 1.071 1.10
DNIΔNI*AGENCYDIV + 0.285 2.18 ** 0.132 1.23 1.129 2.11 ** -0.827 -0.68
REPUR -0.003 -0.31 0.000 0.03 -0.009 -0.29 0.033 1.52
DNI*REPUR -0.044 -2.96 *** 0.000 -0.02 0.074 1.42 -0.057 -1.50
ΔNI*REPUR -0.037 -0.96 0.022 0.61 0.207 1.04 -0.468 -3.14 ***
DNIΔNI*REPUR -1.369 -15.88 *** 0.397 5.29 *** -0.425 -1.03 0.485 1.35
AGENCYREPUR 0.009 0.64 -0.005 -0.40 0.044 1.02 -0.052 -1.74 *
DNI*AGENCYREPUR 0.042 1.83 * 0.000 0.01 -0.084 -1.22 0.027 0.55
ΔNI*AGENCYREPUR - -0.007 -0.13 -0.012 -0.26 -0.253 -2.44 ** 0.500 2.92 ***
DNIΔNI*AGENCYREPUR + -0.301 -1.23 -0.379 -3.57 -0.023 -2.74 -0.650 -1.70 **
PERS -0.011 -1.50 0.005 0.55 -0.030 -0.87 -0.011 -0.28
DNI*PERS 0.058 4.55 *** 0.062 3.97 *** 0.079 1.23 0.049 0.74
ΔNI*PERS 0.303 5.78 *** 0.017 0.40 0.548 2.65 *** 0.138 0.40
DNIΔNI*PERS 0.270 2.40 ** 0.769 7.13 *** 0.010 0.02 0.690 1.14
AGENCYPERS 0.000 0.03 0.009 0.56 0.019 0.49 -0.004 -0.10
DNI*AGENCYPERS -0.026 -1.40 -0.036 -1.45 -0.034 -0.48 -0.049 -0.66
ΔNI*AGENCYPERS + -0.205 -3.42 -0.068 -1.24 -0.500 -2.35 ** -0.024 -0.07
DNIΔNI*AGENCYPERS - -0.096 -2.74 *** -0.045 2.14 ** 0.250 0.39 -0.919 -1.48 *
GOV -0.002 -0.19 0.002 0.08
DNI*GOV -0.014 -0.99 0.024 0.50
ΔNI*GOV 0.011 0.22 0.203 1.03
DNI*ΔNI*GOV -0.289 -3.11 *** -0.113 -0.25
AGENCY*GOV -0.001 -0.10 0.004 0.12
DNI*AGENCY*GOV 0.036 1.57 0.005 0.09
ΔNI*AGENCY*GOV +/- 0.038 0.56 -0.092 -0.44
DNI*ΔNI*AGENCY*GOV +/- 0.578 4.41 *** 0.370 0.78
MB -0.006 -0.93 -0.004 -0.63 -0.006 -0.61 -0.019 -1.00 -0.020 -1.07 0.003 0.11
DNI*MB -0.045 -4.52 *** -0.038 -3.73 *** -0.007 -0.49 0.050 1.74 * 0.029 0.97 0.052 1.31
ΔNI*MB - 0.032 1.74 ** 0.026 1.31 * -0.011 -0.33 -0.039 -0.69 0.008 0.14 -0.164 -1.95 *
DNIΔNI*MB +/- -0.925 -3.74 *** -0.881 -2.27 ** -0.378 -4.80 *** 0.142 1.32 -0.204 -1.81 * 0.664 3.68 ***
LEV -0.012 -2.29 ** -0.018 -1.06
DNI*LEV 0.025 2.88 *** 0.100 3.96 ***
ΔNI*LEV + 0.055 3.22 *** 0.085 1.64 *
DNIΔNI*LEV - 0.187 3.38 0.861 9.72
SIZE 0.016 2.95 *** 0.014 2.24 ** 0.030 3.11 *** 0.042 1.93 * 0.029 1.25 0.013 0.46
DNI*SIZE -0.005 -0.54 0.011 0.99 0.044 2.78 *** -0.092 -2.57 ** -0.122 -3.07 *** -0.032 -0.70
ΔNI*SIZE - -0.047 -1.82 ** -0.049 -1.85 ** -0.057 -1.26 -0.327 -2.89 *** -0.244 -2.09 ** -0.164 -1.13
DNIΔNI*SIZE + 0.312 5.48 *** 0.511 8.30 *** 0.766 8.39 *** 0.492 2.31 ** 0.236 1.04 0.597 1.99 **
Adj. R sqaure 5.62% 6.53% 6.65% 6.14% 6.33% 13.90%
N 66,027   64,953   25,767   8,031   7,826   2,632   
Median cutoff Quartile cutoff
 
* Notes for panel A and B 
1. Panels A and B report the pooled OLS regression results of joint tests of H1,through H5 using asymmetric reversion 
model in Basu (1997). 
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively. P-values are 




Panel C: Fama-MacBeth Regressions using FCF*Q and Quartile cutoffs 
Predicted 
Variable Sign H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H1-H4 H1-H5
Intercept -0.0012 -0.0389 0.0359 -0.0072 0.0004 -0.3304 0.0319
(-0.06) (-0.99) 1.15 (-0.33) 0.03 (-0.85) 1.2
DNI -0.0234 -0.0734 -0.1617 ** -0.0146 -0.0373 -0.2839 *** -0.0859
(-0.72) (-1.66) (-2.23) (-0.43) (-1.04) (-3.24) (-0.50)
ΔNI - -0.1711 0.6783 -0.6801 ** 0.1264 0.0543 5.0007 -0.3335
(-0.47) 1.17 (-2.08) 0.71 0.39 0.8 (-0.35)
DNIΔNI - 0.385 -1.5704 -0.3559 ** -0.1307 ** -0.3747 -0.5686 -1.087
0.7 (-1.14) (-2.24) (-2.17) (-0.50) (-1.49) (-1.14)
AGENCY -0.0104 0.038 -0.0663 ** -0.0064 -0.0001 0.289 -0.0254
(-0.98) 0.83 (-2.38) (-0.51) (-0.00) 0.75 (-0.93)
DNI*AGENCY 0.1554 -0.2925 0.8514 ** 0.0061 -0.014 -4.3021 -0.0332
0.76 (-0.96) 2.65 0.05 (-0.46) (-0.73) (-0.20)
ΔNI*AGENCY + -0.0144 0.0079 0.2124 * -0.0202 -0.5412 0.3296 ** -0.0153
(-0.54) 0.26 1.77 (-0.70) (-0.67) 2.69 (-0.01)
DNIΔNI*AGENCY - -0.436 ** -0.3322 ** 0.144 ** -0.504 *** -0.2822 ** -0.2243 1.7236
(-2.04) (-2.09) (-2.13) (-2.44) (-2.45) (-0.22) 1.46
DIST_D 0.0813 1.0221 -0.0235 ***
0.8 0.96 (-3.50)
DNI*DIST_D -0.0206 -0.006 0.0671 **
(-0.39) (-0.11) 2.73
ΔNI*DIST_D -0.8698 -9.842 0.6604 **
(-0.95) (-0.94) 2.69
DNIΔNI*DIST_D 0.2352 -2.1639 0.1741
0.23 (-1.46) 0.29
AGENCYDIST_D -0.0356 -1.0286 0.0356 ***
(-0.73) (-0.97) 3.08
DNI*AGENCYDIST_D -0.0571 -0.1478 * -0.0436
(-0.69) (-1.96) (-1.29)
ΔNI*AGENCYDIST_D - -0.7301 10.0045 -0.7072
-0.84 -0.95 (-1.17)
DNIΔNI*AGENCYDIST_D + 0.9872 ** 0.1825 0.6512
1.79 0.15 0.81
DIV -0.0739 -0.3456 0.0012
(-1.66) (-1.30) 0.11
DNI*DIV 0.1835 0.1613 -0.0013
0.96 0.72 (-0.01)
ΔNI*DIV 2.2062 * 1.2767 -0.5099
1.94 0.52 (-0.88)
DNIΔNI*DIV -7.555 -9.7401 1.3621
(-1.16) (-1.29) 1.1
AGENCYDIV 0.0965 ** 0.3959 0.0215
2.52 1.37 0.56
DNI*AGENCYDIV -0.2482 -0.2014 0.0301
(-1.22) (-0.96) 0.21
ΔNI*AGENCYDIV - 6.7965 9.1514 0.3158
1.01 1.19 0.21
DNIΔNI*AGENCYDIV + 2.1912 ** -2.5075 -1.651 *
-2.08 (-1.35) (-2.05)
REPUR -0.0078 -0.0341 * -0.0305 *
(-0.26) (-1.95) (-1.83)
DNI*REPUR 0.223 * 0.3427 * 0.0353
1.75 1.98 1.39
ΔNI*REPUR 0.0544 0.0631 0.3684
0.12 0.29 1.29
DNIΔNI*REPUR 6.3991 8.1111 0.0962
1.2 1.32 0.19
AGENCYREPUR 0.0351 0.0577 ** 0.0024
0.91 2.35 0.23
DNI*AGENCYREPUR -0.3521 ** -0.4751 ** -0.0347
(-2.34) (-2.33) (-0.99)
ΔNI*AGENCYREPUR - -0.1823 -0.4236 * -0.8978 *
(-0.51) (-1.84) (-1.94)









Table 9 (continued) 
PERS 0.2491 0.4745 0.0107
1.02 1.21 1.3
DNI*PERS -0.3073 -0.5306 -0.0035
(-1.18) (-1.23) (-0.48)
ΔNI*PERS -1.259 -3.1165 -0.1531
(-1.04) (-1.10) (-1.02)
DNIΔNI*PERS -0.6724 -0.55 0.9696 **
(-1.28) (-0.94) 2.22
AGENCYPERS -0.2548 -0.4827 0.2168
(-1.05) (-1.24) 1.13
DNI*AGENCYPERS 0.3118 0.5622 0.0639
1.17 1.31 0.18
ΔNI*AGENCYPERS + 1.1458 2.9982 0.2904
0.92 1.04 0.77
DNIΔNI*AGENCYPERS - 0.7949 0.6331 -1.061 *
1.88 1.41 (-1.35)












ΔNI*AGENCY*GOV +/- -0.1763 -0.6694
(-0.70) (-1.18)
DNI*ΔNI*AGENCY*GOV +/- -0.5505 * -0.193 *
(-1.37) (-1.32)
MB -0.0006 -0.0087 -0.0005 -0.0043 -0.0225 0.0025 -0.0097
(-0.06) (-0.65) (-0.03) (-0.43) (-1.11) 0.2 (-0.38)
DNI*MB 0.0585 0.0497 0.0604 0.0573 0.0478 0.0801 0.0542
0.99 0.77 0.75 0.92 1.09 0.8 1.17
ΔNI*MB + -0.2052 -0.1212 -0.0688 -0.0879 -0.1767 -0.0594 -0.3587 *
(-1.07) (-0.73) (-0.47) (-0.77) (-0.63) (-0.47) (-2.04)
DNIΔNI*MB +/- -0.4931 -1.1811 -0.6717 -0.4626 0.2334 -0.3807 1.2572 **
(-1.10) (-1.12) (-0.72) (-0.95) 0.34 (-0.33) 2.94
LEV -0.0294 -0.0251 -0.0131
(-1.15) (-1.63) (-0.87)
DNI*LEV -0.0586 ** -0.0725 * -0.0672 **
(-2.19) (-1.82) (-2.41)
ΔNI*LEV + 0.5844 0.2829 * 0.0859
0.93 1.29 0.42
DNIΔNI*LEV - -0.178 -1.4828 * -0.2589
(-0.34) (-1.99) (-0.47)
SIZE 0.016 -0.0053 0.0075 0.0143 0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0016
0.83 (-0.18) 0.36 0.72 0.19 (-0.18) (-0.10)
DNI*SIZE -0.0418 -0.0187 -0.0271 -0.0185 -0.0219 -0.0021 -0.093 **
(-0.70) (-0.32) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.69) (-0.02) (-2.58)
ΔNI*SIZE - 0.0187 -0.2453 -0.2055 -0.1045 0.0123 -0.0525 0.0103
0.07 (-1.28) (-1.14) (-0.54) 0.03 (-0.28) 0.02
DNIΔNI*SIZE + -0.8935 0.3 0.8921 -0.6042 -1.7214 *** 1.1263 -3.2724 ***
(-0.69) 0.29 1 (-0.52) (-3.16) 1 (-3.63)








Panel D: Fama-MacBeth Regressions using EXCASH*Q and Quartile cutoffs 
Predicted 
Variable Sign H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H1-H4
Intercept -0.0359 -0.0473 -0.0636 0.6629 0.1336 -0.0628 0.0086
(-0.72) (-0.99) (-1.06) 1.02 1.02 (-1.02) 0.33
DNI -0.0609 -0.0326 -0.1059 ** -0.3854 -0.1162 ** -0.1012 ** 0.2268
(-1.62) (-0.86) (-2.49) (-1.16) (-2.25) (-2.04) 1.02
ΔNI - -0.0572 0.1104 -0.0542 -9.3655 -4.1748 0.0821 0.4009
(-0.36) 0.74 (-0.10) (-1.02) (-1.11) 0.14 0.41
DNIΔNI - -0.4811 -0.5261 -0.2641 -2.7373 -0.9973 ** -0.2712 1.0852
(-1.27) (-1.40) (-1.62) (-1.04) (-2.60) (-1.68) 0.25
AGENCY 0.0396 0.0548 0.0451 -0.3535 -0.0865 0.0421 0.0184
0.77 1.08 0.74 (-1.04) (-1.23) 0.73 0.74
DNI*AGENCY 0.284 0.0603 0.0643 8.2682 0.0389 -0.0237 -0.2491
0.99 0.19 0.1 1.01 1.48 (-0.04) (-1.00)
ΔNI*AGENCY + 0.0037 -0.0315 0.0345 0.0154 2.7844 0.045 -0.714
0.16 (-1.39) 0.55 0.52 1.18 0.64 (-0.66)
DNIΔNI*AGENCY - -0.3497** -0.2331 * -1.0015 ** -27.912 0.4158 -0.451 -1.9896
(-2.21) (-1.45) (-2.09) (-1.01) 1.14 (-0.87) (-1.43) *
DIST_D 0.1063 0.0571 -0.012
0.95 0.83 (-0.51)
DNI*DIST_D -0.0734 0.0083 0.007
(-1.35) 0.22 0.2
ΔNI*DIST_D -1.2149 -0.642 0.9333
(-0.97) (-0.85) 1.36
DNIΔNI*DIST_D -0.4036 -0.0008 -0.5122
(-0.62) (-0.00) (-0.77)
AGENCYDIST_D -0.0194 -0.0082 -0.0196
(-0.69) (-0.37) (-1.27)
DNI*AGENCYDIST_D 0.0341 -0.0618 0.0346
0.46 (-1.00) 0.94
ΔNI*AGENCYDIST_D - 0.2764 0.1511 0.0358
1.25 0.85 0.09
DNIΔNI*AGENCYDIST_D + -0.7527 1.382 *** 0.4183 *
(-0.76) 2.38 1.54
DIV 0.0167 0.0056 -0.0125
0.45 0.16 (-1.27)
DNI*DIV 0.1154 * 0.0528 -0.2649
1.71 0.7 (-1.07)
ΔNI*DIV 1.373 1.347 -0.9744
1.49 1.27 (-1.07)
DNIΔNI*DIV -0.8201 -3.1803 -2.6407
(-0.63) (-1.62) (-0.60)
AGENCYDIV 0.0114 0.0229 0.0201
0.31 0.63 0.99
DNI*AGENCYDIV -0.1296 -0.0674 0.2549
(-1.33) (-0.77) 1.03
ΔNI*AGENCYDIV - -1.4949 ** -1.4966 * 0.5698
(-1.67) (-1.49) 0.58
DNIΔNI*AGENCYDIV + 0.9245 *** 3.1347 *** 2.7742
2.64 2.94 0.63
REPUR -0.0028 0.0028 0.0136
(-0.11) 0.11 0.88
DNI*REPUR 0.0774 0.0734 -0.0235
0.75 0.65 (-0.70)
ΔNI*REPUR 0.4608 0.3597 0.1452
1.08 1 0.33
DNIΔNI*REPUR 1.0088 2.0768 0.7907
0.55 0.71 1.37
AGENCYREPUR 0.0079 0.008 -0.027
0.29 0.33 (-1.74)
DNI*AGENCYREPUR -0.0566 -0.0596 0.0252
(-0.55) (-0.54) 0.69
ΔNI*AGENCYREPUR - -0.1815 -0.1768 -0.1772
(-0.69) (-0.61) (-0.38)














Table 9 (continued) 
PERS -0.4089 -0.0848 0.0077
(-0.97) (-1.12) 0.19
DNI*PERS 0.0867 0.0657 0.0178
1.07 0.67 0.25
ΔNI*PERS 22.0133 -3.0652 -0.6138
0.97 (-1.01) (-0.77)
DNIΔNI*PERS -0.4773 0.668 2.3624
(-0.39) 0.38 1.32
AGENCYPERS -0.0167 0.0638 -0.0124
(-0.25) 0.84 (-0.26)
DNI*AGENCYPERS -0.0357 0.039 -0.0545
(-0.52) 0.34 (-1.14)
ΔNI*AGENCYPERS + 0.7306 3.0765 0.4505
0.74 1.02 0.54














ΔNI*AGENCY*GOV +/- -0.7186 -0.6506
(-1.44) (-1.35)
DNI*ΔNI*AGENCY*GOV +/- 0.1516 0.3465
0.35 0.42
MB -0.0359 *** -0.0323 ** -0.0335 0.1019 -0.0955 0.0023 -0.0247
(-2.79) (-2.51) (-1.16) 0.81 (-1.53) 0.16 (-0.73)
DNI*MB 0.0256 0.0149 0.0177 0.0311 0.0928 ** 0.0051 0.101 **
0.98 0.48 0.49 1.09 2.16 0.13 2.73
ΔNI*MB + 0.9311 0.9016 0.2461 3.8518 0.0517 -0.0472 -0.3534
1.07 1.04 0.81 1.01 0.2 (-0.53) (-1.15)
DNIΔNI*MB +/- -0.8359 *** -1.2097 *** -1.0321 ** -0.7583 *** 0.7698 -1.5005 ** 1.7018 *
(-4.09) (-2.53) (-1.71) (-3.12) 1.16 (-1.69) 1.78
LEV 0.0965 0.0541 0.1359
0.86 0.84 0.86
DNI*LEV -0.051 ** -0.0328 * -0.0413 *
(-2.22) (-1.78) (-1.73)
ΔNI*LEV + -1.0996 -0.562 -0.8507
(-0.87) (-0.78) (-0.76)
DNIΔNI*LEV - -0.7679 ** -0.5573 *** -0.862 **
(-2.52) (-2.82) (-2.15)
SIZE 0.0078 0.0107 0.0054 -0.8885 0.038 *** 0.0015 0.0362 **
0.36 0.52 0.26 (-0.98) 3.85 0.07 2.35
DNI*SIZE 0.048 0.0443 0.057 ** 0.0542 -0.0715 * 0.0838 *** -0.0543
1.49 1.57 2.23 1.63 (-1.83) 3.1 (-1.12)
ΔNI*SIZE - -1.1031 -1.1786 -0.085 -0.1133 -0.491 0.0069 -0.8720**
(-1.10) (-1.19) (-0.49) (-0.80) (-1.58) 0.04 (-2.20)
DNIΔNI*SIZE + 1.5729 *** 1.7964 *** 1.6227 *** 1.665 *** 0.3618 2.3783 *** 0.6832
3.87 3.7 2.89 4.14 0.49 5.06 0.61
Adj. R Square 18.79% 20.02% 21.04% 17.60% 28.88% 22.78% 31.09%
 
* Notes for panel C and D 
1. Panels C and D report the Fama-MacBeth regression results of joint tests of H1 through H5 using asymmetric 
reversion model in Basu (1997). 
2. Panels C and D report the mean coefficients across 37 annual cross-sectional regressions over the period 1970-2006 
with Fama-MacBeth t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. The t-statistics are 
reported below the coefficients.   
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively. P-values are 
one-tailed when the sign of the coefficient is predicted, two-tailed otherwise.   
4. Variable descriptions:  
ΔNIt is the changes in net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
DNIt is an indicator variable set equal to one if ΔNIt is negative and 0 otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and 
less than the median (or lower quartile) growth relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets (Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
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SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
DIST_Dt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a leverage ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
DIVt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a dividend payout ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
Dividends (Data 21) are scaled by earnings (Data 237) at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
REPURt-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a repurchase ratio above the industry median and 0 otherwise. 
Repurchases are calculated as repurchase of common and preferred stock (Data 115) minus stock issuances (Data 108), 
scaled by earnings (Data237) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
PERSt-1 is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if (1) firms have the ratio of cash and cash equivalents (Data1) to assets 
(Data6) in excess of 0.25 for the last three years or (2) their excess cash (following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) are 



























Panel E: The Effect of Conservatism on Ex-Post Overinvestment among J-type firms  
∆NIt+1  =β0 + β1 DNIt+ β2 ∆NIt + β3 DNIt ∆NIt + β4AGENCYt-1+β5 DNIt*AGENCYt-1 + β6 ∆NIt * AGENCYt-1+ β7DNIt∆NIt * AGENCYt-1  
           +β8, OVERINVt+1+β9 DNIt OVERINV t+1+β10 ∆NIt OVERINVt+1+β11 DNIt∆NItOVERINVt+1 + β12AGENCYt-1 * OVERINV t+1 
                +β13 DNIt AGENCYt-1 * OVERINVt+1 + β14 ∆NIt AGENCYt-1 * OVERINVt+1+ β15 DNIt ∆NIt AGENCYt-1 * OVERINVt+1+ Controls +ε (4B)  
  
 Pooled OLS Regressions of Change in Earnings at year t+1 on Change in Earnings at year t using Quartile cutoffs 
 
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept -0.005 -0.25 -0.005 -0.26 -0.003 -0.16 -0.006 -0.32 -0.017 -0.93 -0.007 -0.38
DNI -0.024 -0.85 -0.019 -0.68 -0.017 -0.63 -0.004 -0.15 0.002 0.07 -0.003 -0.09
ΔNI - 0.107 2.39 ** 0.123 2.68 *** 0.075 1.71 0.020 0.42 0.083 1.74 * 0.002 0.04
DNIΔNI - -0.218 -8.39 *** -0.217 -8.35 *** -0.184 -7.33 *** -0.163 -6.30 *** -0.169 -6.51 *** -0.153 -5.90 ***
AGENCY -0.006 -0.41 -0.009 -0.68 -0.009 -0.70 -0.007 -0.50 0.002 0.18 -0.004 -0.31
DNI*AGENCY -0.008 -0.40 0.001 0.02 -0.013 -0.65 -0.006 -0.30 -0.022 -1.04 -0.006 -0.28
ΔNI*AGENCY + -0.012 -0.32 0.056 1.55 0.037 1.07 0.065 1.73 * 0.065 1.71 * 0.073 1.97 **
DNIΔNI*AGENCY - -0.544 -9.52 *** -0.579 -9.97 *** -0.639 -11.47 *** -0.415 -7.43 *** -0.681 -11.49 *** -0.414 -7.31 ***
OVERINV 0.013 0.69 -0.011 -0.56 0.006 0.26 -0.001 -0.05 -0.010 -0.49 0.019 0.83
DNI*OVERINV 0.011 0.32 0.022 0.65 0.037 0.96 0.061 1.17 -0.192 -5.68 *** 0.070 1.69 *
ΔNI*OVERINV -0.038 -0.72 -0.005 -0.09 0.217 1.84 -0.117 -1.26 0.028 0.45 0.013 0.11
DNIΔNI*OVERINV -0.728 -2.77 *** -0.468 -2.43 ** 0.099 0.42 0.266 0.72 -3.333 -18.16 *** 1.107 3.92 ***
AGENCYOVERINV -0.014 -0.57 -0.004 -0.15 0.007 0.25 0.038 0.97 -0.013 -0.5 -0.001 -0.04
DNI*AGENCYOVERINV 0.009 0.22 -0.050 -1.19 -0.025 -0.52 -0.032 -0.48 0.203 4.78 *** -0.072 -1.39
ΔNI*AGENCYOVERINV - 0.146 2.13 ** -0.119 -1.57 -0.208 -1.36 0.021 0.15 -0.144 -1.9 * -0.068 -0.36
DNIΔNI*AGENCYOVERINV + 0.609 2.17 ** 0.262 1.17 0.414 1.91 ** 0.058 0.15 3.473 16.07 *** 0.663 1.99 **
MB 0.001 0.04 0.001 0.04 0.000 0.02 -0.016 -0.92 -0.009 -0.54 -0.014 -0.83
DNI*MB 0.051 1.96 ** 0.053 2.08 ** 0.056 2.19 ** 0.022 0.82 0.051 1.98 ** 0.029 1.10
ΔNI*MB + -0.079 -1.67 * -0.051 -1.12 -0.059 -1.29 -0.006 -0.11 -0.035 -0.71 -0.017 -0.34
DNIΔNI*MB +/- 0.325 3.23 *** 0.261 2.82 *** 0.279 3.04 -0.376 -3.52 *** 0.055 0.56 -0.313 -3.18 ***
LEV -0.032 -2.13 ** -0.029 -1.92 * -0.037 -2.43 ** -0.017 -1.05 -0.008 -0.48 -0.020 -1.21
DNI*LEV -0.043 -1.78 * -0.048 -1.99 ** -0.045 -1.87 * -0.095 -3.71 *** -0.083 -3.32 *** -0.101 -3.98 ***
ΔNI*LEV + 0.057 1.31 0.017 0.37 0.065 1.46 0.073 1.48 0.006 0.12 0.089 1.80 *
DNIΔNI*LEV - -0.749 -8.81 *** -0.670 -8.00 -0.766 -9.29 -1.246 -14.15 *** -0.874 -10.11 *** -1.337 -15.71 ***
SIZE 0.029 1.60 0.033 1.87 * 0.031 1.71 * 0.033 1.73 * 0.036 1.86 * 0.029 1.46
DNI*SIZE -0.001 -0.03 -0.005 -0.18 -0.012 -0.40 0.043 1.36 0.042 1.34 0.034 1.06
ΔNI*SIZE - -0.260 -2.81 *** -0.281 -3.07 *** -0.288 -3.13 *** -0.176 -1.67 * -0.168 -1.59 -0.145 -1.36
DNIΔNI*SIZE + 0.698 3.84 *** 0.709 3.92 *** 0.593 3.25 *** 1.699 7.97 *** 1.763 8.38 *** 1.498 6.98 ***
Adj.R square 5.32% 5.60% 5.42% 6.40% 9.82% 7.00%
N 4,233     11,349   
Acquitision
FCF*Q EXCASH*Q 




* Notes for panel D 
1. Panel D reports the OLS regression results of H6, J-type firms with more conditional conservatism are less likely to overinvest ex-post than J-type firms with less 
conditional conservatism, using asymmetric reversion model in Basu (1997) 
2. Panel D reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, two tailed.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
ΔNIt is the changes in net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
DNIt is an indicator variable set equal to one if ΔNIt is negative and 0 otherwise. 
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AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and less than the median (or lower quartile) growth 
relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets (Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t 
OVERINV is a dummy variable that gets 1 when firm-year observations are in the top quartile of * unpredicted total investment (or capital expenditure or acquisition 
expenditure) from Biddle et al. (2009)‟s investment regression and 0 otherwise.  
CAPEX is the capital expenditure (Data 128) scaled by total assets (Data 6). 
 R&D is the research and development expenditure (Data46) scaled by total assets (Data 6). 
Acquisitions is acquisition expenditure (Data 129) scaled by total assets (Data 6). 
Investment is total investment expenditure, calculated as R&D(Data46) plus CAPEX(Data 128) plus Acquisitions(Data 129) less cash receipts from sale of property, 
plant and equipment, SalePPE (Data 107), deflated by total assets (Data6). 
Biddle et al. (2009) use residual term from the following regression as a firm-specific proxy for overinvestment. The following regression is estimated for each 
industry-year based on the Fama and French 48 industry classification for all industries with at least 20 observations per year. 
 


















Table 10 Conservatism and Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow using Sales Growth as an alternative GROWTH 
  
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+ α5DtAGENCYt-1+ α6RtAGENCYt-1+ α7DtRtAGENCYt-1+Controls +ε  (2A) 
 
Variable sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.054 14.89 *** 0.040 8.79 *** 0.026 2.41 ** 0.068 7.26 ***
D -0.039 -6.98 *** -0.030 -4.38 *** -0.032 -1.99 ** -0.013 -0.94
R + -0.006 -1.22 0.001 0.19 -0.042 -3.11 *** -0.015 -1.29
DR + 0.368 27.04 *** 0.356 20.34 *** 0.319 9.18 *** 0.372 12.06 ***
AGENCY -0.002 -0.86 0.012 3.51 *** 0.028 3.69 *** -0.014 -2.08 **
DAGENCY -0.001 -0.23 -0.008 -1.43 0.002 0.14 -0.009 -0.91
RAGENCY - -0.012 3.21 *** 0.002 0.36 -0.016 1.71 * -0.013 -1.61
DRAGENCY + 0.016 1.78 ** 0.026 1.96 ** 0.078 3.07 *** 0.058 2.63 ***
MB -0.039 -11.03 *** -0.038 -10.91 *** -0.039 -3.64 *** -0.058 -6.19 ***
DMB -0.001 -0.13 -0.002 -0.34 0.009 0.54 -0.004 -0.27
RMB - -0.021 -4.51 *** -0.021 -4.56 *** 0.004 0.27 -0.018 -1.6
DRMB +/- -0.215 -17.01 *** -0.215 -17.11 *** -0.117 -3.38 *** -0.183 -6.24 ***
LEV -0.012 -3.49 *** -0.010 -3 *** -0.008 -0.82 -0.013 -1.34
DLEV 0.005 0.91 0.003 0.51 0.004 0.24 -0.010 -0.73
RLEV - -0.013 -1.04 -0.013 -1.06 -0.095 -2.86 *** -0.077 -2.49 **
DRLEV + 0.036 8.03 *** 0.036 7.95 *** 0.061 4.85 *** 0.051 4.43 ***
SIZE 0.061 17.84 *** 0.063 18.21 *** 0.071 6.2 *** 0.095 8.27 ***
DSIZE 0.029 5.4 *** 0.029 5.37 *** 0.019 1.04 0.011 0.59
RSIZE + 0.018 3.55 *** 0.017 3.25 *** 0.009 0.58 0.010 0.65
DRSIZE - -0.185 -13.61 *** -0.180 -13.12 *** -0.220 -5.12 *** -0.227 -5.29 ***
Adj. R square 14.40% 14.93% 13.05% 14.08%
N 22,122   63,818   4,459     14,362   
FCF*SG EXCASH*SGEXCASH*SG
Model 1 Model 2Predicted 
FCF*SG
Model 1 Model 2





1. This table reports the OLS regression results of H1, J-type firms have more conditional conservatism than Non J-type firms, using alternative GROWTH proxy, sales 
growth, using reverse regression in Basu (1997). 
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, one tailed if predictions are made, and two tailed otherwise.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and less than the median (or lower quartile) growth 
relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
SG is the 2-year geometric average of the annual percentage growth in sales. Annual sales growth rate,SGt is calculated as Salest+1/Salest.(Data 12). 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
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Table 11 Lead and Lag Analysis - Using Basu’s Reverse Regression model  
Panel A: Concurrent AGENCY variable and conservatism ( When x = t) 
     NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYx+ α5DtAGENCYx+ α6RtAGENCYx+ α7DtRtAGENCYx+Controls +ε   
 
x=t
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.007 1.85 * -0.018 -1.46 0.036 10.06 *** -0.008 -0.73
D -0.041 -6.74 *** -0.046 -2.43 ** -0.036 -6.80 *** -0.064 -3.93 ***
R + -0.021 -3.97 *** -0.045 -3.18 *** 0.000 -0.05 -0.035 -2.62 ***
DR + 0.405 29.37 *** 0.386 9.67 *** 0.354 28.12 *** 0.376 11.13 ***
AGENCY 0.038 15.69 *** 0.063 7.13 *** 0.021 9.00 *** 0.055 6.66 ***
RAGENCY 0.023 6.61 *** 0.020 1.47 -0.002 -0.71 0.025 2.11 **
DAGENCY 0.011 3.01 *** 0.040 3.90 *** 0.006 1.55 0.003 0.35
DRAGENCY -0.081 -8.92 *** 0.001 0.04 0.000 -0.01 0.026 1.08
MB -0.014 -3.54 *** -0.023 -1.95 * -0.028 -7.33 *** -0.021 -1.98 **
DMB 0.005 0.90 0.004 0.24 0.005 0.80 0.022 1.44
RMB + -0.008 -1.55 ** -0.006 -0.40 -0.022 -4.34 *** 0.002 0.16
DRMB +/- -0.227 -16.41 *** -0.212 -5.67 *** -0.196 -15.06 *** -0.239 -7.72 ***
LEV 0.009 2.45 ** 0.013 1.24 0.000 -0.09 0.000 0.01
DLEV 0.006 1.08 0.022 1.33 0.008 1.41 0.016 1.07
RLEV - 0.038 7.89 0.062 4.63 0.030 6.31 0.064 4.97
DRLEV + -0.015 -1.16 -0.038 -1.06 0.007 0.55 -0.033 -1.03
SIZE 0.059 16.13 *** 0.085 6.59 *** 0.055 15.37 *** 0.112 9.22 ***
DSIZE 0.024 4.22 *** 0.008 0.39 0.018 3.22 *** 0.024 1.32
RSIZE + 0.022 4.18 *** -0.012 -0.67 0.017 3.29 *** 0.012 0.71
DRSIZE - -0.191 -13.28 *** -0.202 -4.10 *** -0.200 -14.13 *** -0.211 -4.67 ***
Adj. R square 17.46% 15.29% 14.94% 16.07%
N 28,122 11,775 76,983 15,475 
FCF*Q EXCASH*Q







Panel B: Lead AGENCY variable and conservatism (When x=t+1) 
     NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYx+ α5DtAGENCYx+ α6RtAGENCYx+ α7DtRtAGENCYx+Controls +ε   
 
x=t+1
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.022 5.68 *** -0.013 -1.07 0.043 12.15 *** -0.014 -1.35
D -0.040 -6.65 *** -0.033 -1.84 * -0.037 -6.95 *** -0.021 -1.38
R + -0.014 -2.75 *** -0.043 -3.09 *** 0.001 0.16 -0.009 -0.68
DR + 0.368 26.30 *** 0.319 8.42 *** 0.333 25.65 *** 0.332 9.93 ***
AGENCY 0.030 12.55 *** 0.058 6.88 *** 0.018 7.65 *** 0.062 8.03 ***
RAGENCY 0.014 4.24 *** 0.004 0.32 -0.007 -2.04 ** -0.010 -0.92
DAGENCY 0.009 2.31 ** 0.027 2.76 *** 0.004 1.12 -0.005 -0.49
DRAGENCY -0.042 -4.60 *** 0.030 1.10 0.011 1.19 0.014 0.58
MB -0.020 -5.14 *** -0.024 -2.13 ** -0.030 -7.93 *** -0.019 -1.87 *
DMB 0.003 0.55 0.007 0.43 0.007 1.25 0.003 0.17
RMB + -0.015 -2.96 0.000 -0.02 -0.023 -4.62 0.003 0.27
DRMB +/- -0.203 -14.37 *** -0.130 -3.64 *** -0.176 -13.26 *** -0.202 -6.62 ***
LEV 0.002 0.60 0.021 1.99 ** -0.003 -0.79 0.012 1.17
DLEV 0.010 1.74 * 0.005 0.32 0.008 1.53 0.011 0.75
RLEV - 0.038 8.00 0.062 4.82 0.032 6.60 0.045 3.62
DRLEV + -0.013 -0.97 -0.065 -1.89 0.000 -0.04 -0.010 -0.32
SIZE 0.056 15.18 *** 0.080 6.50 *** 0.053 14.63 *** 0.101 8.65 ***
DSIZE 0.021 3.69 *** 0.016 0.82 0.015 2.63 *** -0.002 -0.09
RSIZE + 0.019 3.57 *** -0.001 -0.08 0.016 3.11 *** -0.011 -0.71
DRSIZE - -0.186 -12.79 *** -0.168 -3.62 *** -0.198 -13.87 *** -0.207 -4.78 ***
Adj. R square 15.44% 13.58% 13.82% 13.76%




Median cutoff Quartile cutoff Median cutoff Quartile cutoff
 
*Notes  
1. This table reports the pooled OLS regression of testing the relationship between each of concurrent and lead AGENCY variable and concurrent conditional 
conservatism.  
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, two tailed.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items (Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
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Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and less than the median (or lower quartile) growth 
relative to industry at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets (Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  




















Table 12 Tests of the Main Effects of FREECASH on Conservatism across FREECASH/GROWTH groups  
NIt= α0+α1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+α4FREECASHt-1+α5DtFREECASHt-1+α6RtFREECASHt-1+α7DtRtFREECASHt-1+α8 MBt-1 
           + α9 DtMBt-1+α10Rt MBt-1+ α11DtRt MBt-1 + α12LEVt-1+ α13 DtLEVt-1+α14 RtLEVt-1+ α15 DtRtLEVt-1 
          + α16SIZEt-1 + α17 DtSIZEt-1+α18 RtSIZEt-1+ α19 DtRtSIZEt-1  
 
Panel A : Using FCF  
Predicted
Variable sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept -0.028 -2.36 ** -0.062 -5.23 *** 0.065 8.40 *** 0.046 5.95 *** -0.040 -3.91 *** -0.050 -3.53 *** 0.066 9.88 *** 0.045 4.93 ***
D -0.022 -1.18 -0.044 -2.32 ** -0.026 -1.97 ** 0.002 0.14 -0.008 -0.53 -0.071 -3.26 *** -0.021 -1.90 * -0.002 -0.16
R + 0.041 2.44 ** -0.009 -0.67 0.045 3.78 *** 0.008 0.78 0.024 1.73 * -0.011 -0.67 0.027 2.71 *** 0.008 0.69
DR + 0.295 6.76 *** 0.291 7.32 *** 0.168 4.78 *** 0.344 10.39 *** 0.285 7.47 *** 0.300 6.62 *** 0.235 7.83 *** 0.301 7.68 ***
FREECASH 0.070 2.77 *** 0.089 3.32 *** -0.007 -0.63 -0.019 -1.65 * 0.044 1.92 * 0.124 4.06 *** -0.003 -0.30 -0.026 -1.89 *
DFREECASH -0.016 -0.39 0.078 1.84 * 0.008 0.45 -0.051 -2.61 *** 0.044 1.21 0.003 0.07 -0.009 -0.58 -0.030 -1.27
RFREECASH - 0.041 1.17 0.066 2.14 -0.028 -1.72 * -0.025 -1.84 * 0.102 3.34 *** -0.001 -0.02 -0.023 -1.66 * -0.023 -1.44
DRFREECASH + -0.121 -1.28 0.023 0.25 0.206 4.57 *** -0.019 -0.41 -0.123 -1.42 0.024 0.24 0.143 3.54 *** 0.043 0.79
MB 0.008 0.54 -0.024 -1.67 * -0.013 -1.40 -0.010 -1.09 -0.009 -0.67 -0.025 -1.54 -0.013 -1.56 -0.014 -1.23
DMB -0.029 -1.30 -0.011 -0.50 0.006 0.36 -0.041 -2.58 *** -0.028 -1.40 0.003 0.12 -0.007 -0.50 -0.039 -2.09 **
RMB - -0.032 -1.67 * -0.044 -2.68 *** 0.000 0.02 -0.037 -3.03 *** -0.022 -1.35 -0.058 -3.11 *** -0.026 -1.99 ** -0.022 -1.59
DRMB +/- -0.178 -3.63 *** -0.187 -4.07 *** -0.079 -1.96 * -0.225 -5.78 *** -0.193 -4.34 *** -0.155 -3.07 *** -0.111 -3.17 *** -0.191 -4.28 ***
LEV -0.002 -0.14 0.021 1.57 -0.014 -1.66 * 0.003 0.38 0.009 0.78 0.021 1.44 -0.013 -1.74 * 0.002 0.16
DLEV -0.006 -0.27 0.010 0.45 0.014 0.95 -0.026 -1.79 * -0.012 -0.67 0.019 0.81 0.009 0.73 -0.010 -0.58
RLEV - -0.021 -1.18 -0.002 -0.14 -0.011 -0.84 0.032 2.88 *** -0.017 -1.09 0.019 1.12 0.024 2.05 ** 0.023 1.85 *
DRLEV + 0.066 1.36 0.122 2.76 *** 0.141 3.57 *** -0.030 -0.81 0.097 2.27 ** 0.064 1.30 0.064 1.91 * 0.017 0.42
SIZE 0.071 5.14 *** 0.099 6.57 *** 0.021 1.70 * 0.035 2.59 *** 0.095 7.60 *** 0.074 4.24 *** 0.017 1.55 0.046 2.77 ***
DSIZE 0.059 2.69 *** 0.042 1.75 * 0.014 0.65 0.098 4.12 *** 0.033 1.66 * 0.078 2.88 *** 0.034 1.83 * 0.074 2.63 ***
RSIZE + 0.006 0.30 0.010 0.51 0.017 0.83 0.042 2.33 ** -0.013 -0.74 0.032 1.51 0.021 1.23 0.030 1.42
DRSIZE - -0.232 -4.29 *** -0.134 -2.48 ** -0.432 -7.67 *** -0.121 -2.05 ** -0.173 -3.49 *** -0.179 -2.99 *** -0.351 -6.99 *** -0.191 -2.81 ***
Adj. R sqaure 16.38% 16.17% 15.36% 13.69% 16.27% 0.154 15.61% 13.53%
N 8,183   6,442   7,339   8,447   6,932   7,467   8,453   7,291  
HCLG HCHG
FREECASH=FCF GROWTH=Q FREECASH=FCF GROWTH=Sales Growth








Panel B: Using EXCASH 
Predicted
Variable sign coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.075 9.85 *** 0.017 1.10 0.043 6.38 *** -0.042 -3.01 *** 0.066 11.86 *** 0.038 6.18 *** 0.065 8.63 *** 0.029 2.77 ***
D -0.045 -3.81 *** -0.010 -0.38 -0.017 -1.56 -0.026 -1.13 -0.031 -3.53 *** -0.024 -2.52 ** -0.043 -3.41 *** -0.008 -0.48
R + 0.027 2.27 ** 0.024 0.92 0.015 1.74 ** 0.014 0.80 0.016 1.94 * 0.017 2.11 ** 0.019 1.68 * 0.020 1.47
DR + 0.317 10.61 *** 0.596 9.10 *** 0.357 13.73 *** 0.306 5.97 *** 0.343 15.52 *** 0.377 16.93 *** 0.227 6.67 *** 0.273 6.19 ***
FREECASH -0.045 -2.36 ** 0.054 3.85 *** -0.017 -1.00 0.080 5.85 *** 0.002 0.44 0.006 1.15 -0.002 -0.32 0.017 1.80 *
DFREECASH -0.011 -0.38 -0.002 -0.10 -0.013 -0.48 -0.002 -0.10 0.000 -0.03 -0.010 -1.22 0.033 2.92 *** 0.005 0.30
RFREECASH - -0.030 -1.08 -0.008 -0.32 0.012 0.51 -0.028 -1.60 -0.020 -2.80 *** -0.025 -3.70 *** 0.011 1.17 -0.020 -1.69 *
DRFREECASH + 0.286 3.92 *** -0.226 -3.70 0.296 4.46 *** 0.047 0.92 0.011 0.60 0.029 1.58 * 0.047 1.57 * 0.066 1.73 *
MB -0.024 -2.72 *** -0.031 -4.74 *** -0.019 -2.58 *** -0.066 -9.64 *** -0.037 -6.42 *** -0.040 -6.59 *** -0.013 -1.53 -0.010 -0.89
DMB -0.009 -0.68 -0.024 -2.40 ** -0.002 -0.18 -0.006 -0.56 -0.005 -0.57 -0.009 -0.99 -0.007 -0.52 -0.036 -1.96 **
RMB - -0.004 -0.34 -0.028 -2.66 *** -0.019 -1.96 ** -0.025 -2.92 *** -0.016 -1.93 * -0.033 -4.18 *** -0.025 -1.91 ** -0.017 -1.26
DRMB +/- -0.224 -7.15 *** -0.188 -7.35 *** -0.175 -6.41 *** -0.232 -9.38 *** -0.209 -9.71 *** -0.239 -11.39 *** -0.124 -3.51 *** -0.206 -4.66 ***
LEV -0.037 -4.15 *** -0.013 -2.12 ** -0.007 -0.90 0.011 1.74 * -0.022 -3.86 *** -0.006 -1.06 -0.013 -1.64 0.008 0.75
DLEV 0.005 0.34 -0.005 -0.52 -0.020 -1.69 * 0.000 0.02 -0.003 -0.36 -0.005 -0.55 0.023 1.75 * -0.011 -0.63
RLEV - 0.001 0.11 -0.017 -1.70 ** 0.021 2.17 ** 0.023 2.78 *** 0.004 0.48 0.028 3.73 *** 0.026 2.16 ** 0.012 0.91
DRLEV + 0.033 0.96 0.042 1.65 * -0.019 -0.71 0.039 1.62 0.050 2.27 ** -0.008 -0.37 0.094 2.68 *** 0.044 1.00
SIZE 0.061 5.71 *** 0.048 6.20 *** 0.051 5.72 *** 0.123 15.34 *** 0.053 9.61 *** 0.078 12.76 *** 0.015 2.00 ** 0.020 1.92 *
DSIZE 0.075 4.48 *** 0.034 2.81 *** 0.034 2.44 ** 0.029 2.26 ** 0.046 5.26 *** 0.039 4.10 *** 0.022 1.73 * 0.047 2.66 ***
RSIZE + 0.024 1.45 0.052 4.15 *** -0.009 -0.77 0.020 1.81 * 0.035 3.94 *** 0.014 1.66 * -0.002 -0.15 0.009 0.64
DRSIZE - -0.280 -6.49 *** -0.359 -11.53 *** -0.259 -7.42 *** -0.132 -4.44 *** -0.205 -8.90 *** -0.157 -6.85 *** -0.223 -6.34 *** -0.142 -3.20 ***
Adj. R sqaure 16.15% 15.63% 15.26% 14.25% 14.96% 16.28% 15.76% 11.86%
N 23,510 18,196 18,397 25,318 20,713 20,644 20,281 22,415 
LCLG LCHG HCLG HCHG LCLG LCHG
FREECASH=EXCASH GROWTH=Q FREECASH=EXCASH GROWTH=Sales Growth
HCLG HCHG
*Notes  
1. This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression of testing the effect of FREECASH on subsequent conditional conservatism across four 
FREECASH/GROWTH groups. 
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, two tailed.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
NIt  is income before extraordinary items(Data18) at  the end of year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
Rt  is the buy-and-hold returns, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t-1 and ending 4 months after the end of year t. 
Dt is an indicator variable set equal to one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
SIZEt-1 is the scaled decile rank of natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
FREECASHt-1 is the scaled decile rank of FCF from Richardson (2006), or EXCASH from Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
GROWTHt-1 is the scaled decile rank of Industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q or Industry-adjusted sales growth at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
Tobin‟s Q is the sum of market value of equity(Data199*Data 25) and book value of debt(Data 34+ Data 9 ) scaled by total assets(Data 6). 
Industry-adjusted Tobin‟s Q is calculated as Tobin‟s Q minus the median Tobin‟s Q in the industry, where industry is defined by Fama and French‟ s (1997) 48 industry 
classifications. 
Sales growth is the percentage of annual sales growth rate calculated as Salest+1/Salest.  
Industry-adjusted sales growth rate is calculated as the 2-year geometric average of the annual percentage growth in net sales minus the median average 2-year sales 
growth in the industry. 
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Table 13 Conservatism of Persistent J-type firms and Temporary J-type firms 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Persistent J-type firms and Temporary J-type firms 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
CASH/Total Assets 0.122 0.058 0.093 0.049 <.0001 0.001 0.181 0.134 0.145 0.091 <.0001 <.0001
FCF/Total Assets 0.041 0.036 0.040 0.035 0.8695 0.3745 -0.011 0.001 -0.018 -0.006 0.1731 0.0114
EXCASH/Total Assets 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.3401 0.0012 0.022 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.2636 <.0001
Tobin's Q 1.342 1.213 1.242 1.136 <.0001 <.0001 1.286 1.173 1.134 1.055 <.0001 <.0001
Ind. Adj. Q -0.165 -0.156 -0.212 -0.156 0.0001 0.0651 -0.142 -0.116 -0.217 -0.170 <.0001 <.0001
Sales growth 0.119 0.071 0.098 0.072 0.1498 0.7224 0.145 0.089 0.101 0.070 <.0001 <.0001
Ind. Median Sales growth 0.209 0.201 0.216 0.219 0.2175 0.0019 0.220 0.220 0.210 0.209 0.0047 0.0021
Ind. Adj Sales growth -0.116 -0.151 -0.135 -0.152 0.2227 0.8183 -0.099 -0.137 -0.127 -0.152 0.0067 0.0337
MB 1.934 1.499 1.703 1.365 0.0008 <.0001 1.976 1.494 1.473 1.211 <.0001 <.0001
SIZE(Log MVE) 4.478 4.415 4.780 4.621 <.0001 0.0002 3.669 3.486 4.767 4.635 <.0001 <.0001
LEV (DIST_D) 0.234 0.213 0.261 0.255 0.0002 <.0001 0.210 0.182 0.246 0.239 <.0001 <.0001
RET 0.081 -0.021 0.182 0.102 <.0001 <.0001 0.067 -0.036 0.137 0.065 <.0001 <.0001
NI ($ MM) 0.031 0.054 0.067 0.079 <.0001 <.0001 0.036 0.060 0.053 0.079 0.2594 <.0001
Total Assets ($ MM) 651.177 119.231 1059.659 185.135 <.0001 <.0001 248.051 45.516 1086.073 201.696 <.0001 <.0001
Sales ($ MM) 657.154 147.337 1162.904 251.072 <.0001 <.0001 260.935 55.377 1161.753 249.632 <.0001 <.0001
R&D/Total Assets 0.038 0.002 0.030 0.005 0.0017 0.9062 0.035 0.003 0.028 0.003 <.0001 0.0562
CAPEX/Total Assets 0.060 0.039 0.065 0.049 0.0745 <.0001 0.066 0.045 0.064 0.048 0.2236 0.0102
DIV/EARN 0.219 0.000 0.387 0.001 0.3294 <.0001 0.165 0.000 0.347 0.068 <.0001 <.0001
REPUR/EARN 0.531 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.2052 0.5579 0.431 0.000 0.411 0.000 0.8675 0.5269
Inv G Score -9.000 -9.000 -9.518 -10.000 0.1528 0.1281 -8.549 -9.000 -9.779 -10.000 0.0007 0.0015
Inv E Index -2.452 -3.000 -2.580 -3.000 0.3823 0.3324 -2.191 -2.000 -2.649 -3.000 0.0013 0.0026
Temporary J-type (N=3312)Persistent J-type(N=5471) Tests of Differences
EXCASH*Q*Median CutoffFCF*Q*Median Cutoff
Temporary J-type (N=1701) Persistent J-type (N=10166) Tests of Differences
 








Panel B: Persistent Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and Conservatism Using Basu’s 
Reverse Regression  
NIt =α0 + α 1Dt+ α2Rt+ α3DtRt+ α4AGENCYt-1+ α5DtAGENCYt-1 
+ α6RtAGENCYt-1+ α7DtRtAGENCYt-1+ α8PERSJt-1 + α9 Dt PERSJt-1  
+ α10 Rt PERSJt-1  + α11 Dt Rt PERSJt-1  +  α12AGENCYt-1 PERSJt-1  
+ α13 Dt AGENCYt-1 PERSJt-1 + α14 Rt AGENCYt-1 PERSJt-1  
+ α15 Dt Rt AGENCYt-1 PERSJt-1 +Control + ε 
  
Predicted
Variable sign coef t-stat coef t-stat
Intercept 0.033 7.32 *** 0.059 15.05 ***
D -0.018 -2.44 ** -0.016 -2.43 **
R - -0.010 -1.60 ** 0.009 1.61 **
DR + 0.357 20.39 *** 0.365 23.25 ***
AGENCY 0.018 6.18 *** 0.002 0.67
DAGENCY 0.007 1.35 0.002 0.41
RAGENCY - 0.015 3.60 *** -0.017 -4.53 ***
DRAGENCY + 0.033 2.69 *** 0.029 2.67 ***
PERSJ -0.007 -0.28 -0.048 -2.34 **
DPERSJ 0.008 0.18 0.036 1.08
RPERSJ 0.035 0.75 0.042 1.11
DRPERSJ -0.082 -0.71 -0.078 -0.86
AGENCYPERSJ 0.008 1.31 0.047 2.27 **
DAGENCYPERSJ -0.011 -0.25 -0.041 -1.19
RAGENCYPERSJ - -0.023 1.05 -0.023 -0.59
DRAGENCYPERSJ+ 0.023 1.69 ** 0.122 1.81 **
MB -0.023 -4.89 *** -0.041 -9.57 ***
DMB -0.006 -0.77 -0.008 -1.12
RMB - -0.032 -4.98 *** -0.026 -4.61 ***
DRMB +/- -0.135 -7.35 *** -0.183 -11.46 ***
LEV -0.004 -1.01 -0.014 -3.48 ***
DLEV 0.015 2.05 ** 0.012 1.83 *
RLEV - 0.030 5.05 *** 0.025 4.63 ***
DRLEV + 0.012 0.68 0.018 1.15
SIZE 0.056 12.52 *** 0.059 14.21 ***
DSIZE 0.010 1.39 0.014 1.99 **
RSIZE + 0.024 3.63 *** 0.023 3.76 ***
DRSIZE - -0.257 -13.87 *** -0.259 -14.95 ***
Adj. R sqaure 15.92% 15.52%








1. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of persistent J-type firms (firms that maintain J-type firm status for each of 
the prior 3 years, t-3, t-2, and t-1) and transitory J-type firms (firms that maintain J-type firm status only at t-1), while 
Panel B reports the pooled OLS regression results of testing whether the subsequent demand for conservatism is 
different between persistent J-type firms and transitory J-type firms. 
2. This table reports the coefficient estimates with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence. Firm and time fixed effects are included. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively, two tailed.  
4. Variable descriptions:  
AGENCYt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for firm-years with more than the median (or upper quartile) free cash and 
less than the median (or lower quartile) growth. 
PERSJt-1 is a dummy that is set to 1(0) for persistent J-type firms (transitory J-type firms) where persistent J-type firms 
are defined as firms having been identified as having high FREECASH/low GROWTH for the past 3 years (t-3, t-2, 
and t-1), while transitory J-type firms are those having high FREECASH/low GROWTH condition for the year t-1 only. 
MBt-1 is the scaled decile rank of the Market to Book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
LEVt-1 is the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets(Data 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  
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